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CONTEMPORARY CHINA AS A PROBLEM FOR POLITICAL SCIENCE*

By A. M. HALPERN

I. Purpose

THIS article attempts to set forth, in as nearly comprehensive and organized a manner as possible, a range of problems referring to the political development of Communist China whose investigation would not only advance our understanding of contemporary Chinese politics but would also produce results of value for the general study of politics. Our focus is particularly, but not exclusively, on events since the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949. Our procedure is to move from the general to the specific: that is, to inquire, first, what are the most general classes of political phenomena with which the Chinese political system has affinities; second, what are the most general developmental trends which can be observed in the Chinese revolution; and third, what are the particular aspects of the dynamics of the Chinese political system which offer rewarding opportunities for research.

In this presentation, we wish to put special emphasis on problems which are in fact researchable. In our conclusion we will deal briefly with the question of researchability—the extent and limits of data, the applicability of various research techniques, and the like. Ideally, this discussion should be accompanied by an evaluation of the state of the art. There is hardly any aspect of Chinese politics that has not been studied where such study is feasible. The consensus of men active in the field is that there is no aspect of Chinese politics that does not badly need further study. In general, I think it is reasonable to say that there has been produced so far the first generation of books on contemporary China, consisting of those that are broadly descriptive in rather an empirical way; in addition, a number of approaches have been made to theoretically guided or controlled special studies of particular facets

* This paper was drafted in its present form on the basis of discussions held by an informal group concerned with politics under the auspices of the Joint Committee on Contemporary China. Members of the group, besides the present author, are John M. H. Lindbeck, Lucian W. Pye, George E. Taylor, and Tang Tsou. Harold D. Lasswell generously contributed to the group's discussions, and the section on "Dynamics of the System" in the present draft depends largely on suggestions made by him. Responsibility for the contents of the draft, however, rests solely with A. M. Halpern.

The paper was originally prepared for presentation at the meeting of the American Political Science Association in Washington, D.C., September 5-8, 1962.

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of Chinese politics. The indicated present need is for many more intensive monographic studies of the latter type, upon whose completion the second generation of books, which will contain the really significant contributions to political science, will become possible.

There is no need to insist on the practical value of understanding Chinese communism. We take it for granted that this value is amply understood; if there is a caution to be offered in this respect, it is that perhaps more need exists to avoid overestimating China's real-world importance than underestimating it. The practical value of Chinese studies serves in itself as a justification for research, and almost all writing on the subject reflects awareness of this factor, even though the student's original motive may not be to make a contribution to policy. But for political theory, size and actual or potential power do not alter the fact that China is but a single case. Our attention will be directed to the characteristics of this single case which are of interest for theory or for comparative studies.

II. The Chinese Revolution: Historical Perspective

We note, to begin with, that the Communist revolution in China will very probably turn out to be one of the great historic revolutions of man's post-Neolithic history. Apart from the number of people directly affected, the changes already brought about or envisaged in institutional structure, basic values, the nature and distribution of power, and the forms of political participation are extensive enough to justify the statement that a more drastic change in political type is taking place in China than has occurred in any human society for several centuries. The leaders of this revolution represent it as having the character of historical inevitability and as foreshadowing a number of comparable developments elsewhere in the world, especially in the underdeveloped countries. For scientific purposes, the analysis of the pre-existing situation and of the revolutionary strategies and tactics employed is still insufficient to render a judgment concerning the predictive value of the Chinese case for other Oriental or African societies. As more historical evidence becomes available, the possibility of further study of this question improves.

Chinese Communist politics, both before and after achieving power, has been and continues to be a *politics of transformation*. Conflicting views are held as to how radical the break with the Chinese past has been, or as to how far it can go before encountering a cultural inertia that is too great for political techniques to overcome. In the judgment of some scholars, the break is or is intended to be absolute, leading to

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nothing less than the dissolution of one and the re-creation of another political community. In this view, there is being inculcated in the Chinese public a wholly new system of beliefs, if not indeed of new modes of political perception.[1] Others see in the Chinese revolution a persistence of social, economic, and political problems which were already present in the prerevolutionary period, with a change in the methods by which these problems are attacked, but not necessarily in the nature of the solutions aimed at. In this view, the Chinese revolution tends to fall into a historical pattern of movement from *integration to disintegration to reintegration*, with perhaps a rather considerable persistence of "Chineseness" in the style of political behavior. We do not yet have intensive studies of particular facets of Chinese politics in which the interplay of the transformative drive with traditional values and behavior patterns is analyzed so as to put the question in a scientifically testable form.

The Chinese revolution is totalitarian in two senses—in the sense of a drive toward the monopoly of power by a single institution, and in the sense of the progressive politicization of areas of social life not previously under the proximate control of political authority. In the first sense, the revolution may be seen as falling into a historical pattern of movement from *monolithism to pluralism to monolithism*, and it can be argued that this movement is perhaps responsive to a profound Chinese cultural preference. In the second sense, Chinese developments are subject to comparison with other cases of development from *traditional to modern* social forms, whether the latter cases are comparably totalitarian or not.

Although we imply here that ideology and the political process can be separated for some analytical purposes, we by no means ignore the function of ideology in determining political choices. In view of the special social and cultural milieu from which Communist China has emerged, it is to be anticipated that China will provide an especially interesting case of the diffusion and restriction of revolutionary symbols. This expectation is perhaps confirmed by Chinese claims to be at the same time the defenders of Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy and to have produced significant innovations and adaptations in the practice of Marxist-Leninist revolution and in socialist construction. It appears that these developments have had special characteristics in China, owing to the nature of the pre-Communist power situation and value system. These

[1] In a personal communication, Professor Tsou has suggested, for example, that in the Chinese Communist case, "It is not very fruitful to try to understand politics or 'political culture' as a function of the general culture or a mere subsystem of the culture. Instead, one must see the general culture as a function of politics."

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characteristics have been, if anything, obscured by the employment of symbols—"proletariat" and "bourgeoisie," for example—identical with those used in other Communist revolutions. It is, for instance, obvious that the so-called destruction of feudalism has not meant the same thing in detail in China that it did in Russia. It is not to be taken for granted that the process is as yet completed or that when completed it will result in a political structure only insignificantly different from that of other totalitarian systems. Given the pretensions of communism to the status of a universal secular religion, it remains to be seen whether the deviations from the theoretical norm will or will not be within the doctrinal limits of toleration.

The simple approach to a statement of the meaning of China for political theory is to list those characteristics of the Chinese revolution which establish its membership in one or another class of political phenomena. China is a case of totalitarianism, a case of consciously managed and directed political and social change, a case of political disorganization and reintegration, a case of forced economic development, a case of transformation from an agricultural to an industrial society, and the like. Its value to political theory would depend in each of these instances on whether it offers an especially attractive field for the testing of hypotheses regarding the political process under each of these conditions. If we look at the matter in the opposite order, there can be no question of the value of political science for the study of China. Whatever the defects of material and the problems of studying a closed society, any increase in the analytical sophistication applied to the study of Chinese politics is not only welcome but potentially productive of a multiplier effect.

In both the short and the long run, a much more refined understanding than we now possess of Communist China as a political organization is essential to the useful understanding of the world-wide distribution of influence. Despite her own pretensions and the overeager acceptance of them in many new and some old nations, China is not a major world power. It is not even to be taken for granted that she will become one in the next decade. But China does not need to achieve the actuality of great-power status in order to have a significant impact on world influence patterns. Two obvious facts are that the entire mode of functioning of the United Nations Organization and the possibility of arms control depend significantly on China's actions and world response to them. Similarly, even if all one can say with certainty at this point is that China helped precipitate the trend toward polycentrism, it is clear that the mode of functioning of the world Communist

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movement is affected by what the Chinese do, threaten to do, or are believed capable of doing. Besides the direct effects of Chinese actions and demands, their indirect effects on the internal politics and the international solidarity of other countries, especially the uncommitted, are neither wholly unanalyzable nor wholly predictable.

If we look forward to future developments, it appears that China's potential effect on world influence patterns will depend, first, on whether the distribution of power is consolidated in a bipolar pattern or moves towards an increasingly pluralistic one; and, second, in either of these cases, whether the pattern of China's external relations moves toward increased activity in the world community or reverts to a comparatively withdrawn or even parochial status. In terms of China's observable aspirations, a more active international role would be expected. In terms of foreseeable environmental changes, this trend is not altogether to be taken for granted.

III. The Chinese Revolution: Main Social-Political Processes

In an overall view of the restructuring of Chinese society and politics during the last twelve years, one can designate certain major reconstructive processes which provide a comprehensive, though not necessarily definitive, descriptive base. The adequacy of any such formulation depends on how satisfactorily we can describe and analyze the pre-existing structure which serves as the point of departure. While much remains obscure, and any increase in the depth of our knowledge of the republican period would be welcome, many of the political characteristics of pre-Communist China are fairly exactly describable. The reconstructive goals of the Chinese Communists have been stated verbally with considerable exactness, and for some of them concrete models exist in other countries.

We here provide a brief résumé of processes under three heads: transfer of power, transformation of beliefs, and technological development.

Transfer of power has taken place by the elimination or transformation of formerly existing groups of power-holders and the creation of new groups. Broadly speaking, this process has been conducted in three areas—the rural, the urban, and the power elite. The process was carried on with a high degree of consciousness on the part of those directing change and with a continuous review of whether it was going according to expectations. We lack a coherent theory of the present nature of the sources of power and of the distribution of these sources of power among the various newly constructed institutions developed for the purpose of using it. There is very suggestive evidence that resistance

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has taken place at almost all points in this revolutionary process but we have no coherent theory concerning the nature of this resistance.

In the *rural area* the transfer has been from the gentry to the lower and middle peasantry to the organized congregate under state control. Theories exist concerning the sources of power of the gentry in the pre-Communist period. What we lack is an analysis of the methods by which the various sources of power were isolated from one another and either eliminated or transferred to new social segments or institutions. In the *urban area* the transfer of power has been from the commercial classes to the state or to state-controlled institutions with limited autonomy, such as the labor union. It is clear that the structure has been changed from one in which control was highly dispersed and exercised on an individual basis, while at the same time the individual in his own interest formed more or less voluntary alliances both up and down in the social structure, to one in which individuals coordinate their activities through designated channels, under the control of the state, in relation to which they all occupy separate but equivalent status. The *power elite* has in practice become the party leadership. This apparently means two things. First, there is a trend toward the monopoly of power by a single institution. Second, the area of recruitment of the power elite has been expanded while the number and nature of the routes to membership in the power elite have become restricted. The first of these observations may require qualification. The party itself has pursued a declared policy of maintaining a united front. Events of 1957 and again of 1962 have indicated either that the monopoly has not been total, or that it has not been a fully effective instrument for achieving the goals of the regime, or that there are sectors of society, whether remnants or newly emerged, in which the hope has been retained that the monopoly need not necessarily become complete.

The second aspect in the revolutionary process has been the deliberate *transformation of beliefs*. The precise mixture of Chinese Communist ambivalent feelings about the past is hard to define. On the one hand, there is an evident attachment to the concept of China's greatness which now manifests itself in the intensity with which the regime insists on maintenance of the country's territorial integrity, recognition of its world power status, and the like. As in other underdeveloped countries, the national interest is placed above the interests of any lesser components of the nation, and in China perhaps with greater emphasis and consistency than in other underdeveloped countries. It can be plausibly suggested that in fact, and not just in Communist Chinese theory, China and the former colonial countries have reacted in similar ways

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to similar restrictions of national aspirations in the pre-independence period. If the supremacy of the national interest is at present taken more seriously in China than in some underdeveloped countries, this may in part be accounted for by reality factors, i.e., China's superior potentialities for achieving in reality the standing she desires.

On the other hand, there has been throughout the history of the Chinese Communist movement a consistent strain of hostility to the so-called "bourgeois" values which historically constitute the central values of the Chinese tradition. Again one can plausibly suggest that both this hostility and the intensity of the attachment of the Chinese Communist leadership to its countercode are a reflection of decades of political disintegration and consequent impotence. Since taking power, the regime has attempted a redefinition of pre-existing values in many significant areas—the state (collective) vs. the individual, the worker-peasant vs. the bourgeoisie, women and children vs. men, the citizen of China vs. the Chinese, soldier vs. civilian, and many others. It is easy enough to draw up a list enumerating such areas of transformation of morale but this does not in itself provide either an account of the system, an account of the dynamics by which the revolutionary values have been imposed, or an estimate of the extent to which they have been effectively adopted. The transformation of morale has involved the formulation of many new images of the worthy man as against the unworthy. Over time the specifications and emphasis given to such images have varied, presumably in accordance with the variations in the nature of immediate real-world problems.

There may be a significant difference in Russian and Chinese emphases on the characteristics of the rejected tradition which the revolution strives to eliminate or to transform. One feature that appears to be of possible importance in this contrast is that whereas the early Russian revolutionaries believed themselves to have the mission of liberation of all Western civilization (which in the evolutionary sense really meant all of civilization) from the shackles of a capitalism which had outlived its creative period, the Chinese rejection of the bourgeois tradition seems to have been conceived largely in Chinese cultural terms and only incidentally as contributing to the progress of human civilization as a whole. It is not that there is any lack of consciousness on the part of the Chinese Communists of belonging to a world movement. But the stated goals of the Chinese revolutionary process seem to be formulated in terms of immediately preceding Chinese history and of the transformation of specifically twentieth-century Chinese political and social relationships.

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For a certain period of time after the take-over of power, the works of Mao Tse-tung impressed many Asian progressives as offering an effective critique of the social injustices in their own national culture or in Asian culture as a whole. In a twelve-year perspective, however, the Chinese version of the significance of their revolution for others is remarkably lacking in emphasis on moral and cultural values capable of being generalized. There has been a revival and transvaluation of traditional Chinese arts, but no great upsurge of aesthetic or philosophical creativity comparable to what the Russians thought they were achieving in the 1920's and 1930's. The emphasis has been on the improvement of the standard of living and on the tactics of attack and alliance which lead to the destruction of existing political power. Seen from the outside, then, the Chinese revolutionary model impresses one as devoid of human warmth and as extraordinarily preoccupied with the techniques of political-economic action.

There is probably no existing political community more completely committed than Communist China to *technological development* as a social and political goal. From this commitment derive several characteristic features of the political system. It is this that determines, to the exclusion of other, traditional values, the relative priorities assigned to the needs of the rural and urban populations. Demands made on the population for the acquisition and employment of skills and for participation in new organizations acquire a deeply political character. The nature of aspirations must be seriously modified, and new patterns of loyalty must be developed. From the individual's standpoint, the sacrifices demanded and the rewards offered by society are structurally and qualitatively new and must result in a new concept of society.

At the same time, success in achieving announced economic goals becomes a major measure of the political validity of the system in the eyes of all participants. The regime's claim on the basic confidence of the masses becomes unusually closely linked to its prospects of performance in this one area. So long as belief is maintained in the regime's determination and probable ability to succeed, mass cooperation appears to be obtainable even at the cost of substantial personal sacrifice. But to the extent that such belief is compromised, disaffection, apathy, or resistance in various forms may take place, and the legitimacy of the regime in all areas of political action may come into question.

IV. Dynamics of the System

In this section we present briefly a series of problems or problem areas in which research can be done. These are grouped under a set of

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rubrics designed to be in principle comprehensive and applicable both to the entirety of the Chinese Communist political system and to distinguishable subsystems within the total system. With reference both to the total system and to subsystems, we should take note here that, within the brief history of the present mainland regime, there have been several important changes of phase corresponding to estimates on the part of the leadership regarding the attainment of stated goals of social-political transformation. The student of Chinese politics thus finds himself of necessity analyzing trends through time and dynamic processes. To every statement of a research problem below should be appended the phrase: "and to determine how this has varied through time."

Six major rubrics are used: participation, perspectives, organization, control, strategies, and outcomes. It is suggested here that these rubrics provide the basis for a comprehensive political analysis: that is, that we would in principle have a complete analysis of the Chinese Communist political system if we could accurately determine who participates, with what perspectives, through what organizational forms, exercising what extent of control, in accordance with what strategies, and with what outcomes (how effectively). Under each rubric below, we attempt to designate research problems in terms of observable features which appear to be specific to the Chinese political system. Each such problem should be capable of study and worthwhile in itself. The whole framework supplies a way of relating individual studies to one another. The same, or a not very different, set of rubrics should be applicable to other political systems, so that the whole framework can help locate problems for comparative study.

(1) *Participation.* The Chinese Communists think of participation in politics ideally as almost universal, subject only to the exclusion of those who are regarded as not admissible to the ranks of the "people." Theoretically, then, political action is expected of members of non-Han minority groups and of the Overseas Chinese. This attempted universalization of political participation throughout the area to which the regime's authority extends, coupled with the provision of organizational forms within which such participation can take place, is in fact a feature of the contrast between the present and preceding Chinese regimes.

Within this ideal pattern of universal political participation, there are categories of people who occupy roles which are characteristically and consistently, not temporarily or secondarily, the roles of political actors. Formally defined roles are, for example, those of members of the

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Communist Party, the so-called "cadres" (Kanpu), government officials, and the responsible representatives of minor parties or semiofficial organizations. There is some evidence of significant participation by actors outside the formal role-system.

The indicated research problem is the determination of what the actor roles are, who occupies them, and what kinds and degrees of influence the actors have over what resources.

(2) *Perspectives.* The discussion above of Chinese Communist ambivalence about the Chinese past would lead one to expect that the Chinese have a problem of self-identification. This expectation can be validated by reference to empirical data. The potential extremes are total identification with the Communist bloc and denial of any other identity, or total identification as an autonomous national Communist country and denial of other identity. Within this range there is the possibility of identification as a sector of an Asian Communist movement. In practice, there has been no exclusive option for any of these possibilities, but an oscillation between the extremes. The indicated research problem is the analysis of this oscillation and of the interplay between this and various constellations of policy choice.

There appears also to be a more or less regular opposition in the post-revolutionary process of government between "radical" (or "ideological") and "pragmatic" perspectives. In some cases the comparative desirability of given alternatives is so discrepant that in practice the choice is predetermined. In other cases, at times involving fundamental problems of state policy, the choice is not so clear. As evidence that such choice situations have been characteristic of the development of Communist China, there has been one open deviation, that of Kao Kang, which resulted in the elimination of the deviating faction, and rather frequently repeated strictures in the official Chinese press concerning both rightist and leftist trends in disagreement with the official line.

Especially in the absence of real information about policy differences, the major avenue of approach for the analysis of such differences has to be the study of Chinese ideological writings. These, one can assume, are not merely philosophical exercises but the reflection of competing preferences with regard to the course of practical political action. Ideological writings help locate the axes of political conflict—within the party, between the party and the state apparatus, between the regime and the remnant bourgeoisie, and so on—at given points in time. One can at least hope that these writings embody one (possibly more than one) detailed code of behavior which tacitly or openly conditions the

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policy choices of the Chinese leadership and thus has consequences in the real world.

The indicated research problem is the analysis of variations in the relative dominance of "radical" vs. "pragmatic" perspectives and of optimistic vs. pessimistic expectations as contained in authoritative communications and the relation of these to images of the desired outcomes of alternative recommended policies.

(3) *Organization.* In the sense of the description of institutions, research on contemporary China is possibly further advanced in regard to this category than is the case for any of the other categories used here. In respect to the mode of functioning of these institutions, there is a need for much more analysis.

To begin with, it appears probable that the concrete models for Communist Chinese organizations are to be found in Soviet Russian practice or in the experience of the Chinese Communist Party prior to the achievement of power rather than in Chinese institutions of the republican period. There is thus the possibility of discrepancy between the two sources of guidance in organizational matters, as well as possible modification or innovation in response to emergent problems, environmental changes, and resultant redefinitions of political goals.

Second, there has been an observable oscillation, not yet well analyzed, between decentralized and centralized forms of organization. Furthermore, at either pole of this oscillation, there are varying degrees of concentration or deconcentration, so that organizational functions are sometimes exercised by parallel forms, such as the party and the state, and sometimes concentrated in one form which dominates the other. This suggests that a key observation concerning organization in Communist China may be that it is not yet routinized, and that research might be directed at the factors favoring or inhibiting routinization. Among organizational subsystems, the army, in view of its pre-revolutionary role and of the impact on it of strategic demands arising from the expansion of China's post-revolutionary horizons, may be a particularly interesting focus of study. In addition, interesting comparative implications will emerge as the political role of the military in underdeveloped countries is further analyzed.

(4) *Control.* In an earlier section we have treated the transfer of power as one of the major characteristics of the Chinese revolutionary process and have stressed the drive toward monopoly of power by the party leadership. We here suggest that the process involved continues to be a dynamic one. United-front policy continues in the post-revolutionary period to preoccupy China's Communist leadership. While the

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tolerance of pluralism to the point of permitting independent power centers is contrary to Communist doctrine and practice, the bargaining potential of non-Communist elements in China, especially of the so-called intellectuals, is apparently greater than zero. This appears to be an important, though obscure, aspect of the power structure.

(5) *Strategies.* Under this heading we consider the degree to which participants have an effective impact in terms of control over power or other values, and we find it necessary to refer back to points raised in earlier paragraphs of this section.

The factors that determine policy choices in China clearly go beyond real-world practicality. They seem to involve varying predispositions on the part of elements within the leadership concerning the relative importance of moral and material factors, the choice of practical revolutionary tasks, and the relative effectiveness of coercive or persuasive methods of operation. A possible approach in this area would be through increased study of decision-making personnel. In actuality this study has so far produced very little of direct relevance. It is possible that the preferred method of study, which emphasizes social characteristics, has been inappropriate to the real problems. The real problems may lie in the personality and life experiences of particular individuals and in the pattern of their interpersonal relationships as this pattern has developed over a period of time equal to that of the normal adult span of life. But this is exactly an area where concealment or distortion of the facts is a serious obstacle. However much we may doubt the façade of unanimity the Chinese regime presents to the world, we have no reliable way of knowing what power conflicts take place within the regime. As far as the outside world is concerned, China's leaders are supposed to have public, but no private, lives and personalities. In view of the depth and the length of the commitment of leadership figures to the party, we must even take into account the possibility that they are in a very real sense public men, and that their private selves are in fact only partial reflections of their public selves. The interplay of private and public motives in the selection of strategies may have in China an almost unique dynamic.

This may also be a good place to mention China's relations with the Communist bloc. The selection of strategies within China is clearly a matter of concern to the whole Communist movement and a matter on which the Communist movement has ways of exerting influence. At the same time, the determination of strategy in relation to the world Communist movement is a major area of Chinese policy. In this area,

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we are close to the point of having productive competing theories, and clearly a continuation of studies on an expanded scale is indicated.

(6) *Outcomes.* Under this head we consider studies oriented toward estimating the stability of the regime's authority and its effectiveness both within its territory and vis-à-vis other countries. We can anticipate real difficulties here. Especially in regard to internal politics, lack of access for direct observation is an obvious difficulty. A somewhat less obvious difficulty is that of establishing measures of success or failure. In a politics of self-conscious transformation, the goals are repeatedly stated and, since such statements are intended as action guides for participants, they may also legitimately be taken as criteria of performance. But there remains the problem of determining how many proximate successes equal ultimate stability, or how many proximate failures result in nonviability. We have suggested above that overall economic performance is a key measure, since failure may lead to a loss of legitimacy.

In foreign relations, access to observation is less of a problem, since access to countries which are important targets of China's foreign policy is possible and the impact of her activities can be more or less accurately measured through the responses of the target countries. China's external politics, like her internal politics, is directed toward transformative goals. The criteria of performance are not too different from what one would apply to other countries. The research possibilities are many.

V. The Problem of Researchability

It is well known that China does not offer an opportunity for the application of many of the field techniques that have become characteristic of political research in the last decade or two. It is not so well known that the documentary material produced by the Chinese is voluminous, and that a very large part of it is available in adequate English translation. In connection with many problems, the bulk and the refinement of the documents make it possible to arrive at more precise descriptive formulations than one can do in the relatively inarticulate underdeveloped countries. Major defects in the Chinese data are underreporting of facts, systematic suppression through censorship, and slanting for propaganda purposes. More or less accurate discounting is sometimes possible. The regime's need to communicate sometimes compensates for its need to conceal.

Inability to use controlled field techniques means that one major method of confirming an hypothesis is inapplicable. But this does not

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mean that there are no methods of confirming at all. The kind of data the Chinese sources provide means that there are essentially three approaches.

Intuition is in practice the most widely used. The researcher absorbs a great deal of available data, comes to a tentative conclusion, and applies to this conclusion the tests of internal consistency and of consistency with bodies of more or less known fact that were not employed in arriving at the conclusion. The researcher's frame of reference is often not explicit at the outset of his study and is likely to be importantly conditioned by the data, but it can be stated explicitly at some stage, if only the final one, of the study. It can be argued, however, that precisely because of the problems of partial and negative evidence and because of the relatively limited areas so far subjected to analysis, the intuitive approach may still be the most productive. Empathy and the historian's touch may for the present be highly desirable, at least as leading to formulations subject to further systematic testing.

Content analysis ideally is a considerably more rigorous method than intuition. It was developed in part for the analysis of events and situations in which direct access to people and their intentions and decisions could not be had. It would appear to be particularly appropriate to the Chinese situation. Complex rules of inference should be adopted, and the results cannot be regarded as self-validating. In contrast to intuition, content analysis ideally begins with an overtly stated frame of reference not derived by an inspection of the data themselves.

The third approach is through the formulation of *hypotheses*, which can then be tested and confirmed or refuted. Because of the small number of area specialists and the exigencies of Sinological training, it is too much to expect that fruitful hypotheses will appear in adequate quantity from the work of existing personnel alone, especially in the field of politics. Contemporary social science provides many theoretical concepts capable of application to Chinese data. Presumably the two most promising sources are studies completed or in process dealing with the Soviet Union as a type of Communist totalitarian political system and studies of comparative politics.

The problem of Chinese politics, for all its refractory characteristics and despite the limits on knowledge systematically imposed by a leadership driven by large ambitions and deep apprehensions, can be approached for purposes of analysis from a number of angles.[2] Communist

[2] As Professor Tsou has put it, "Attention must be focused on significant problems rather than on novel research techniques. For many of our novel techniques would be difficult to apply, while our theoretical insight would enable us to see deep significance in seemingly stereotyped materials and trivial events."

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China as a political system has its points of departure in the absolute rejection of a pre-existing system and the construction of a substitute system out of both used and new materials. The abandoned system is sufficiently describable. The reconstructive goals pursued by the revolution can be identified by reference to existing prototypes or to verbal formulations. The revolutionary methods employed have been, broadly speaking, transformation of the material environment, transformation of the value system, and the deliberate disassembly and reallocation of the facilities for political control.

It would be sterile to argue whether this process is historically unique or whether it has sufficiently close analogues to other known cases so that a comparative analysis will provide adequate explanatory formulae. What has been lacking has not been the possibility of stating relevant problems in practicable terms, or access to manipulable if not wholly adequate information, but a body of research workers equipped with the skills that modern political theory provides and sufficiently interested to attack the job. Deficiencies in the available information probably mean that in the short run useful contributions will depend on disciplinary maturity and sophistication—possibly even a touch of intellectual arrogance—rather than on Sinological background.

The first requirement, then, is manpower. The absence of centers committed to long-term programs of investigation of one or more major aspects of Chinese politics on an ambitious scale means that the data will progressively exceed the capacity of the academic world to analyze it. Thus, instead of an increasingly effective understanding of Chinese politics and a more and more important contribution by students of China to political dynamics, to the understanding of totalitarian systems, to comparative politics, and to the measurement of world influence patterns, we are likely to get the opposite.

With regard to research priorities, we have given above a number of suggestions. What can in fact be accomplished depends in part on the relative adequacy of the available data, in part on the general or theoretical interests most favored in the institutions where research is centered. There is still an urgent requirement for compilations which will provide at least initial guidance to the researcher. Concurrent with this work, some of which is being done and some of which may become available from nonacademic sources, the next indicated step is toward intensive studies, rather sharply focused and guided by a sense of theoretical relevance, so that each such study is conducted with awareness of the total Chinese context and of its comparative context. Otherwise stated, the immediate need is on the descriptive-analytic level. This

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does not mean purely empirical studies, but studies guided by a concept of the dynamics of the whole revolutionary process in China and by a sense of responsibility to the scientific understanding of man and politics.

If the task is approached in these terms, its first requirement does not seem to be a large-scale training program designed to produce more high-quality China specialists. Such a program has a priority status all its own—namely, it is in the long run indispensable—for without an effective training program an immediate research program will eventually be abortive. The paramount requirement at present, however, is both better use of existing committed manpower in an improved system of mutual communication and a moderately extensive borrowing of nonspecialized personnel from various disciplines, especially from among intellectually adventurous scholars in the social science fields.

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THE "NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC STATE"

A Communist Program for Less-Developed Areas

By WILLIAM T. SHINN, JR.*

I

AT the international Communist conclave that assembled in Moscow in November 1960, the Soviet delegation introduced a new formula, designed to serve as an ideological blueprint for Communist policy in the less-developed areas of the world.[1] The formula consisted of two parts: a statement of immediate objectives and a tactical plan to achieve them. Of these, the objectives were set forth in the form of a theoretical governmental model, described as a transitional state structure appropriate for less-developed societies. It was christened the "national democratic state," and the tactical plan chosen as the proper means for its establishment was correspondingly designated the "national democratic front."

A new concept was thus registered in the Communist ideological lexicon. Since its initial appearance in the Conference Statement of December 6, 1960, the "national democratic state" formula has been endorsed, discussed, and elaborated by Communist spokesmen, who have hailed it as a "new creative enrichment of Marxism-Leninism."[2]

It would be misleading, of course, to assume that a single concept

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[1] The Soviet initiative was revealed by East German Politburo member Hermann Matern in a speech published in *Neues Deutschland*, December 23, 1960.

[2] See especially V. N. Gye, *Novaia stranitsa istorii* [A new page of history] (Moscow 1962); V. Bochkaryov, "New Paths for New States," *New Times*, No. 41 (1961), 14-16; I. D. Chesnokov, "O gosudarstve natsional'noi demokratii" [On the national democratic state], *Politicheskoe samoobrazonvanie*, No. 6 (1961), 61-64; M. G. Kirichenko, "O nezavisimom gosudarstve natsional'noi demokratii" [On the independent national democratic state], *Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo*, No. 11 (1961), 104-15; B. N. Ponomarev, "O gosudarstve natsional'noi demokratii" [On the national democratic state], *Kommunist*, No. 8 (1961), 33-49; V. Agafonov, "Godsudarstvo natsional'noi demokratii" [The national democratic state], *Leninskoe znamia*, June 27, 1961; Khalid Bagdash, "Programma KPSS i sobremennyi etap natsional'no-osvoboditel'nogo dvizheniia" [The program of the CPSU and the present stage of the national liberation movement], *Pravda*, March 23, 1962; D. Volskii, "Kogda podniat flag nezavisimosti" [When they raise the flag of independence], *Krasnaia zvezda*, April 24, 1962; Ye. Zhukov, "Polnyi krakh kolonializma neminuem" [The complete collapse of colonialism is inevitable], *Pravda*, January 5, 1961; and articles in *Literarni Noviny* (Prague), December 31, 1960, and *Narodna armiia* (Sofia), January 3, 1961.

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such as the "national democratic state" formula could exert a major determining influence on actual Soviet policy. As is the case with most Communist ideological tenets, it is somewhat vague and allows for varying interpretations. Moreover, it is broad enough to serve as justification for either a hard- or a soft-line policy toward the less-developed countries.

Nevertheless, the new formula is of more than mere theoretical interest. It is valuable as a summary of Soviet designs and hopes in the less-developed areas, and it is especially noteworthy as a symptomatic reflection of current Soviet attitudes and problems. While the theory is, in effect, a program for ultimate Communist revolution in the developing countries, Communist spokesmen have thus far used it mainly to emphasize the immediate tactical desirability of supporting non-Communist nationalism, even where institutionalized in the form of governmental authority. In short, the formula, as presently interpreted by the Communists, apparently seeks to justify and extend the post-Stalinist policy of cooperation with the young national states and to establish a basis for resolving the traditional conflict between Soviet state and international Communist interests by integrating this policy into a broad scheme, designed to ensure eventual hegemony in the less-developed world.

II

Before examining the nature and implications of the concept of the "national democratic state," it is essential to review briefly some of the highlights of past Soviet theory and practice on the colonial question.

The doctrinal roots of Soviet policy on this issue can be traced to Lenin's monograph *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*, written in the spring of 1916, which sought to demonstrate that competition for empire among the Western powers would result in increasingly violent international conflicts. Lenin argued that imperialist expansion could assuage capitalist "contradictions" temporarily, but that when the colonial world was completely divided up among the great powers, these "contradictions" would intensify sharply over redivision of the spoils. Moreover, at that point, according to Lenin, new difficulties would be added to those already besetting capitalism from within, as the "exploited" peoples began to resist the colonial system more vigorously.[3]

[3] Lenin expatiated on this theme in another article written in the spring of 1916 entitled, "The Socialist Revolution and the Rights of Nations to Self-determination." Classifying China, Persia, and Turkey as "semi-colonies," he urged the Communists to support all "bourgeois-democratic, national-liberation movements" in these countries in

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The theoretical conclusions of this thesis, based largely on Marxian determinism, were soon overshadowed by its practical implications. Lenin's analysis provided a rationale for the support of all anti-imperialist forces in the colonies, whether they were Communist or not. Anything that served to antagonize the imperialists was now deemed "progressive."

Thus, on the eve of the revolution in Russia, the main lines of Soviet policy on the colonial question had been drawn. This issue had become a central element in Lenin's broad strategy for the demise of Western capitalism and for the victory of the international proletarian revolution. Soviet anti-colonial policy was directed against the West. In its basic outline, this strategic concept still forms the nucleus of present-day Soviet activities in the less-developed areas.

It remained, however, for Lenin's theory to be translated into practice, and it was here, during the 1920's, that Lenin and his successors encountered problems that even today must still weigh heavily on the minds of Soviet policy-makers. The first sign of trouble emerged at the Second Congress of the Comintern in 1920 during the famous debate between Lenin and the Indian Communist M. N. Roy. In response to Lenin's vigorous defense of the tactic of Communist collaboration with and support for "national bourgeois movements," Roy urged that the role assigned to the Communists should be given primary emphasis, and that the indigenous Communist parties should seize control of the revolutionary movement in the colonies and refuse to collaborate with the "national bourgeoisie" on any other terms.

The polemic that emerged at the Second Comintern Congress was deep-rooted. In its essence, it represented a clash between the ambitious revolutionary interests of Communists outside Russia and the desire of the Soviet leaders to use the "anti-imperialist movement" primarily as a means of protecting and strengthening the Soviet state. At the Fourth Comintern Congress in 1922, the tactic of the "united anti-imperialist front" was adopted, calling for an alliance of workers, peasants, and "progressive" bourgeois groups. While the Communists were urged to maintain their independence of action in the front and to prepare for revolution, the main task assigned to them was to prevent the "indigenous ruling classes" from compromising with imperialism, and their principal slogan was to be the "demand for a close alliance with the Proletarian Republic of Soviets."[4]

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order to drive out Western influence. V. I. Lenin, *Sochineniia* [Works] (3rd edn., Moscow 1935), XIX, 44.

[4] *Kommunisticheskii internatsional v dokumentakh, 1919-1932* [The Communist International in documents, 1919-1932] (Moscow 1933), 322-23.

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In looking back over the vicissitudes of Soviet policy on the colonial question during the 1920's and 1930's, one is struck by two major difficulties—both of which seriously impaired the implementation of Communist strategy. First, there remained a clear disparity between Soviet state interests and the ambitions of most of the non-Russian Communists. Although it was clouded over at times by personal animosities and genuine ideological differences both in the Kremlin and in the various local Communist parties, nevertheless the conflict between the interests of state and party was vividly reflected both in policy debates and in actions taken—the most notable example, of course, being the China issue in the mid-1920's.

Of no less importance was the almost total failure of all Communists —Russian and non-Russian alike—to comprehend the true viability of nationalism. This phenomenon, destined to emerge onto the historical scene as the single most dynamic political force of the postwar world, was treated by the Communists as no more than a temporary aberration that could be exploited and then conveniently cast aside. Nationalism was basically alien to the Marxist scheme of history. In the West, the Communists denounced it as "chauvinism," while in the colonies they sought to use it as a provisional catalyst that would promote the coalescence of anti-imperialist forces.

After World War II, the colonial problem assumed an entirely different shape. Colonies were rapidly superseded by young independent states, governed in virtually all cases by non-Communist nationalists. Because the "national bourgeoisie" had assumed political power and had become the ruling class, in the strict Marxist view it had ceased to play a "progressive" role. Communist doctrine justified the tactical support of "bourgeois-nationalist *movements*"—not governments. The old strategy—disputed and riddled by internal disagreement as it was —had been designed to apply to dependent colonies, not to independent national states. True, for a time in the early 1920's the Communists had cooperated with nationalist governments in Persia, Afghanistan, and Turkey. However, the fiction had been maintained that these were *movements*, and in any case it was not long before the *détente* gave way to open animosity on both state and party levels.

The initial Soviet reaction to the postwar situation was outright refusal to recognize the independence of the newly liberated colonies. Burma, India, Indonesia, and Egypt were labeled "semi-colonies" and local Communist groups were encouraged to oppose their governments through the tactic of "armed struggle." The "two-camp" doctrine, reaffirmed by Zhdanov in 1947, insisted that there could be no middle

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road between capitalism and communism. The revolutionary successes achieved in China and Vietnam were hailed as models for Communists in other less-developed states, and revolutionary struggle to establish "people's democracies" became the ubiquitous watchword.

All this was altered by the series of policy modifications that accompanied Khrushchev's rise to power. While there were some signs of a tactical shift even before Stalin's death, these were minor compared with the far-reaching measures taken in the mid-1950's to cultivate friendly relations with neutralist governments. At the Twentieth Soviet Party Congress in February 1956, the "two-camp" doctrine was officially abandoned and Khrushchev announced that the less-developed states had joined the Communist countries in a vast "zone of peace." What the Soviets had done, in effect, was to accord to the nationalist *governments* the same status formerly granted to "bourgeois-nationalist" *movements* in the "united anti-imperialist front." As a corollary to the new line, the activities of local Communist parties were de-emphasized, and for a time the Soviets even proved willing to accept local Communist setbacks in order to maintain good relations with the nationalist governments in power.

However, the old problem of the degree to which nationalists should be supported returned to plague Soviet policy-makers in the late 1950's. Stimulated by increasing evidence of anti-Communist campaigns and apparently irritated by growing criticism from the Chinese Communists, Moscow began a cautious reassessment of its new policy in the fall of 1958. For the first time in years, Communist periodicals criticized Nasser and Nehru by name, and the leading Soviet spokesman on relations with foreign Communist parties, B. N. Ponomarev, asserted that prospects for direct action by local Communist parties were becoming increasingly more favorable.[5] At the Twenty-first Party Congress (January 27-February 5, 1959), Khrushchev berated nationalist leaders openly for failing to allow local Communists freedom to agitate; however, he indicated that Soviet economic assistance to nationalist governments would continue.

By the fall of 1960, Soviet policy-makers were presumably still searching for a way to clarify the dual and somewhat contradictory approach that had been the outcome of the Twenty-first Congress. The policy of supporting non-Communist nationalist governments had achieved important successes and was still clearly beneficial to Moscow. However,

[5] B. N. Ponomarev, "Mezhdunarodnoe kommunisticheskoe dvezhenie na novom etape" [New stage of the international Communist movement], *Kommunist*, No. 15 (1958), 12-30.

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there remained a need to reconcile this line with the policies and activities of the Communist movement, to give it an aura of ideological respectability, and, in accordance with the traditional Russian predilection for broad schemes, to integrate it into a "grand strategy" for the less-developed world.

III

The concept of the "national democratic state" was presumably designed largely in response to this need. It represents, in effect, a Communist program for the less-developed areas that seeks to take into account local nationalist aspirations as well as local Communist and Soviet state interests and pull all these elements together into a single broad strategy. Of course, the new formula borrows heavily from past theory and is itself a reflection of the inherent difficulties in forming such a strategy. However, in at least one respect, it is unique. It candidly recognizes the viability of nationalism and provides a firm justification for Communist support of nationalist governments. In short, it is clearly an attempt to adjust to the hard fact that nationalism and non-Communist socialism are firmly established in the developing countries and have doubtless scarcely begun to reach the outer limits of their influence.

What then is a "national democratic state"? Put briefly, it is a transitional state, governed by a coalition of nationalists and Communists, headed by a non-Communist. While the "national bourgeoisie" is thus to hold the formal reins of political power, within this framework the Communists are to maintain their strength and freedom of action, preparing to seize control at the appropriate time. "National democratic states" are to succeed the presently existing governments and serve as vehicles for the eventual establishment of Communist states. During their transitory period of existence, they are to draw increasingly closer to the Communist states and carry out internal reforms that will facilitate a steady, and in most cases nonviolent, transition to communism.

The "national democratic state" slogan is designed to appeal to nationalist and anti-Western sentiment. Moreover, the very definition of the "national democratic state" represents a Communist action program, calculated to give the local Communists a means of increasing their influence that will potentially be more effective than their outworn appeals for establishment of "people's democracies."

There are four general criteria in the definition of a "national democratic state." They are:

(1) *Non-alignment and anti-Western orientation.* "A national demo-

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cratic state must defend its political and economic independence, fight against imperialism, the military blocs of imperialism, and against military bases on its territory."

(2) *Minimization of Western economic influence.* Such a state must ". . . struggle against the new forms of colonialism and the penetration of imperialistic capital [i.e., it must refuse to accept economic aid from the West or at least carefully control the terms of acceptance]."

(3) *Tolerance of local Communists.* It must ". . . reject dictatorial and despotic methods of government, assure freedom of speech, press, assembly, and demonstration, make possible the institution of agrarian and social reforms, and allow the people [i.e., the Communists] to participate in determining state policy."

(4) *Development of the state economic sector.* It must ". . . build its own economy, independent of imperialism, create its own industry, transport, political, and cultural cadres."[6]

In this list, the diverse interests of Soviet foreign policy, local Communists, and indigenous nationalists are all gathered together and intertwined into a single scheme for Communist advance. Western influences are to be eliminated, cooperation with the Communist states increased, and local Communists are to be given the opportunity of steadily gathering their strength prior to taking over a political and economic structure already centralized along state lines.

However, despite the outward clarity of this plan, the underlying traditional contradictions of Soviet policy still remain. Moreover, new problems have emerged with the attempts to apply the "national democratic state" formula in practice.

IV

The concept of the "national democratic state" was presumably designed by the Soviets with the Cuban example in mind, and several Communist spokesmen initially cited Cuba as either the prime example of, or the best prospect for, a "national democracy."[7] However, the Cuban Communists themselves apparently hesitated to accept the designation, aspiring perhaps to promote their revolution to a higher stage

[6] The fourth criterion did not appear in the original definition in the Statement of December 6, 1960, presumably because of Chinese Communist objections. It was first mentioned in Zhukov's *Pravda* article of January 5 and has since been included in virtually all Soviet literature on the subject.

[7] See the speech by Walter Ulbricht on the Moscow Conference (*Neues Deutschland*, December 18, 1960), the speech by Hermann Matern, and the Agafonov article—all of which credit Cuba with having attained the status of a "national democratic state." Most other early references merely listed Cuba as the prime example of a "potential national democracy."

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of historical development than that implied by the "national democratic state" concept—that is, to the stage of "building socialism." The Cubans' reluctance may also have stemmed from a desire to identify their state with "socialism" in the broad sense of the term, rather than with an abstract formula invented by the Kremlin. In any case, the Soviets acceded to Cuban wishes. The 1962 May Day slogans forthrightly declared that the people of Cuba had "embarked on the path of building socialism"—a distinction hitherto accorded to no country outside the Soviet orbit.[8] And a recent pamphlet on the "national democratic state" omits Cuba entirely in its list of potential "national democracies."[9]

Thus, at the present time, with Cuba "on the path to building socialism," there are no full-fledged "national democratic states." However, Soviet commentators have consistently pointed to four countries that are said to have "created the prerequisites for the creation of national democracies." One of these is Indonesia. The other three are all in Africa. They are Guinea, Ghana, and Mali.[10]

The application of the "national democratic state" formula to Africa presents special difficulties. Guinea, Ghana, and Mali all lack the basic requirements, such as a strong proletariat and a dynamic national bourgeois class. There are not even Communist parties in these countries. Nevertheless, Moscow certainly cannot ignore the fact that, to one degree or another, they all have leaned toward the Communist sphere in foreign policy and are implementing domestic programs that approximate some of the criteria of the "national democratic state."[11]

Presumably with this in mind, Soviet First Deputy Premier Mikoyan, in his election speech on March 14, 1962, asserted that "new forms of national democracy" were emerging in Africa.[12] During his tour of West Africa in January 1962, he asserted that Guinea was building a "national democratic state";[13] however, he curiously omitted this formu-

[8] *Pravda*, April 15, 1962.

[9] Gye, 22.

[10] The only Soviet reference to the national democratic state antedating the Statement of December 6, 1960, that has come to the author's attention appears, interestingly enough, in an African context. It is mentioned in a doctoral dissertation written by I. I. Potekhin in the 1930's and published in a very limited edition in 1955: *Formirovanie natsional'noi obshchnosti Yuzhno-Afrikanskikh Bantu* [The formation of national communities of the South African Bantu] (Moscow 1955), 47. This reference, as well as a further discussion of national democracy in Africa, will appear in the chapter on Africa by William Lewis, in C. E. Black and Thomas Thornton, eds., *Political Violence and Communist Theory* (forthcoming).

[11] Some of these difficulties were listed in an editorial in the Soviet journal *Narody Azii i Afriki*, No. 5 (1961), 3-14, which concluded that "A thorough study of the problems related to a government of national democracy remains a first-priority task of Soviet researchers."

[12] *Pravda*, March 15, 1962. [13] *Agence Guinéenne de Presse*, January 10, 1962.

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lation during his stay in Mali and Ghana, apparently in deference to objections similar to those raised by the Cubans. In his public speeches in Accra, Mikoyan went so far as to credit Ghana with "building socialism"—vaguely defined as a unique form suitable for Africa and identified with the ideas of President Nkrumah.[14] Mikoyan's actions clearly indicated that the Kremlin was not prepared to let doctrinal considerations stand in the way of statecraft. All the same, while the Soviets may have felt that the change of terminology was justified in the case of Cuba, they must still consider that, despite Nkrumah's "socialist" pretenses, in terms of strict Communist ideology his government should remain classified in the "path to national democracy" category.

V

The November 1960 Moscow Conference also issued a new tactical directive, designed to correspond with the "national democratic state" concept. Communist parties in the "majority of countries" were urged to form "national democratic fronts," uniting "all national patriotic forces" in a broad coalition. The "national democratic fronts" are presumably to pave the way for the formation of "national democracies" in much the same way as the "popular" and "united fronts" led to the establishment of "people's democracies" in Eastern Europe, China, North Vietnam, and North Korea.

The "national democratic front" is to include the "national bourgeoisie, the petty urban bourgeoisie, and the democratic intelligentsia" in its ranks. It is essentially a structural device to join nationalism with communism in a tactical coalition that will give the Communists a wide base of popular support. Once the "national democratic state" is established, however, the Communists are to begin preparing for a complete takeover. Until the appropriate time arrives, they are to pressure the nationalist government leaders, in effect, to dig their own graves by promoting pro-Communist domestic policies and pro-Soviet foreign policies.

In Guinea, Ghana, and Mali, the Soviets have been forced to recognize that there can be no "national democratic fronts" because there are no local Communist parties. However, they have adjusted to this fact by christening the existing political parties "national democratic parties," presumably in hopes that they will fulfill the same functions as the "national democratic fronts" do elsewhere. The Soviets have even attempted to draw these parties into the international Communist move-

[14] *Pravda*, January 13, 1962.

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ment. Delegates from these "national democratic parties" were invited to the Twenty-second Soviet Party Congress—an honor accorded to no other non-Communist groups within recent memory. They were thereby given an official stamp of approval. On September 19, 1962, it was announced that formal party relations had been established between the Soviet Communist Party and the Sudanese Union of Mali.

At the Twenty-second Party Congress, Communist delegates from Ceylon, Costa Rica, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Senegal, Sudan, and Tunisia all specifically endorsed the "national democratic" concept, and party representatives from Argentina, Colombia, Ecuador, Honduras, Pakistan, Syria, and Thailand supported the tactic in all but name. That the tactic has apparently not yet been universally adopted by all Communist parties testifies to the current disorganizing tendencies within the Communist movement as a whole, and in particular may well be due to Chinese Communist opposition.

VI

Except for an initial *pro forma* endorsement,[15] Peiping has maintained a strict silence on the concept of the "national democratic state," suggesting its tacit disapproval. From the Soviet point of view, it is entirely possible that the new formula may have been introduced to answer Chinese Communist objections to Soviet policy in the less-developed areas—in particular, to what Peiping has regarded as too great a Soviet tolerance of the "national bourgeoisie" at the expense of local Communists. Moreover, evidence suggesting that the concept may have been intended as a means of outflanking the Chinese ideologically stems from the resemblance of "national democracy" to Mao Tse-tung's theory of the "new democracy," first propounded in 1940.[16]

Peiping probably opposes the formula because it is too moderate and gradualist and because it introduces an extra stage in the revolutionary process. In addition, Peiping has traditionally been wary of Moscow's support for the development of the "state sector" of industry in the less-developed states. The Chinese have consistently argued that the growth of "national industry" leads only to "state monopoly capitalism," which strengthens the nationalists at the expense of the local Communists.

[15] *Jen-min Jih-pao*, December 7, 1960.

[16] While the "new democracy" called for industrial nationalization and agrarian reform carried out by a "transitional form of state to be adopted by revolutions in colonial and semi-colonial countries," Mao asserted that this should be accomplished by a "joint dictatorship of several revolutionary classes," meaning in effect complete Communist control. In contrast, the national democratic state is to be governed by the "national bourgeoisie." *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung* (New York 1955), Vol. III.

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Chinese Communist theoreticians have cautioned that the "state sector" should be enlarged only after the Communists take over.

A further possible source of irritation to Peiping may be the fact that "national democratic states" are to be under the governing authority of the "national bourgeoisie." In early October 1961, just before the Twenty-second Soviet Party Congress, Chinese Vice-Chairman Tung Pi-wu declared in a speech that ". . . there is no country in which the national and democratic revolution can achieve complete victory under the leadership of the bourgeoisie." In an obvious reference to the "national democratic state," he went on to assert that ". . . neither the plan for a bourgeois republic nor that for any other form of bourgeois state can enable these countries to embark on the road to complete independent development."[17] According to Peiping, the Communists must maintain complete control over the national movement in order to transform it immediately into a Communist government on the Chinese model when it seizes power.

Since January 1962, several references to the "national democratic state" have appeared in the Soviet press in polemical articles directed against Chinese Communist criticism. The brunt of the Soviet argument has been that developments in less-developed countries can, and in many cases should, proceed in a "peaceful" manner.[18] The need to resort to militant tactics in certain situations has certainly not been abandoned by Moscow; however, the Soviets have rejected Peiping's apparent insistence that this is the only available tactic for ensuring eventual Communist hegemony in the less-developed countries.

VII

Since the Twenty-second Party Congress, Soviet policy has sharpened its focus on the less-developed countries. The central theme of the Congress itself was a vigorous reaffirmation of the decisions of the Twentieth Congress of February 1956, accompanied by an assertion that this line would be followed in spite of Sino-Soviet differences. This theme was echoed by the new Party Program approved by the Twenty-second Congress, which in the section on the "national liberation movement" declared: "Fraternal alliance with the peoples who have thrown off

[17] *Jen-min Jih-pao*, October 10, 1961.

[18] The issue of *Kommunist* signed to the press on January 30, 1962 (No. 2), editorialized: "In our epoch, when the socialist camp is exerting increasing influence on the pace of world events, the possibilities for attaining the goals of national liberation by peaceful means have been increased." In the next paragraph the editorial outlined the goal of the "national liberation movement" as the formation of national democratic states (pp. 19-20).

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colonial or semi-colonial tyranny is a cornerstone of the foreign policy of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union."

Post-Congress Soviet policy has backed up this declaration in word and deed. During the past year or so contacts with nonaligned nationalist governments have increased, beginning with the fence-mending missions of Admiral Gorshkov to the United Arab Republic in December 1961 and of Mikoyan to Africa in January 1962. Moreover, for the first time a non-Communist definition of "socialism" has been recognized in Burma, Ghana, and the United Arab Republic. In contrast to the disparagement aimed at the Belgrade Nonaligned Nations Conference in August 1961, commentators from Communist countries have accorded "nonalignment" a positive stamp of approval and have gone so far as to endorse the idea of economic regionalism in the less-developed areas.[19] They have even suggested that under some conditions "national liberation struggles" can be carried out by "nonviolent" methods—apparently both in deference to the widespread desire among the neutrals to employ peaceful methods of modernization, and in order to avoid provoking vigorous Western countermeasures wherever possible.

There have been occasional outbursts of anti-nationalist sentiment, such as Premier Khrushchev's speech of May 19, 1962, in Sofia, in which he berated non-Communist "socialists." However, such criticism has been markedly restrained, compared with the period immediately preceding the Twenty-second Congress. It has been decidedly overshadowed by the efforts made to improve and extend cooperation with the neutralist wing of the "camp of peace."

In short, since the Twenty-second Congress, Moscow has apparently come to a renewed determination that the most promising line of attack against the West lies through the less-developed regions, and that for this purpose the cultivation of nationalism as an ally is essential. The immediate objective of this drive is the reduction of Western influence in the less-developed areas. The Communists apparently hope that a diminution of the Western presence will lead to discord within the Western camp and to a lessening of Western power and authority, thereby enabling the Communist countries to muster increasing political support for their policies, counter the challenge posed by Western economic integration, and gradually draw the neutrals eastward.

This scheme is a neat one. Nevertheless, the basic difficulties that have traditionally plagued Communist policy in the less-developed world remain and cannot be resolved merely by the creation of a new

[19] See, for example, Khrushchev's speech of May 30, 1962.

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formula. In fact, the very need for a new approach to the problem of the less-developed states emphasizes the failure of past policy in reconciling Soviet state and Communist interests, and suggests the increasing urgency for a solution because of the present disorganizing tendencies within the international Communist movement.

The concept of the "national democratic state" essentially represents an attempt to adapt past policies and doctrines to fit the new historical situation created by the emergence of non-Communist governments in the former colonies. It seeks to reaffirm the validity of Lenin's postulates on the inevitability of conflict among the Western powers and between the "exploiting nations" and the "exploited peoples." These postulates lie at the very basis of long-range Soviet policy assumptions. In order to maintain them, the Soviets have been obliged to compromise with the fact that nationalism and non-Communist socialism have become the main political forces in the developing nations. They have also been forced to take into account the Western response to the challenge of modernization in the developing countries.

The "national democratic state" formula may accordingly be viewed as an effort to adjust to this situation. In their continuing attempts to coordinate policy, the Communist planners undoubtedly hope that their revised "grand strategy" will be more successful in persuading, cajoling, and pressuring the developing nations to resist Western influence and to strike more effectively at the "weak link of capitalism"—in other words, to recognize the interests that Communist theory insists they must have.

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NUCLEAR TACTICS FOR DEFENDING A BORDER

By THORNTON READ*

I. Alternatives to Tactical Nuclear Defense

ALTHOUGH tactical nuclear weapons have been extensively integrated into NATO, there appears to be no clear doctrine for using them to control a battlefield or hold a defense perimeter.[1] Even the possibility of a limited tactical nuclear war has been questioned. Disenchantment with tactical nuclear defense has stimulated an increased interest in the controlled use of strategic weapons and a demand for stronger conventional forces. But these alternatives also present problems.

A strategic counterforce strike against the Soviet Union could scarcely be considered except in such grave circumstances that the Soviet forces would be in a high state of alert. And the full weight of our strategic superiority could be brought to bear only in a war of such proportions that the destruction would certainly be severe and might be nearly fatal to Europe. On the other hand, the controlled exchange of limited strategic strikes as part of a bargaining strategy would have little direct effect on a local territorial contest, and would lend itself to the sort of systematic malevolence that a dictatorship could exploit to disrupt a voluntary alliance—for example, by concentrating its reprisals on a single dependent ally.[2]

The NATO nations collectively have the manpower and industrial potential to raise conventional forces that would free them at least from the need to use nuclear weapons *first*. The examples of Switzerland and Israel show that large conventional forces are compatible with a democratic form of government. However, Western governments have been unwilling to demand from their peoples the sacrifices required to build up and maintain conventional forces and trained reserves that could be fully employed only in the highly unlikely event of a full-

* The author wishes to thank those who offered helpful analysis and criticisms of an earlier draft—in particular Paul Ramsey, Klaus Knorr, Richard Falk, David Bobrow, and Robert C. Tucker of Princeton University and Morton Halperin and James Richardson of Harvard University.

[1] The problems to which the present article is addressed are well presented by Henry A. Kissinger in "The Unsolved Problems of European Defense," *Foreign Affairs*, XL (July 1962), 515-31.

[2] The pros and cons of this strategy are discussed by a number of authors in *Limited Strategic War*, ed. by Klaus Knorr and Thornton Read (New York 1962).

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scale conventional World War III. After the Soviets' experience in East Central Europe, it is questionable how anxious Moscow is to acquire any more reluctant satellites or what risks it would run to do so. Most Europeans prefer some deterrent beyond the present conventional shield and the threat of civil resistance in occupied areas, but they feel that this can be provided by nuclear weapons, which we must have in any case. And the Soviets must reckon with the possibility that nuclear weapons would be used, whether or not we have a satisfactory doctrine for using them.

Belaboring the defects of a tactical nuclear defense will not necessarily stimulate the Europeans to build up much stronger conventional forces. Rather it may increase their desire to have strategic nuclear deterrents under their own control.[3] In any case, a major increase in conventional forces would require several years—during which time we need a doctrine for using the tactical nuclear weapons which have been deployed in Europe and which could not abruptly be withdrawn without adverse political effects, even if such withdrawal were desirable on military grounds. Whatever the ultimate prospects of a non-nuclear defense of Europe, it is imperative that we continue to search for a viable doctrine for operations on a nuclear battlefield. Even if we eventually renounce the first use of nuclear weapons, we need to know what nuclear tactics the Soviets might use against us.

II. Limited War as a Test of Will

Nuclear tactics and the problem of limiting a local nuclear war have been discussed extensively but none of the proposed limits have received general acceptance.[4] Geographical limits such as national boundaries and important rivers have the advantage of being clear. For example, in Europe nuclear detonations could be confined to the area between the Rhine and the Oder-Neisse line. But limitation to a particular geographical area would result in the destruction of the country being "defended." NATO must offer its more exposed members more than the

[3] The prospects and dangers of independent nuclear deterrents are discussed in Kissinger, 531-41. See also Dean Acheson, "The Practice of Partnership," *Foreign Affairs*, XLI (January 1963), 247-60; Henry A. Kissinger, "Strains on the Alliance," *ibid.*, 261-85; and Malcolm W. Hoag, "Nuclear Policy and French Intransigence," *ibid.*, 286-98.

[4] For recent discussions of nuclear tactics, see Thornton Read, "Limited Strategic War and Tactical Nuclear War," in Knorr and Read, eds., 67-116; Morton Halperin, *Limited War in the Nuclear Age* (in press) and "Nuclear Weapons and Limited War," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, V (June 1961), 146-66; and T. N. Dupuy, "Can America Fight a Limited Nuclear War?" *Orbis*, V (Spring 1961), 31-42 [reprinted in *Survival*, III (September-October 1961), 220ff.].

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assurance that an aggressor would not be permitted to capture them alive, or that a Soviet satellite would suffer equally.

It has been proposed that attacks be confined to military targets or to combatants. But virtually any measure that combat troops used to protect themselves or any advantage due to superior reconnaissance or accuracy of fire could be canceled out by using higher yield weapons or more of them, or showing less discrimination and blanketing larger areas with lethal blast and radiation. Thus each side effectively holds the opposing troops (as well as the opposing civilians) in hostage.

In the absence of qualitative limits, the use of nuclear weapons in ground combat would have to be limited quantitatively. That is, the two sides would exchange deliberately restrained attacks on combat troops as part of a bargaining strategy or test of will. But this has many of the disadvantages of limited strategic warfare. Indeed, it might be an even less attractive form of conflict. In the case of controlled strategic reprisals, warning could be given to permit evacuation of people from the target area so that destruction could be confined to property. Deliberate punitive attacks on property—even property of little military value—would seem preferable to killing soldiers, not as part of a trial of strength subject to qualitative limits, but as part of a test of will in which each side is limited only by its expectation of how many casualties are required to break the other side's will. The actions or fighting qualities of combat troops would scarcely matter. They would simply be "assets" to be destroyed as a means of acting on their government's will. This sort of voluntaristic or "spiritualized" warfare would be neither morally acceptable nor advantageous to the West.[5]

III. The Search for Tactical Stability

It may be argued that our failure to find satisfactory tactics for the battlefield use of nuclear weapons is not due to insufficient ingenuity, but to the fact that—as in the effort to construct a perpetual motion machine—failure is inevitable and can be predicted from basic principles. Any rules for nuclear warfare must be artificial and to some extent arbitrary. But why should the Soviets accept arbitrary rules so weighted in our favor as to cancel out their superiority in ground forces —for example, a rule limiting yields to the low kiloton or subkiloton range, where we have a virtual monopoly? To be sure, there is also

[5] The moral and political implications of making war a "spiritualized" contest of wills are critically examined by Paul Ramsey in *The Limits of Nuclear War: Thinking About the Do-Able and the Un-Do-Able*, Council on Religion and International Affairs (in press).

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something artificial about fighting a major conventional war in the nuclear age. But the distinction between conventional and nuclear weapons is a clear and obvious discontinuity, which (whether we like it or not) has acquired a good deal of psychological significance and thus naturally suggests itself as a limit.[6] If we found ourselves in a war and wished to keep it limited, we might have to settle for that limit in default of any other, even though it put us at a disadvantage. The question is whether we can discover any other form of limitation, equally clear and obvious, which could become a focus for expectations as an alternative, or at least a complement, to the conventional-nuclear distinction.

A useful limit on tactical nuclear warfare need not be asymmetrical in favor of *us*. It might favor the side trying to hold its own territory against external aggression. A condition which is symmetrical between the two sides but which favors the side defending its own territory against external attack is not unprecedented. If all nations were islands separated by large bodies of water, the world would be more stable against external invasion. A land boundary running along difficult mountainous terrain can produce a defensive stalemate even when considerable inequality exists between the two combat forces. Various technical measures, such as mine fields, can make a boundary difficult to penetrate. Today a volatile military technology offers such a rich variety of weapons and doctrines that it surely is not unreasonable to look for ways of achieving tactical stability—at least in cases where the territorial *status quo* is politically stable—just as we now seem to be reaching a relatively stable strategic balance between well-protected second-strike forces. In any case, the effort ought not to be rejected out of hand on the basis of historical analogies of doubtful relevance or clichés about "Maginot Line mentality."

The past decade has seen a good deal of inconclusive debate about whether tactical nuclear weapons favor the defense or the offense. But the question of who would be favored in a limited nuclear war has little meaning apart from a specification of the rules or limits that would govern its conduct. If we want to prevent armed attacks across well-defined national boundaries, then we ought to look for limits that favor the side defending its own territory. If single limits (such as the one on geography) are unsatisfactory, we might try simple combinations of two or more clear limits.

[6] Now that we have small atomic weapons which overlap in yield with the largest high-explosive bombs, it has been claimed that the distinction between nuclear and conventional weapons is relatively unimportant. For a contrary view stressing the physical, operational, and symbolic importance of the conventional-nuclear distinction, see Read, in Knorr and Read, eds.

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A combination of limits favoring the defense has been suggested at various times—for example, by Admiral Buzzard, Leo Szilard, and Paul Nitze,[7] who have proposed that each side use nuclear weapons over its own territory or the territory of an ally. However, this proposal has received little attention and is often misunderstood or summarily dismissed on the basis of interpretations that virtually reduce it to absurdity. For example, the defender's territory may be visualized as a fluid battlefield in which the two forces interpenetrate and maneuver around local concentrations of population. And in this confusion it is assumed that nuclear weapons would be used freely—possibly by both sides. Thus the defender's country would be destroyed while the aggressor's country was spared. However, the proposal can be formulated explicitly in terms of a forward, linear defense along a well-defined boundary.

IV. Sanctuary and Lethal Area

Let us first describe how the strategy is intended to work and then see how we might *make* it work against an uncooperative enemy.

To avoid misunderstanding it may be better to state the proposal by saying that we would use nuclear weapons against, and only against, enemy troops who crossed onto our side of the border. The border would then become the sharp dividing line between a lethal area and a safe area, or sanctuary, for enemy troops. On crossing the border, the residual life expectancy of enemy soldiers would drop abruptly from, say, fifty years to fifty minutes. This would create a powerful incentive not to cross and would tend to undermine the offensive spirit of the aggressor's troops. The proposal combines two clear limits or distinctions —the geographical boundary and the distinction between combatants of the two sides. The target for nuclear attack is neither a particular national nor a particular area but a national who has placed himself in the wrong area.

To provide a forward defense that would prevent the defender's territory from becoming a battlefield, tactical nuclear weapons should be regarded not as a substitute for conventional ground forces, but as a complement to a conventional shield deployed along the frontier and strong enough to prevent infiltration or a lightning territorial grab, and thus to ensure that any concentration of troops massive enough to take and hold territory on our side of the border would constitute an inviting target for nuclear attack.

[7] The most complete statement has been given by Nitze in *East-West Negotiations*, Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research (Washington 1958), 28-37.

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In principle a sharply defined lethal area adjacent to a sanctuary for enemy troops could be created along any geographical line. But there are many advantages in creating it along the initial boundary between the countries and their armed forces. The boundary is well defined and unambiguous. Even if the enemy did not recognize the legal validity of the border, he would be in no doubt as to *where* the border was. And initially all enemy troops would be in the sanctuary area. Thus no combatant would be a target for nuclear attack until he made himself one by crossing from the safe area on his side to the lethal area on our side.

Our conventional forces should be strong enough, not necessarily to hold an all-out attack indefinitely, but to fall back slowly and in good order, thus affording time to evacuate civilians from the danger zone and to make a deliberate, duly authorized decision to use nuclear weapons—which could normally be held under tight central control and well behind the front. A nation using nuclear weapons over its own territory would exercise some discrimination. But far more important is the small size of the area subject to nuclear attack. Nuclear explosions would be confined to that slice of the defender's territory which had been taken by the aggressor. Thus, the region that is fair game for nuclear attack is not only clearly defined and small in area; it need not even exist until the aggressor creates it.

In what follows, we shall refer to the battlefield use of nuclear weapons over one's own territory as the *defensive* use. Attacks on troops on their side of the boundary are then *offensive*.

V. Sanctions and Reprisals

If each side agreed to detonate nuclear weapons over its own territory but not over the other's territory, the result would be a defensive stalemate. Suppose, however, that the conventional aggressor answered our defensive use of nuclear weapons with *offensive* nuclear strikes. We would then have a conflict over the rules of the game. In using nuclear weapons over our territory we would be granting the enemy the right to use them over *his* territory. He, however, would claim (by actions, if not also by words) that, because we had used nuclear weapons against his forces, he was entitled to use them against our forces. Thus the two sides could agree on the need for symmetrical limits and reciprocated restraint, but differ on how symmetry was to be measured.

The question of how to respond in case the enemy initiates offensive nuclear strikes is, of course, one we have to face, no matter what strategy we adopt for local defense—even if we renounce any first use of nuclear weapons. The appropriate response depends on the nature of the at-

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tack. If the enemy concentrated his nuclear strike on a segment of our defensive line to make an opening for a breakthrough, we could bomb the forces pouring through the opening. The defending side could always counter an attempt to clear a path through his lines simply by rebombing the area that the offensive side had bombed and then occupied.

If the aggressor used discriminating nuclear strikes against interdiction and tactical support targets on our side of the border, we could reply in kind. The symmetrical destruction of supply and support facilities would tend to bring ground operations to a halt and thus reinforce the tactical stalemate.

If the enemy replied to our defensive use of nuclear weapons by tit-for-tat punitive reprisals against our troops in an effort to make us desist from any use of nuclear weapons, we would face a dilemma. To counterretaliate against troops still on his side of the boundary would involve us in the open-ended and morally repugnant business of killing people as a bargaining tactic. It would also destroy the basis of our nuclear defense, which is the discontinuity between a lethal area and a sanctuary for enemy soldiers. The strategy requires a carrot as well as a stick. Enemy soldiers must not only face nuclear destruction on our side of the boundary; they must also be assured of safety on their own side.

Perhaps the best answer to the enemy's use of nuclear weapons against our troops would be a relatively heavy but still highly discriminating attack on tactical support targets or, if necessary, even on strategic military targets in the Soviet Union. We ought to be able to hold our own in any controlled, discriminating counterforce exchange. The danger is, of course, that the Soviets would not exercise discrimination. In a heavily populated area like Europe, even the most careful counterforce attacks would do severe civil damage and it would be a simple matter deliberately to do much more in the guise of "collateral" or "bonus" damage. Our answer to such "carelessness" would presumably be a still heavier counterforce strike. A strategic counterforce superiority or first-strike capability should probably be regarded not as a backup for conventional defense, but as the ultimate sanction for keeping a limited nuclear war limited (insofar as possible) to military targets.

However, it is beyond the scope of this article to discuss the esoteric strategic problems of general nuclear war—a contingency that one hopes is as unlikely to happen as it is revolting to contemplate. The relevance of general war to any doctrine for local defense is whether the latter increases the danger of general war or creates any special problems for

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keeping it under control and terminating it short of a total catastrophe. A doctrine for the discriminating defensive use of nuclear weapons to protect Western Europe need not aggravate whatever dangers are inherent in the sheer existence of strategic forces. It strains the imagination to suppose that the Soviets are so determined to prevent the emergence of a free and integrated Europe that they would launch an all-out conventional ground offensive, fully prepared to respond to our discriminating defensive use of nuclear weapons by escalating all the way up to indiscriminate strategic strikes that would virtually destroy Europe. If they were resolved to embark on so reckless a course, would they not rather strike first at the strategic level and thus avail themselves of whatever advantage surprise might offer?

VI. Deterrence and Defense

It may be objected that, if a nation were prepared to abide by rules for nuclear combat which overwhelmingly favor the defense, it would respect the international law against aggression and not attack in the first place. Therefore, what advantage does our proposal have over a simple prohibition of aggression? In any case, we must be prepared to engage in some reprisals and counterreprisals to enforce rules. Why not say that the basic rule is the prohibition of armed attack across a well-defined national boundary, and that to enforce this rule nuclear weapons may be used not only over the defender's territory, but in whatever way will most effectively prevent aggression?

This objection misses the main point in creating rules that affect governments. The purpose is not just to bind a potential violator through his respect for law or his concern for world opinion. It is, above all, to influence his behavior by affecting his expectations as to how other nations will respond. Motorists who have no respect for the law usually drive on the proper side of the road because that is the prudent thing to do in the light of their expectations about other drivers' behavior. The question to ask about our proposal is not whether a potential aggressor would be pleased by it, but how he would be affected by knowing that *we* had accepted it and were prepared to act on it. The proposal not only reiterates the prohibition against aggression; it also reinforces that prohibition by focusing expectations on a specific sanction which would make aggression unfeasible.

The usual argument against introducing nuclear weapons into conventional warfare is that, once we cross the nuclear threshold, there is no clear-cut stopping place short of at least a local disaster. Therefore, both sides would be deterred from initiating the use of nuclear weap-

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ons; and (so the argument goes) since nuclear warfare is self-deterring, it cannot be depended on to deter non-nuclear provocations. The proposal to use nuclear weapons over one's own territory turns this argument against the aggressor by focusing on a clear-cut limit for the *defensive* use of nuclear weapons, and thus puts the aggressor in the position of either accepting a defensive standoff or deliberately choosing to enter on the dangerous and open-ended game of *offensive* nuclear attacks and reprisals.

In short, the acceptance of this proposal as our declarative policy will have a *deterrent* value, whether the Soviets ostensibly agree to it or not. However, the proposal also has a *defensive* value as an action policy because it would prevent the aggressor from making territorial gains during the reprisals and counterreprisals and the bargaining over rules. It should be easier to induce our adversary to call off an unsuccessful adventure than to give up the fruits of a successful one. We act both on the enemy's capability and on his will. First, by posing a credible threat of limited nuclear defense, we discourage him from launching an offensive. Second, the combination of conventional and tactical nuclear defense denies him the ability to make territorial gains. The conventional shield prevents sudden major penetrations and the defensive nuclear strikes wipe out small penetrations before they become big ones. Third, if the enemy launches nuclear strikes against our defending forces, our reprisals against military targets in his territory will degrade his ability to support his ground offensive and also act on his will, punish him, and communicate to him our resolve.

A defensive tactic in which only those soldiers who have left their sanctuary will come under nuclear attack is surely preferable to killing arbitrarily selected enemy soldiers as a means of carrying on a test of will with their government.

VII. Tactics and Timing

A general doctrine for using nuclear weapons defensively is compatible with a number of specific tactics that vary according to how early in the battle nuclear weapons are introduced, how much territory is given up first, and what effort is made to hold or counterattack with conventional forces. An extreme case of using nuclears early would be to evacuate a small strip on our side of the border and subject it to a clean, discriminating, but spectacular nuclear bombardment before the enemy could occupy it or even before the war started. If we had warning, this could be done just before he attacked. Such a demonstration or "exercise" would be a natural extension of a nation's right

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to test nuclear weapons over its own territory in peacetime. Our nuclear defense would not only be credible; it would already have been put in operation. We would not take the initiative in bombing enemy forces. They would take the initiative in walking into nuclear fire.

The advantage of delaying a nuclear response as long as possible is that our conventional forces might be able to hold or to retake lost ground without having to resort to nuclear weapons at all. But there are dangers in waiting too long. Crossing the nuclear threshold is, by itself, so drastic a step that it should be taken while the area subject to nuclear attack is still small and is occupied by a small number of enemy troops. Nuclear weapons should be used to prevent the enemy from gaining control of our territory rather than to bomb him out of an area in which we had allowed him to become firmly established. Finally, there is the danger that an inadequate conventional defense will disintegrate, thus producing the worst possible conditions for introducing nuclear weapons.

VIII. The Role of Conventional Forces

A forward nuclear strategy, far from permitting reductions in the NATO conventional forces, would require more combat-ready divisions deployed along or near the border. Tactical nuclear weapons are a substitute, not for stronger conventional forces in being, but for the massive reserves required to hold Europe in the unlikely event of a conventional World War III. A forward nuclear strategy might encourage the Europeans to support stronger conventional forces by giving the NATO shield a convincing role to play. As Kissinger says, "The purpose of the conventional forces would be to create optimum conditions for the use of tactical nuclear weapons. . . . The most convincing argument on behalf of the 30-division goal is in terms of a tactical nuclear, not a conventional, defense."[8]

Emphasizing the distinction between the offensive use and the defensive use of nuclear weapons in ground combat does not imply that the conventional-nuclear distinction should be de-emphasized or that the atomic bomb should be regarded as just another weapon. The conventional-nuclear distinction should be preserved as a limit on warfare that arises not from external aggression, but from internal political instability. Even in clear cases of external aggression, our proposal preserves the conventional-nuclear distinction as a complementary limit: a conventional offensive justifies a nuclear defense—not a nuclear of-

[8] Kissinger, "Unsolved Problems of European Defense," 525-26.

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fense. Nuclear warfare is so strong a form of combat that nuclear defense can dominate conventional offense. Because nuclear firepower can make our side of the border perfectly lethal for enemy troops, their own side can remain perfectly safe.

IX. The Question of First Use

Any limits on the use of nuclear weapons restrict our freedom of action and, to that extent, are undesirable. But, so long as national power depends on the willingness to use force, some restrictions on warfare are necessary to prevent the power struggle from degenerating into a competition in manipulating the threat of mutual disaster. Making war an act of madness does not so much reduce the role of force in international relations as increase the role of madness.

The proposal to use nuclear weapons defensively in ground combat may be criticized as being either too restrictive or not restrictive enough. A more restrictive rule would be a ban on any first use of nuclear weapons.[9] This would, of course, require that the West build up an adequate conventional defense. It is difficult, however, to know just how strong a defense would be adequate. In some past wars the offense may have required a *local* superiority of something like 3 to 1, but it is fallacious to extrapolate such ratios to an entire front or theater. Because conventional combat is so unpredictable, the West would require overwhelmingly superior conventional forces to achieve the same protection against conventional aggression that could be obtained by a nuclear defense combined with a strong, but not necessarily superior, conventional shield. If the enemy expected to meet such a defense, he would hardly attack unless he was prepared to use nuclear weapons offensively from the outset. But, in that case, would he not also be willing to initiate the use of nuclear weapons to blast a way through superior conventional forces?

To be sure, superior Western conventional forces would be in a position to take the offensive—for example, to push through to Berlin or support an uprising in a Soviet satellite—provided the Soviets were willing to abide by a rule of no first use. If the NATO nations had been persuaded to make the considerable sacrifices required to build

[9] For a statement of the case for no first use, see Thornton Read, *A Proposal to Neutralize Nuclear Weapons*, Policy Memorandum No. 22, Center of International Studies (Princeton University, December 15, 1960), and "A New Proposal for Nuclear Arms Control," *New Leader*, XLIV, June 12, 1961; and Morton Halperin, *A Proposal for a Ban on the Use of Nuclear Weapons*, Study Memorandum No. 4, Special Study Group, Institute of Defense Analyses (Washington, October 6, 1961). For contrary arguments, see Henry A. Kissinger, *The Necessity for Choice* (New York 1960), 88-91.

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up superior conventional forces on the grounds that we could not use nuclear weapons against a Soviet conventional offensive, it might be difficult to explain that *our* superior conventional forces could never take the offensive because the Soviets would stop them with a nuclear defense.

Perhaps the chief argument for a rule of no first use is that it provides a perfectly clear criterion for deciding when nuclear weapons may be used—namely, when the enemy has used them first. There are cases of attack across a well-defined border where the offensive-defensive distinction is as clear as the conventional-nuclear distinction. But there is no sharp dividing line between these unambiguous cases of aggression and more ambiguous ones. The danger is that, once nuclear weapons have been accepted as a legitimate means of defense against aggression, they will tend to be injected into more and more situations through an increasingly liberal interpretation of "defense" and "aggression." On the other hand, if this danger is recognized, guarding against it may be no more difficult than achieving general acceptance of the rule that *no* conventional attack, however flagrantly aggressive, justifies *any* use of nuclear weapons, however defensive and discriminating.

X. The Spread of Nuclear Weapons

The restrictions that the nuclear powers accept on their freedom to use nuclear weapons will affect the desire of other nations to acquire nuclear weapons. If we depend on nuclear weapons to defend the front in Europe, or in Korea, will not all nations demand nuclear weapons to make their borders secure? Not necessarily. The smaller nations can probably be better protected from external conquest through an alliance with a Great Power or, in some cases, through the United Nations. There is some justification for confining nuclear weapons to the Superpowers, who cannot depend on anyone else for their security. And, in any case, a non-nuclear power must depend on a nuclear power for protection against *nuclear* attack. However, the motives for acquiring nuclear weapons are probably more political than military. A nuclear capability is seen as a source of prestige and status. Thus any rules that tend to make nuclear weapons more legitimate and usable will tend to remove from them the stigma that so far has prevented the nuclear club from growing as rapidly as technological capabilities would have allowed. A rule of no first use puts nuclear weapons in the category of illegitimate weapons like poison gas and bacteria, which may be possessed to deter their use by the enemy but never used except in reprisal for prior use.

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It is difficult to evaluate (1) how much the emotional revulsion against nuclear weapons would be affected by a rule, not that nuclear weapons are as legitimate as conventional ones, but that some uses of nuclear weapons are less illegitimate than all-out conventional aggression, and (2) how much difference this would make in voluntarily restricting the growth of the nuclear club. At this point it may be that the spread of nuclear weapons can be stopped only if the Great Powers are resolved to stop it—by force, if necessary.

XI. The Special Case of Berlin

The choice of a limited war doctrine for the West is complicated by the fact that our problem is not just to defend a line along the Iron Curtain, but to protect West Berlin, an enclave inside Soviet-held territory. We must not cast our doctrine for nuclear defense in so restrictive a form that it rules out too many of the options open to us for dealing with a threat to West Berlin. Thus, if the possibility of Western conventional offensive is ruled out, one may argue for keeping open the option of using nuclear weapons offensively to clear a way to Berlin. This would seem to be an unattractive option, but if we must keep it open we need not reject a doctrine which in other respects is sound. Rather we could just say that, because Berlin is geographically an exceptional case, it will have to be treated as an exception to a general geographical limit on the use of weapons. Another possibility is to renounce only the first offensive use of nuclear weapons against *troops* and leave open the possibility of initiating controlled discriminating attacks on material targets (such as air or missile bases) that could be knocked out with little human damage.

Some variation of a defensive battlefield nuclear strategy may be the best choice for the West, at least in the interim while stronger conventional forces are being built up. Eventually there may be a formal international agreement on the use of nuclear weapons, but the prospects for this are not bright in the midst of the cold war and without any solution of the political and territorial problems of Central Europe.

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CZECHOSLOVAKIA'S PENETRATION OF AFRICA, 1955-1962

By CURT F. BECK

THE water is safe to drink in Alexandria and Cairo, Egypt, thanks to a water filter station established by Czechoslovak engineers. A shoe factory in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, is being built by Czech technicians. Across the frontier, in Somalia, Czechs are building a technical institute to teach some young Somalis the techniques necessary to staff modern factories. Across the continent in Conakry, Guinea, airport inscriptions are in Czech as well as in French and English to accommodate the many Czechs arriving on the direct Prague-to-Conakry airline. In the smaller villages of Ghana special trucks are delivering Czech beer to the local inhabitants. In Mali journalists are being trained by Czechs in the establishment of their own press agency. And in Prague, the capital of Czechoslovakia, there are numerous Africans among the more than 2,000 students from Africa, Asia, and Latin America enrolled at Czech state expense in institutions of higher learning. To say that Africa has assumed a role of real importance for the Czechs is an understatement.

How has all this come about? Why is Czechoslovakia so deeply involved in a continent that until 1955 was extremely remote from her? What consequences will this have for the Czechs? These are the questions that this article will attempt to answer.[1]

One must make clear at the start that in her African policy Czechoslovakia fulfills a task that she has been given by the Soviet Union. However, the type of role that Czechoslovakia chose and the manner in

[1] This article is based on information contained in the leading Czech newspaper, *Rudé Právo*, 1955-1962; the ideological journal for party functionaries, *Nová Mysl*; communiqués of the Czechoslovak Press Bureau (Československý Tiskový Kancelář, hereinafter cited as ČTK); *Československý Zpravodaj* [News from Czechoslovakia], published in New York by the Free Europe Committee; *Czechoslovak Foreign Trade*, published in Prague by the Czechoslovak Chamber of Commerce; and the following African newspapers: *Ethiopian Herald* (Addis Ababa), *Daily Graphic* (Accra), *La Vigie Marocaine* (Casablanca), and *Egyptian Gazette* (Cairo). The author would like to make acknowledgment also to the excellent summaries, "Eastern Europe Overseas," appearing monthly from December 1960 to October 1961 in *East Europe*, and the following survey articles in the same journal: "Red Sky over Africa," IX (October 1960), 32-40; "Prague, Cairo and Damascus," VII (April 1958), 12-13; "Communist Traders Look Abroad," VIII (December 1959), 19-23; "Africa," X (August 1961), 8-12; and "The Courting of Guinea," IX (May 1960), 14-15. See also Robert F. Lamberg, "Prager Aktivitäten im Entwicklungsraum 1960/61," *Aussenpolitik*, XIII (January 1962), 40-49.

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which she has played and continues to play it are the result of peculiar circumstances of Czechoslovak origin.[2]

The guideline for the policies to be pursued by the members of the "socialist camp" toward underdeveloped countries was well summarized in the November 1960 Moscow Declaration of the Communist Party leaders: "The socialist countries are the sincere and true friends of those nations that are fighting for their freedom or that have already succeeded in throwing off the imperialist yoke and oppression. They decisively reject any interference whatsoever in the internal affairs of the young nation-states and deem it their international responsibility to help the nations in their fight to strengthen their national independence. They offer these countries help of all types and support on their road ahead as they build their own industries, develop and strengthen their national economy, build up their own trained manpower reserves, and they cooperate with them in their fight for peace on the entire globe, against imperialist aggression."[3] In other words, the rise of the new nations on the ruins of Western imperialism is welcome as a significant weakening of the strength of the anti-Communist "imperialist camp." The new nations are cultivated in the expectation that they will join the countries of the "socialist camp" in important issues affecting the international balance of power.

Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Václav David was more specific when he stated: "The basic problem of newly independent states in Africa is to eliminate the remnants of economic and political domination of colonialism, to strengthen their national independence and sovereignty.

[2] It is important to bear in mind the significant part played by Poland and Bulgaria, as well as the remaining satellites, in the Soviet Union's policy toward Africa. Czechoslovakia, however, has played the leading role. Thus, next to the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia maintains the largest number of Communist embassies and consulates in Africa. At the end of 1962 she had—or had agreed to have—diplomatic and, in most cases, commercial relations with the following independent African countries: Algeria, Congo (Léopoldville), Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Libya, Mali, Morocco, Nigeria, Somali Republic, South Africa, Sudan, Tanganyika, Togo, Tunisia, and Uganda. Such extensive relations far surpass those that the other Eastern European satellites have been able to establish with African countries. (Vernon McKay, *Africa in World Politics*, New York 1963, 228; and *Ost-Probleme*, XIV [August 1962], 490.) If Czechoslovakia's role is to be placed in proper perspective, detailed studies of the roles of the other satellites must be made—a task beyond the scope of this article. The following articles cover the activities of some of the other satellites: "Rumänien und die afro-asiatischen Länder," *Wissenschaftlicher Dienst Südosteuropa*, XI (April-May 1962), 47-51; "Bulgarien und die afro-asiatischen Länder," *ibid.*, XI (June-July 1962), 74-77; "Ungarn und die afro-asiatischen Länder," *ibid.*, XI (August 1962), 93-97.

[3] As translated from the Czech in a quotation used by Jaroslav Šedivý, "ČSSR a hospodářsky málo vyvinuté země" [The Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the underdeveloped countries], *Nová Mysl*, No. 7 (July 1961), 798. This statement can therefore be considered as the guideline for the Czechoslovak Communist government. For the text of the full statement, see *New York Times*, December 7, 1960, 14-17.

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Czechoslovakia sees its main task as rendering all-round assistance to the African nations in their effort to achieve this aim."[4]

The strategic importance of Africa has recently been given some attention by the Czechs. Thus Zanzibar's future independence was related to the ultimate removal of a United States Project Mercury base,[5] and the independence movement throughout the continent to the prospective loss of the remaining Western bases in Libya, Morocco, and elsewhere.[6]

Once the Soviet Union began seriously to concern itself with the underdeveloped countries, its interest was directed at Asian countries that had recently achieved independence, such as India and Burma, or at others that had been traditional targets of Russia, such as Afghanistan and Iran. The Soviet Union arrived in Africa riding on the crest of the wave of nationalism. Her policies were undoubtedly calculated to stir this wave to even greater turbulence. The West was prepared for this, but it did not gauge adequately the Soviet Union's readiness to benefit therefrom. It was apparently forgotten that while the independence movement reached Asia in the immediate postwar years when the Soviet Union was barely holding her own, it reached Africa only after the economic and power position of the Soviet Union had greatly improved.

Soviet involvement in Africa started in Egypt, expanded from there to other Arab and Moslem states, and only subsequently proceeded beyond the Sahara to Black Africa.[7] Thus the Soviet Union followed the time-

[4] In answer to questions posed by UPI London correspondent, George Pipal, ČTK, April 10, 1961. Antonín Novotný, First Secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, said in an address to the 12th Congress of that party on December 4, 1962: "The wars of national liberation from the chains of colonialism have dealt a heavy blow to the world capitalist order. Upon achieving independence these nations have ranged themselves in most cases on the side of those who are anti-imperialist and anti-war. Thus the last few years saw an unprecedented growth in the ranks of those nations that actively join in the resolution of international questions and that often take up a position conforming to that of the socialist countries. . . . We have good and friendly relations with those countries that have freed themselves from colonialism. . . . We stand on their side and today, just as in the past, we are seeking to help them in accord with our abilities." (*Rudé Právo*, supplement, December 5, 1962.) Compare also slogan No. 22 in the May 1, 1960, celebration (*ibid.*, April 4, 1960), and frequent commentaries in *ibid.*—e.g., July 5, 1960.

[5] ČTK, January 11, 1961.

[6] Milan Mádr, "Severoatlantický pakt a Afrika" [NATO and Africa], *Rudé Právo*, October 21, 1962.

[7] There are many excellent accounts of the Soviet Union's policy toward Africa, its origins, various phases, and recent manifestations. The *Mizan Newsletter*, published by the Central Asian Research Centre, London, in association with the Oxford Soviet Affairs Study Group, reviews current Russian research on, and activities in, Africa; especially useful is the February 1962 supplement, "Soviet Economic Relations with Middle East and African Countries." Sergius Yakobson's "Russia and Africa" in *Rus-*

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table set by the independence movement. Her influence grew quickly, in part because of her own clever efforts, but in large measure because of a favorable combination of circumstances that she knew how to exploit. The Soviet Union was quick to grasp Egypt's role as a major influence in the African independence movement, while the West was still thinking of Egypt primarily in traditional strategic terms, in which the Suez Canal loomed large.

The Egyptian Revolution of July 1952 happened to be followed in a few months by the most extreme phase of Russia's and, significantly, Czechoslovakia's anti-Semitic policy: the Doctors' Plot in Russia in January 1953 and the Slánský trial in Czechoslovakia in November 1952. Whether these sensational events disposed the new Egyptian leaders, who were still smarting from the 1948 Palestinian fiasco, more favorably toward the Communist camp is a moot question. It can be argued that neutralist tendencies had manifested themselves even before the fall of Farouk and that, furthermore, it was natural for a revolutionary regime to demonstrate its break with the past and its desire for national independence by opting for a policy of neutralism. In any event, the increasing tension between Great Britain and Egypt over the Suez Canal and the ultimate refusal of the West to underwrite the Aswam dam provided the Soviet Union with an almost perfect opportunity to move into what had become a power vacuum. The Soviet Union then proceeded to bolster her position in Egypt and, benefiting from Gamal Abdel Nasser's dynamic African policy, she was in an excellent position to use Egypt as a base from which to influence other parts of the continent.

Czechoslovakia's involvement in Africa began at this point. She helped the Soviet Union significantly in the latter's effort to build a strong position in Egypt, because she was the most logical country in the "socialist camp" to provide the essentials Egypt needed when the Soviet Union was suddenly called upon for weapons and technical aid to enable Egypt to defy Western pressure in the shortest possible time. Czechoslovakia has a tradition of supplying weapons. Her Lenin works in Plzeň, formerly known as the Škoda works, and other armaments factories near Prague and Brno supplied weapons to the Little Entente in the 1920's and 1930's, to the Russians in the 1930's—a supply that did

sian Foreign Policy, ed. by Ivo J. Lederer (New Haven 1962), gives an excellent concise survey of Russian involvement in Africa from before the Revolution to the present. A survey of more recent Soviet activities is contained in McKay, chaps. 11-13. See also David L. Morrison, "Communism in Africa: Moscow's First Steps," *Problems of Communism*, x (November-December 1961), 8-15; "Soviet Views on Africa," *Soviet Survey* (London), No. 28 (April-June 1959), 37-45; Fritz Schatten, "Nationalismus und Kommunismus in Afrika," *Ost-Probleme*, xiv (August 1962), 482-87.

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not cease even when Hitler occupied Bohemia and Moravia in March 1939—and to Israel, enabling the Israelis to defend their independence against the Arabs in 1948. Czechoslovakia's initial involvement in Africa was therefore in keeping with her traditional role as the supplier of munitions and arms to militarily weaker states. In September 1955 Czechoslovakia agreed to supply Egypt with arms in return for Egyptian cotton.[8] The arms deal was, however, part of a much broader relationship between the two countries, the foundations of which had been laid in March 1955 when Czechoslovakia opened a large industrial exhibit in Cairo. The 5,500 square meters of exhibition space were devoted primarily to displays of engineering industry products. In July a Czechoslovak government delegation visited Cairo, where a trade, payments, and long-term barter agreement was concluded.

From these beginnings Czechoslovakia was to build in Egypt within only a few years a position of impressive strength. Czechoslovakia's share in Egypt's trade rose from 2.1 per cent in 1953 to 2.9 per cent in 1954, 3.9 per cent in 1955, 5.9 per cent in 1957, 6.3 per cent in 1958, and 6.6 per cent in 1959.[9] Her cotton imports from Egypt had by 1960 increased fivefold over the pre-World War II level. It was reported that by the end of 1960 Czechoslovakia had granted Egypt a total of $80.5 millions' worth of loans, not including credit for arms purchases. Czechoslovakia claimed in 1961 that she had put 35 complete industrial installations into operation since 1956. During 1959 and 1960 alone, she exported to Egypt two power plants, cement mills, cane-crushing equipment for a sugar mill, equipment for a nonferrous metal-rolling mill, a factory for the production of ceramics and porcelain, a rubber toy plant, a bicycle plant, a fire clay factory, a plywood factory, and equipment for a footwear factory. Textile machinery, diesel equipment, freight cars, tractors, trucks, machine tools and equipment for mills, and several pumping stations were also delivered.[10] In 1960-1961 the following

[8] For some examples of Czech military and other aid under this agreement, see "Prague, Cairo and Damascus," *East Europe* (April 1958).

[9] ČTK, July 1, 1961. Czechoslovakia's foreign trade with the UAR (including Syria) in 1955-1960 was as follows:

(*in million Czech crowns*)	*1955*	*1956*	*1957*	*1958*	*1959*	*1960*
Imports from UAR	156	298	276	277	331	211
Exports to UAR	100	91	215	328	186	174

During 1957-1960 the UAR was one of Czechoslovakia's three or four most important trade partners in the following Czech export items: diesel engines, electric motors, trucks, autobuses, cut wood, porcelain, and ceramics; and in the following import items: phosphates, cotton, barley, and rice. (*Statistická Ročenka Československé Socialistické Republiky 1961* [Statistical yearbook of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic 1961], Prague 1961, 377-86.)

[10] ČTK, January 2, 1961. See also H. Králova, "Prospects of Development of Czecho-

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additional Czech projects were announced: a power plant, an order for spinning machines, several drinking-water filter stations,[11] an order for seven diesel locomotives, equipment for two tanneries, and a large order of trucks.

Technical aid supplemented economic aid. Egyptian engineers and technicians in considerable numbers were sent to Prague for further training. These included Egyptian pilots, who were trained in Czechoslovakia to fly the planes furnished by the Soviet bloc. The Czechs agreed in 1961 to build a technical institute in Cairo for training work foremen, technicians, and designers. Czech teachers were to lecture in Czech at the language college in Cairo.

Closely tied in with this was the increasing flow of Egyptian students to Czechoslovak universities and technical schools. The Egyptian students were one of the largest contingents in Prague from the underdeveloped countries in 1960. Their presence there must at times be considered a mixed blessing by President Gamal Abdel Nasser, for they have been used occasionally by the Czech Communist government to register Czechoslovakia's displeasure at some of Nasser's domestic anti-Communist policies.[12]

The extensive flow of students from the underdeveloped countries to Prague[13] was not as illogical as it might at first appear. Many of the African states followed the Continental educational pattern, which in theory at least prepared them for Czechoslovakia's institutions of higher learning. There are indications, however, that serious problems were

slovak Trade Relations with Cambodia, Indonesia, UAR," *Czechoslovak Foreign Trade*, 1 (July 1961), 18.

[11] *Rudé Právo*, November 19, 1962.

[12] *Ibid.*, June 2, 1961. African students also demonstrated against French atomic bomb explosions in the Sahara desert in Prague on February 15, 1960, and transmitted their protest to the French Embassy (*ibid.*, February 16, 1960). On February 15, 1961, on the occasion of Patrice Lumumba's murder, they adopted a resolution to be transmitted to the United Nations that requested Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld's removal (Radio Prague, February 15, 1961).

[13] Out of 1,807 foreign university students studying in Czechoslovakia in 1961, 815 were African; 285 of these were already studying in the universities, and another 530 were taking a preparatory one-year course in the Czech language. Since 1959, 160 Africans have received technical training in Czechoslovakia. In 1961, 50 were enrolled from Guinea, Mali, Tunisia, Congo, and Sierra Leone. (*Smena*, Bratislava, June 23 and 29, 1961.) On November 18, 1962, it was announced that 380 new foreign students were matriculated at the University of the 17th of November, and that 86 foreign countries were represented at Czech technical schools and universities. (*Rudé Právo*, October 2 and November 18, 1962. See also *Večerní Praha*, September 21, 1962.) The *Kenya Weekly News* of May 11, 1956, refers to an international students' conference on the problems of colonialism held in Prague on April 13-19, 1956, and attended by Africans from Tunisia, Sudan, French Equatorial Africa, West Africa, Senegal, Egypt, Madagascar, and the Portuguese colonies.

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encountered. The Czechs sent many of the African students first to special language schools to prepare them for the universities and technical institutes. Some were disillusioned or ill prepared and left the country.[14] That the problem was serious was evidenced by the fact that Czechoslovakia set up on September 15, 1961, a new "institution of higher learning which will accommodate foreign students and Czechoslovak experts interested in careers abroad." The institution was called the University of the 17th of November, commemorating the uprising of Prague students against the Nazis in 1939. It is modeled on Moscow's Friendship University. The University's responsibility is to prepare foreign students for more advanced studies and to direct the work of the several preparatory study centers for foreign students that already exist in Czechoslovakia. In the words of the prorector of the University, the function of the University is not merely to educate good specialists, although that is its primary responsibility, but also to create good friends for Czechoslovakia.[15]

A cultural center was opened by the Czechs in Cairo in December 1959. An agreement for scientific and cultural cooperation was signed on November 7, 1960. Czechoslovakia also sent an archaeological expedition, including a specially equipped ship, to assist in the preservation of the Nubian monuments in the Aswan dam flood areas.

All of these activities required increased communications between Prague and Cairo. An agreement to establish a direct Prague-to-Cairo airline was signed in November 1957, and the Czechoslovak airlines opened an office in Cairo in 1960. A trade and navigations treaty was signed on February 7, 1959.

These activities served to build up Czechoslovakia's position not merely in Egypt but in the Arab world in general. Czechoslovakia helped Nasser to spread his propaganda by providing him with several new medium-wave transmitters for his "Voice of the Arabs" radio station.

The absorption of Syria by Egypt in 1958 automatically extended Czechoslovakia's influence to that part of the United Arab Republic. It should be kept in mind, however, that even prior to Syria's incor-

[14] The government of Guinea announced on January 25, 1962, that it had recalled its students from Czechoslovakia. This action has since apparently been rescinded. On January 16, 1962, the *Neue Züricher Zeitung* reported the case of six Somali students who had left Czechoslovakia, apparently because they resented the political indoctrination to which they were exposed. The prorector of the University of the 17th of November, V. Štepánek, wrote an interesting statement (*Rudé Právo*, October 2, 1962) in which he referred to discontent on the part of foreign students, attributing such discontent to students who had come to Czechoslovakia with bad intentions.

[15] *Ibid.*, October 2, 1962.

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poration into the UAR Czechoslovakia exerted a strong influence there.[16] We have excluded Syria from consideration in this article only on the ground that it is not situated in Africa.

Czechoslovakia's influence extends to the Sudan, with which she conducted trade discussions leading to a payments agreement in 1955. She has built several plants there.[17] Her influence reaches also to Libya, with which she began negotiations in 1958 that led to the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1960. Technical aid was to follow. Czechoslovakia concluded a trade and payments agreement with Tunisia in 1961 that envisaged a considerable increase in mutual trade, and the two countries cooperate in the field of science and technology. A Czech film week was held in April 1961. Further discussions for the development of closer ties were held in Prague in October 1962.[18]

Diplomatic relations with Morocco were established in 1959. A Czech trade mission had been set up in Casablanca as early as 1957 and a trade agreement negotiated. A new trade agreement was concluded in 1960 that provided for a 65 per cent increase in the exchange of goods as compared with the preceding period. The year 1960 also witnessed an exchange of trade delegations that was said to have ushered in a new era of expanded cooperation by the Czechs in the building up of Moroccan industries.[19]

It was reported that Czechoslovakia was active in Algeria even before that country's independence.[20] Czechoslovakia was quick to extend *de jure* recognition to the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic on March 21, 1962.[21] On November 2, on the occasion of a visit by a Czechoslovak governmental delegation to Ben Bella and Ferat Abbas, the latter publicly thanked the Czechs for the aid which Czechoslovakia had rendered and expressed the hope that mutual cooperation would develop further.[22]

[16] "Prague, Cairo and Damascus," *East Europe* (April 1958).

[17] There were rumors in 1956 that Sudan was considering the purchase of Czechoslovak arms. This was officially denied later on. (*Manchester Guardian*, March 24, 1956, and *Times* [London], April 24 and July 30, 1956.) See also *Africa Digest*, No. 3 (May 1956), 39, and No. 4 (July 1956), 70.

[18] *Rudé Právo*, October 2, 1962.

[19] Stanislav Kubánek, "Prospects of Development of Economic Relations Between Czechoslovakia and Morocco," *Czechoslovak Foreign Trade*, 1 (February 1961), 17-18.

[20] An AP dispatch from Algeria, dated July 8, 1962, reported that Ben Bella's forces were equipped with Czechoslovak arms. A delegation of the General Union of Workers of Algeria, led by General Secretary Abdel Kader Maach, visited Czechoslovakia in March 1961 and discussed "forms of further cooperation between trade unions of the two countries" (ČTK, March 21, 1961).

[21] ČTK, February 21, 1962.

[22] *Rudé Právo*, November 4, 1962.

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An African country in which Czechoslovakia is strongly entrenched is Ethiopia. The Czech Communists, who have repeatedly and vehemently denounced the pre-Communist leadership of Edvard Beneš, have not hesitated to stand on his pre-World War II diplomatic record in their attempt to win Ethiopia's friendship. Emperor Haile Selassie visited Prague in 1959. The Emperor's references to the support that he received from Czechoslovakia in the League of Nations in his 1935 stand against Italy were quoted with obvious satisfaction in *Rudé Právo*, the leading Czech Communist newspaper. Within less than a year of the Emperor's Czechoslovak visit the two countries ratified a treaty of friendship and cooperation, an agreement on cultural cooperation, and one on scientific and technical cooperation.[23] The Czechs held a major industrial exhibition in Addis Ababa in November 1960.[24] They installed machinery in a footwear factory in the Ethiopian capital, delivered complete equipment for eight hospitals, and provided scholarships to enable Ethiopian students to study at Czechoslovak universities.[25]

Czechoslovakia's friendly relations with Ethiopia did not deter her from establishing good relations with Ethiopia's archenemy, Somalia, upon the latter's achievement of independence in July 1960. Thus the Somali Minister of Education announced after visiting Czechoslovakia in December 1960 that Czechoslovakia would build a technical institute in Somalia and would give forty Somali students technical training in Czechoslovakia.[26] The Prime Minister of Somalia visited Prague in 1961 and Czech-Somali agreements were subsequently concluded in the cultural and commercial fields as well as one on economic cooperation.[27]

Czechoslovakia's activities in Egypt had prepared her for the opportunities that opened up with the spread of the independence movement to Africa south of the Sahara. Her point of penetration was Guinea, which, alone of France's former colonial possessions, had opted in September 1958 for immediate independence. It was hardly a matter of accident that Guinea's nationalistic leader and President, Sékou Touré, turned immediately to Prague for military and economic aid. Since 1949 students from West Africa had attended Czechoslovak universities, and Sékou Touré had been among the earliest ones.[28] His

[23] *Ibid.*, May 19, 1960.

[24] *Czechoslovak Foreign Trade*, 1 (March 1961), 17-18.

[25] Following a Czech journalist's stay of ten days in Ethiopia in 1960, many items favorable to Communist Czechoslovakia appeared in the *Ethiopian Herald* (e.g., March 22 and 25, April 21 and 27, May 4, 9, 16, and June 1, 11, 22).

[26] Speech by Minister of Public Education, Ali Garad Jama, upon his return from a tour of foreign countries, February 14, 1961.

[27] *Rudé Právo*, October 23, 1962.

[28] *Zemědělské Noviny*, April 11, 1959.

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experience apparently left a permanent attachment that was to be of crucial importance in securing for Czechoslovakia a foothold in West Africa from which she was able to build up a strong position in a very short period of time. Shortly after Guinea had formally acquired independence, a Czechoslovak mission signed an agreement with Guinea on economic, scientific, and cultural relations.[29] Two shipments of Czechoslovak arms valued at roughly $500,000 arrived in Conakry, along with a group of technicians. An accord, signed on May 25, 1961, increased the credit extended by Czechoslovakia to Guinea to a total of $10 million. Czechoslovakia has provided Guinea with complete equipment for various industrial plants, machines of all types, a radio station, automobiles, trucks, motorcycles, agricultural implements, medical supplies, paper, textiles, shoes, and sugar.[30]

Czechoslovakia's influence in the political and cultural fields appears to be as important as in the economic field. Czechoslovakia has been host to countless Guinean delegations, including one of members of Parliament who sought to "become acquainted with the work and accomplishments of Czech state organs." Together with Polish experts, the Czechs helped the Guineans open a school of journalism in Conakry that will train Guinean journalists "not merely to inform but to fight for a better future for Guinea, for the complete liberation of Africa and for peaceful coexistence among all nations."[31] This was followed by the conclusion of a protocol of mutual cooperation between Guinean and Czech official news agencies in news reporting and photographic services. The Czechs also provide the Guineans with films, and arrangements were made in 1961 for Czechs to help the Guineans in the shooting of their first full-length film. The Czechs helped in the establishment of the first national museum and a Czech museum director traveled through the interior of the country for "surveys and discoveries."

Following the example provided in Cairo, the Czechs set out to improve their connections with Guinea and established a direct airline between Prague and Conakry via Zürich, Rabat, and Dakar that began operations on July 19, 1960. This airline made headlines when it suffered two fatal crashes within a four-month period in 1961. Its importance to Guinea can be gauged in part from the fact that Czech has been added to French and English on Conakry airport signs.

In the light of the foregoing, it is not surprising that Conakry was alleged to be the headquarters for Czech efforts in Africa south of the

[29] *Rudé Právo*, May 19, 1960.
[30] K. Madhu Panikkar, *Revolution in Africa* (Bombay 1961), 7-8, 177-78; "The Courting of Guinea," *East Europe* (May 1960).
[31] ČTK, February 21, 1961.

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Sahara, and the distribution point for the 11 million pieces of propaganda for Africa reportedly produced in the first half of 1960 by the printing offices of Czechoslovakia at the order of the Africa Institute in Prague.[32]

Czech influence has penetrated Mali and Ghana. Symptomatic was the extension of the Prague-Conakry airline to Bamako on February 14, 1961. Czechoslovak penetration of Mali has so far been on a smaller scale than that of Guinea, but the nature of the Czech efforts is very similar. Delegations exchanged visits between the two countries, Czechoslovakia provided technical assistance in the construction of a leather industry combine, and credit was granted for the purchase of equipment for a textile factory, a hospital, a laboratory, machinery, and so forth. Cultural cooperation was initiated in 1961, and an agreement was signed in March 1961, according to which Czechoslovakia was to aid Mali in the establishment of its own press agency and in the training of journalists.[33]

In view of Kwame Nkrumah's recent position as one quite critical of many aspects of Western policy, it is surprising that Czechoslovakia's contacts with Ghana were slow to mature. Although Ghana became independent in 1957, it was not until 1960 that the relations between the two countries became close. An accord was signed in May 1961 providing for a long-term loan for the purchase of Czechoslovak plants, including sugar mills, shoe factories, ceramic plants, machinery for four hydroelectric power plants, tanning and plywood factories, and a 200-bed hospital. In the beginning of August 1961, Kwame Nkrumah visited Prague to cement these close relations further.

While the above countries were either members of the so-called Casablanca Group or, in the case of Ethiopia, Somalia, and the Sudan, somewhat in sympathy with it, Czechoslovakia sought to influence also the "Monrovia Group" of African states. Thus the Czech press took notice of the approaching independence of every former member of the French colonial empire. Czech official missions were sent to attend the independence celebrations. Students from Nigeria had attended Czech universities for some time. Even Liberia, the African country with the closest American ties, was not neglected. A Czech commercial mission

[32] "Conflict in the Congo," *American Universities Field Staff Reports,* Central and Southern Africa Series, VIII, No. 4 (October 1960), 2. Following the revelation of a plot in December 1961 against Sékou Touré that implicated the Soviet Embassy, as well as those of other East European countries, relations between Guinea and Czechoslovakia cooled off somewhat. Guinea has tried to restore friendlier relations with Western countries, including France. It appears, however, that Czechoslovakia will continue to play a vital role in Guinean affairs, albeit a more circumspect one.

[33] ČTK, March 30, 1961.

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visited Liberia in November 1958 to explore the question of Czech-Liberian commercial ties. A delegation attended the celebrations in honor of the inauguration of President Tubman to another term of office. Further missions exploring the possibility of extending trade were exchanged in 1960 and 1961.

When the Belgian Congo became independent in July 1960, Czechoslovakia dispatched a delegation to attend the ceremonies. The Czech delegation was received by Kasavubu on July 4 and offered cooperation in the fields of culture, education, and scientific-technical aid. It was reported that in a short time from 250 to 300 Russians and Czechs, including diplomats, technicians, doctors, mechanics, interpreters, and journalists, arrived on the scene. The Czechs had about fifteen members on their official embassy staff. However, the Russians and Czechs had apparently miscalculated and were subsequently expelled. Only recently have they re-established relations with the central Congolese government. The Czech press played up the difficulties in the Congo, especially Patrice Lumumba's murder, and public demonstrations took place in Czechoslovakia to protest Lumumba's fate. Antoine Gizenga was then supported until his power weakened.

With the independence movement sweeping the former British colonies of East Africa, Czechoslovakia entered a new area. On October 28, 1962, it was announced in Prague that an agreement had been reached providing for the establishment of diplomatic relations with Uganda.[34]

From this account of Czechoslovakia's activities in various parts of Africa a pattern emerges. Once the Soviet Union recognized the opportunity for an increase in her own power presented by the quickly changing conditions in Africa, she called upon her satellites to give her special aid to meet the challenge most effectively. Czechoslovakia was always ready to deliver arms on short notice, as in the cases of Egypt and Guinea. She could then supplement the limited credit facilities of the Russians with considerable amounts of her own. But perhaps the most important fact was that Czechoslovakia possessed the skills and experience to help underdeveloped countries set up important industries,[35] to build and equip hospitals, to establish institutions to train technicians and, last but not least, to educate African students in Czechoslovak institutions of higher learning. As a consequence of such aid closer cultural and political ties developed, leading ultimately to the

[34] *Rudé Právo*, October 28, 1962.

[35] Josef Jonáš, "Czechoslovak Socialist Republic: An Exporter of Complete Industrial Plants," *Czechoslovak Foreign Trade*, 1 (October 1961), 3.

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establishment of Czech centers of culture, Czech movie weeks, and Czech influence in journalism.[36] While Czechoslovakia's efforts have so far borne fruit in only a relatively small number of African states, she stands ready to extend her operations to other countries at a moment's notice, should the opportunity arise.

There is little doubt that Czechoslovakia's ventures in Africa fit into the larger framework of Soviet policy and would have been impossible without Soviet approval. Czechoslovakia's active role in Africa enables the Soviet Union to wield influence far beyond the limits imposed by exclusive reliance on her own resources. By relying on and acting through Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union is able not only to save her own limited and technical and capital resources, but also to reach states that are more worried about cooperating with the Russian colossus than with little Czechoslovakia. It can be said with considerable justification that the tremendous effort exerted by Czechoslovakia in the Soviet Union's drive in underdeveloped areas since 1955 takes the place of the more direct form of economic exploitation by the Soviet Union that Czechoslovakia suffered between 1949 and 1955.

On the other hand, Czechoslovakia is advancing not merely Soviet interests, but also interests of particular importance to herself. There is little doubt that the Communist leaders of Czechoslovakia consider the involvement in Africa and the other underdeveloped parts of the world as strengthening their regime at home. The mere fact that Czechoslovakia is called upon for assistance by non-Communist countries serves as proof to the people that the Communist system in Czechoslovakia works and is respected abroad. Indirectly this also serves as an answer to the charge that the Communist regime has acted as a brake on economic and industrial progress. After all, the African countries have by their own free choice selected Czechoslovak aid over the help proffered by Western countries. It might be added that, for those Czechs who are sent to the backward African states, conditions there cannot help but raise their estimate of conditions at home. The Czech economy with all its shortages and imperfections is preferable to conditions in an African country. That there are plenty of Czech technicians who are glad to be sent to Africa is not at all surprising. One of the most common complaints in contemporary Czechoslovakia is the lack of freedom

[36] An interesting example of Czechoslovakia's offensive in the cultural field is the *New Orient* (produced in English), a journal devoted to the modern and ancient cultures of Asia and Africa that is published in Prague by the Czechoslovak Society for Eastern Studies. It is obviously intended to impress the intellectual elite of the independent countries of Africa with the extent of Czechoslovakia's interest in African culture.

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to travel abroad. Many Czechs will jump at this opportunity to fulfill their desire to get away and to be able to do it legally and as part of a patriotic enterprise. However, it is significant that there have been very few reports of technicians who have utilized their stay in underdeveloped countries as a means of permanent escape from Communist Czechoslovakia.

The Communist regime is certainly happy to be able to prove to the Czech people that it is playing an important role in the world. There are many indications that the regime has suffered from its position of inferiority as a satellite of the Soviet Union. Since Czechoslovakia became involved in underdeveloped countries, this has changed. Hardly a month passes without a dignitary from the non-Communist world visiting Prague and paying his respects to the Communist government. Czechoslovakia is respected in Africa. Her flag flies in many countries. Africans take the trouble to study Czech, until recently one of the less important languages in the world. In short, Czechoslovakia is no longer submerged within the Soviet bloc, but is given considerable attention by the non-Communist world. This appeals also to a somewhat traditional, although usually repressed, desire on the part of the Czechs to achieve some measure of greatness to compensate for the unfortunate geographical position that has so long placed them in the shadow of more powerful nations.

Finally, there are economic benefits. Czechoslovakia has received exports of tropical fruits and raw materials in return for her aid to the West African states. Against this gain, however, one must place the heavy burden that Czechoslovakia's extensive aid program puts on the Czechoslovak people. Czechoslovakia often underbids other countries by building projects at what undoubtedly constitutes an economic sacrifice for her. Her programs of economic aid are, after all, determined by considerations of political necessity rather than economic feasibility.

In conclusion, it can be said that Czechoslovakia's involvement in Africa is on an enormous scale if the small size of the country and the limited population are kept in mind. Czechoslovakia is making a major contribution to the Soviet Union's aims vis-à-vis the underdeveloped countries, and the Czechoslovak Communist regime has gained prestige that strengthens its domestic position. Czechoslovakia's increasing contacts with non-Communist states open up possibilities that so far remain in the realm of speculation. In any event, Czechoslovakia's manifold ties with African and Asian states must have an impact on a country that has until recently been almost completely cut off from the outside world.

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BARGAINING AND BOMBING DURING WORLD WAR II IN EUROPE

By GEORGE QUESTER

I. Introduction

THE Second World War is often regarded as a virtually total conflict, with few mutual restraints to bind the belligerents to less than maximum use of their destructive capabilities. While it is generally remembered that poison gas and bacteriological weapons were not used, these limits are usually cited as great exceptions to the rule. Relatively little notice has been taken of the restraints in Europe on the use of conventional high-explosive and incendiary bombs in aerial bombardment, restraints which remained in effect for an unexpectedly long time after the start of the war.

The most common explanation for restraints shown in war is straightforwardly that many destructive acts do not in and of themselves serve the interests, physical or moral, of the nation capable of them, since interests of nations at war are not all antithetical and therefore no nation destroys as much as it is able to destroy.

Yet such an explanation of limited war would be sufficient only if neither side had made significant assumptions about the motivation of its opponent. The point of view of this article requires an assessment of the bargaining process in which each participant sees value in leaving some "utility" to his opponents, while reminding them of his ability to deprive them of it—a bargaining process which at times in World War II led to serious departures from the pattern of attack that would have been appropriate in the absence of communicated intentions, a bargaining process which at other times had no discernible impact, however, as the participants decided to write off any bargaining gains.

The interaction of "practical" considerations of what type of destruction is desirable in itself, and "bargaining" considerations (potent or neutral) of what behavior might be discreetly impressed upon an enemy, is the determinant of the nature of war in general, and of the air campaigns of World War II in Europe in particular.

II. September 1939-May 1940: The "Phoney War"

Despite many dire prewar predictions of a total conflict leaving no sanctuary for civilian populations, and despite the existence of a German

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force of over 1,100 bombing aircraft and of an Anglo-French force of approximately 1,000, the opening rounds of the Second World War witnessed no bombing raids at all on the populated areas of Germany, Britain, or France.

On the first day of the war, September 1, 1939, President Roosevelt had addressed an appeal to the belligerent powers for a restriction of aerial warfare to strictly military targets, the formal acceptance of which appeal was announced on the 2nd by the Allies, and on the 18th of September by the German government.[1] Yet all evidence indicates that orders to this effect had been issued to each of the air forces in question even before the appeal.

During the German September campaign in Poland, the Luftwaffe was used primarily in close support of army units, or in attacks on the airstrips of the Polish Air Force. A series of attacks was carried out on Warsaw itself in the first week of the war, and again in the final siege of the city, but orders were issued to all crews in the first raids to aim with care at bridges and communications targets, and the bombings of the final siege were explained by the Germans as close tactical support against resisting enemy positions.[2]

Whatever the implications of the Polish campaign, German operations in the West were limited to reconnaissance flights and to minelaying and attacks on coastal shipping. Orders to the Luftwaffe in this early period were so strict as to preclude almost any attack which would be likely to result in bombs falling on British or French soil.[3] Allied bombers, similarly restricted, conducted only reconnaissance missions, some leaflet raids, and a few attacks on ships and bases of the German fleet. Even the raids made against naval shore bases on both sides were limited to targets well-isolated from populated areas.[4]

The German invasion of Norway in April 1940 saw a use in that country of both bomber forces, again in a tactical role. No expansion of the air war in the West was to occur, however, until the invasion of the Low Countries on May 10, more than eight months after the outbreak of the war.

For these first eight months, then, the exemption from air attack applied not only to the capital cities of Berlin, London, and Paris, but

[1] Charles Webster and Noble Frankland, *The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany* (London 1961), 134.

[2] J. R. M. Butler, *Grand Strategy*, II (London 1957), 20; Basil Collier, *The Defence of the United Kingdom* (London 1957), 79; Albert Kesselring, *A Soldier's Record* (New York 1954), 42.

[3] Werner Baumbach, *Broken Swastika* (London 1960), 69-70; Adolf Galland, *The First and the Last* (New York 1954), 19.

[4] Webster and Frankland, 140.

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to all other populated areas of the three countries, however close to military or industrial targets.

The Allied decisions in August and September 1939 not to launch a strategic air attack on Germany were based largely on estimates of the capabilities of the German Air Force, estimates which seemed valid at the start of the war, but which have since been shown to be quite unrealistic.

By 1938 the Allies had seen signs of rapid growth in the Luftwaffe, growth by which the Germans seemed to reach parity with, and then surpass, Allied air strength. In the interpretation of this apparent German superiority (the Allies in 1939 rated the Luftwaffe bomber force at 2,100 instead of its actual 1,100), the Allied governments drew upon air-power theory formulated in the years since 1918, and reached truly frightening conclusions as to the peril to which their homelands were now exposed.

Strategic planners in Britain and France between the wars had come to believe that relatively moderate tonnages of high explosives dropped for one or two days on a few large cities (a "knockout blow") would cripple not only a nation's civilian life, but the operation of industry and government, thus imposing strong pressures for a negotiated peace or surrender.[5] These estimates (traceable in part to the Italian General Giulio Douhet's *The Command of the Air*, which stressed bomber capabilities and treated other forms of air strength as unnecessary)[6] were thought to be particularly applicable to London in England, and Paris in France, where concentrated, single metropolitan areas held the nerve centers of national political and cultural life, together with a large part of the heavy industry of the country and a good deal of its population.[7]

In 1920 Lord Balfour estimated that a steady assault of only 75 tons of high explosives a day would quickly make London untenable for both the British government and the civilian population;[8] as late as 1937, a Joint Planner's Report to the Chiefs of Staff still forecast that 150,000 casualties a week would be suffered by London in an air attack.[9] The extent to which such extreme conclusions had influenced not only the Allied planners, but also the general public, was illustrated in September 1938, when almost a third of the population of

[5] Collier, 1; Constantine Fitz Gibbon, *The Blitz* (London 1957), 6-8.
[6] J. M. Spaight, *Air Power and War Rights* (3rd edn., London 1947), 32.
[7] Collier, 31-32.
[8] *Ibid.*, 11.
[9] Webster and Frankland, 89.

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Paris rushed to leave the city during the Munich crisis, and when trenches were dug as bomb shelters in London's Hyde Park.[10]

Douhet believed, moreover, that the proper counter to such aerial attack was to equip oneself with the better bomber force, and to strike earlier and harder in an "offensive counterforce" sense at the enemy's strategic centers and aircraft industry. In the early 1920's, when Germany had no air force and Britain and France saw themselves as potential aerial antagonists, the calculations of the vulnerability of Paris and London did indeed produce primarily bomber forces in the two countries.[11] After 1935, however, the Western planners came to see Germany as the only air enemy, an enemy against which some serious damage could be directed by air raids, but an enemy with enough dispersal of its population centers to preclude a "knockout blow." The "knockout blow" against London or Paris was still, however, to be feared.

The apparent rapid growth of the Luftwaffe, coupled with this belief in an inherently lesser vulnerability of Germany to a "knockout" attack, had led the RAF in 1938 to reverse its bomber emphasis of the interwar period, and to begin frantically building up its fighter forces. The French Air Force over this period, hamstrung in its modernization program by a series of political crises, not only ceased to develop its strategic bomber forces, but gained no compensating strength in its air defenses.[12]

The Allied leadership thus was left in 1939 with a serious apprehension about the effects of German bombing, and with no matching confidence in the ability of Allied bombers to destroy the German capability for air attack. Allied offensive attacks did not promise to save London and Paris, defensive measures seemed able to help these cities only to a slight degree, and the holding of German population centers as intact hostages appeared to be the sole possible means of sparing them. The British and French governments therefore saw the gains of restraint, the avoidance of horrible destruction to their cities, as outweighing the costs, the missed opportunities for a strategic weakening of Germany; no reversal of this opinion was to take effect until May 1940.

The German decision, on the other hand, to hold back the Luftwaffe in 1939 stemmed from calculations quite different from those of Chamberlain and Daladier. The German Air Force, unlike those of Britain and France, seems never to have really accepted Douhet's theories on the omnipotence of the bomber; and, except during the short tenure of General Walther Wever (killed in a crash in 1936), the Luftwaffe

[10] John Wheeler-Bennett, *Munich: Prologue to Tragedy* (New York 1948), 11.
[11] Collier, 15. [12] Butler, 33.

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did not seek to develop a true long-range, high-payload, strategic bombing aircraft.[13] Despite its independent status and a tendency to revel in its aerial accomplishments, the Luftwaffe was in fact satisfied with the functions of close support to the ground forces and the maintenance of tactical air superiority, the precise functions which Douhet (and his disciples) tended to regard as superfluous.[14]

As the German leadership did not believe in the feasibility of the "knockout blow" against its enemies, it similarly did not fear any such blow against Germany. Yet Hitler was nevertheless very anxious to avoid any bombing of Germany at all, not for fear of the total breakdown envisaged in London and Paris, but because of his personal desire to spare Germany all possible wartime hardship, and because of a fear that the enthusiasm of the German people for his regime might not survive the rigors of war. Hitler's policies on production of consumer goods, on the mobilization of women, and so forth, all show his great unwillingness to impose a real austerity on Germany, and his aversion to an aerial exchange of strategic attacks sprang from the same motive.

Apart from this desire to avoid an assault on Germany, Hitler for the first two months of the war also still cherished the hope of a negotiated peace with France and Great Britain, on the basis of the *status quo* achieved in the East, thus additionally precluding a Luftwaffe offensive which might further antagonize the Allies.

Anxious, therefore, to avoid an actual exchange of blows, the German leadership strove to build up the deterring fears of the Allies, fears which the Luftwaffe did not feel itself capable of fulfilling.[15] The Germans were, however, not averse to additionally exploiting such fears for lesser purposes, and the successive take-overs of Austria, the Sudetenland, and Bohemia-Moravia all involved subtle references by Goering and others to the possibility of "total destruction" raining down from the air, if German demands were resisted.[16]

Thus we find the German leadership, down to September 1939, playing the somewhat dangerous game of bluffing a course of action which at all costs it wanted to avoid, a bluffing based on the exaggerated fears of its opponents. Hitler saw little possibility of victory in an aerial assault on the population centers of the Allies and, for several reasons, he was extremely reluctant to have his own population centers bombed.

[13] Telford Taylor, *The March of Conquest* (New York 1958), 24.
[14] Derek Wood and Derek Dempster, *The Narrow Margin* (London 1961), 44-45.
[15] Walter Ansel, *Hitler Confronts England* (Durham, N.C., 1960), 192-93.
[16] J. M. Spaight, *Bombing Vindicated* (London 1944), 18.

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Hence German policies emphasized air defense and ignored long-range bombers; hence the German Air Force did not initiate attacks on Allied cities in 1939.

III. May 1940-June 1940: The Defeat of France

The German attack of May 10 on Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg, with its ensuing offensive into France, saw the use of the Luftwaffe in a role similar to that played in Poland, aiming to destroy opposing air forces, achieve air superiority, and give tactical support to the army. On the 14th of May, in the confused fighting around Rotterdam, a force of dive bombers destroyed a considerable portion of the city, which was again, however, explained by the Germans as a tactical move against a defended town (although some of the more bombastic German propaganda was not so careful to indicate circumscription).[17] No clear deviation from the pattern of tactical bombing on the German side was in fact ordered, as the German forces rolled rapidly westward through Belgium to the Channel. In the period up to the French surrender on June 17, Paris itself was not bombed, targets elsewhere in France of a non-military nature were generally spared, and only a very few raids were made on Great Britain, raids generally limited to RAF fighter strips in southeastern England.[18]

On May 15, however, the day after the bombing of Rotterdam, RAF Bomber Command had received orders to start striking at targets in northwestern Germany, orders which were to change from day to day as the Allied position in France collapsed. In the period up to the French surrender, raids were alternately conducted on German ground forces, on the German synthetic oil industry, on communications links from Germany to the front, and on various other "panacea" targets in the Ruhr. The bombing of Germany itself was therefore not a sustained or heavy effort, and specific objects of military significance were always the target; the attacks were, however, conducted at night and on targets close to or in cities, thus subjecting the civilian population of portions of northwestern Germany to their first bombardment. No raids were conducted as yet against Berlin, or against other cities in the east of Germany.[19]

With the Allied evacuation of Dunkirk and the French surrender, German air activity came to a pause, and the British effort was predominantly, although not completely, pulled away from targets in Germany and directed against the coastal and shipping facilities needed for a

[17] Kesselring, 57. [18] Collier, 156. [19] Webster and Frankland, 148.

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German invasion of Britain. The French Air Force had been limited throughout the campaign to giving close support to the Allied ground forces, and no French strategic raids were launched against Germany. With the entry of Italy into the war in June, the French government in fact prevented British "Haddock Force" bombers from leaving bases in southern France on raids into northern Italy.[20]

By June, Paris and northern France were occupied, and southern France was out of the war. London and the other large British cities, however, had not yet been subjected to bombing, while Berlin and most (but not all) German cities still enjoyed a similar dispensation. Those cities of Germany which had been attacked had not been heavily bombed as yet, and the attacks had not inflicted maximum damage on them. The air war had lost a participant, but it was still far from unlimited.

The German restraints observed throughout the campaign in the Low Countries and France demonstrated a continuing German desire to impress distinctions on the Allies which would prevent a heavy assault on German cities—a desire which at times however was crossed by the irresponsibility of German propaganda agencies, and by the inherent haziness of the distinction between tactical and strategic operations.

It was the case, moreover, that Hitler again had high hopes of negotiating an end to the war with Britain after the defeat of France, and that he hoped to make such a settlement easier by showing restraints in his conduct of the campaign. It was possible that the possession of intact cities might make the British feel that they had more to gain by a peace. The restraints shown in the sparing of French cities similarly served to give the French a stake in an early surrender, a stake which the Luftwaffe could easily deny them if it desired, but which would be retained by a speedy French capitulation.

The extreme British fears of a "knockout blow" had however been considerably moderated over the period of September 1939 to May 1940, as civil defense and air defense preparations in the United Kingdom began to show some progress, as newer and more sober estimates were made of the nature of aerial bombardment, as new perils arising for Britain tended to reduce the relative importance of the aerial threat, and as Winston Churchill replaced Chamberlain as the British Prime Minister.[21]

[20] Denis Richards, *Royal Air Force, 1939-1945*, I (London 1953), 146.
[21] Butler, 211.

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A segment of the RAF Air Staff moreover still felt (as it had before the war) that significant results might be achieved by a precision assault on a few "key" targets in Germany; these planners had continued to press for permission to begin such an offensive, to put Bomber Command to some use at last.[22] The fate of Rotterdam and the ambiguity of German declarations about this instance of bombing moreover reduced British prospects of being forever spared; in view of the German successes on the ground, it was felt that it might, in fact, be advantageous to bait the Luftwaffe onto military targets in Britain (thus easing pressure on the forces in France, and bringing to action those RAF fighter squadrons which had in any event to be held in Britain).[23]

For all these reasons, the order to commence a program of "precision" night bombings of military and industrial targets in Germany was given on May 15. The British had not yet lost all hope of being spared severe bombardment of their cities, nor had they decided to end all their self-restraints; the prospect of German bombardment had merely become a less terrifying one, while the hope of avoiding it was no longer as bright, thereby making lesser British restraints now seem appropriate. The exemption of Berlin from attack was still maintained, in hope that London might yet be spared and in face of the physical disadvantages of long-range strikes against eastern Germany. While it was thought necessary to attack by night to avoid high casualties, it was still intended that target discrimination would be practiced; the extent to which inaccuracies at night would weaken this distinction in the eyes of the attacked country was not appreciated (an error which was to be repeated by both sides at several more critical points in the exchange of blows).[24]

Until the very surrender, the French government still lived in real terror of the fate that might befall its undefended and unprepared cities, and the British raids on Germany throughout the campaign were conducted against French desires.[25] The projected raids against northern Italy were thus forcibly stopped by the French to prevent a feared massive Italian retaliation against Nice and Marseilles.

IV. June 1940-August 1940: The Battle of Britain

Through the early phases of the Battle of Britain, RAF Bomber Command was directed in large part against the German airstrips in France and the German shipping being assembled on the coasts facing England,

[22] Webster and Frankland, 244.
[23] Fitz Gibbon, 42; Richards, 122.
[24] Webster and Frankland, 145.
[25] *Ibid.*, 143; Richards, 111.

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and only to a smaller extent against the targets of the Ruhr valley and northwestern Germany. Raids against Germany were generally conducted at night, but still with some attempt to emphasize military and industrial targeting and to avoid civilian casualties. No raids at all were made on Berlin or on cities without industrial significance.[26]

German air activity from June 17 to July 10 limited itself to a series of minor probing attacks, of which the targets usually were British airdromes. On July 10, however, there began a heavy assault on English coastal shipping which was to continue until August 12, when the massive attack shifted to airdromes and, for the first time, to plants of the British aircraft industry.[27] Thus while the British public still was spared serious exposure to attack, it had become more exposed after the 12th, as the Luftwaffe not only went after RAF stations (most, but not all, of which were away from built-up areas), but also after aircraft factories, many of which were in or near population centers. The Luftwaffe's attacks continued to be made primarily by daylight up to the 24th of August, and aimed quite specifically at precise targets which would contribute to the achievement of air superiority over the RAF.[28]

While Germany thus continued to be spared the bombing of its capital and to be subjected only to minor attacks on a few of its population centers, Great Britain was undergoing a very intense assault on the supporting facilities of its air force, which nonetheless still left most of its population centers, particularly London, unscathed. The German assault, moreover, was being carried out so as not to inflict serious civilian casualties even in the area of attack.

The German victory in France had brought the threat of occupation to Britain, a prospect which made safety from aerial bombing seem a minor question. While the moderate British campaign of night attacks against Germany continued to observe rules of discriminate bombing, the incentive for such limits came thus to rely less and less on bargaining considerations relative to the safety of British cities, and more simply on the high practical results the target selectors continued to expect from attacks on "key" industries. The German invasion threat had not yet removed all significance from mutual aerial restraints for the British, but it had again seriously reduced this significance.

The lull in the German air effort illustrated Hitler's continuing desire for a negotiated peace. The abandonment of such hopes and the decision to prepare for an invasion of Britain produced a vast Luftwaffe effort aimed at the achievement of air superiority over the RAF, an

[26] Webster and Frankland, 148. [27] Collier, 450-59. [28] Wood and Dempster, 220.

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achievement regarded as the *sine qua non* for a successful invasion.[29] The initial massive attacks on shipping thus were planned primarily to force the RAF into a battle which would exhaust most of its strength; the subsequent shift to the airdromes and facilities of Fighter Command, and to the aircraft industry, was designed to complete this attrition process.[30]

The care nonetheless shown to limit civilian damage in this German operation still stemmed significantly from hopes for a similar discrimination in RAF attacks on Germany, and, in addition, from a new desire, perhaps, to preserve the shock of a "terror" assault for the most strategic moment on the day of the invasion. If and when prospects of a German conquest of Britain appeared bright, the dangers of a prolonged RAF retaliation would disappear, and the temptation to treat Britain as one more "tactical area" open to bombing would be great.

For the period of the Battle of Britain, however, the intention remained in effect that Luftwaffe air supremacy should be won without harming the "hostages" of London and other British cities. Losses to the Luftwaffe proved to be considerably higher than had been expected, and higher than those of the RAF; yet the precise, daylight attacks on RAF bases began to show results, threatening to destroy the communications net which had given Fighter Command advantages compensating for its numerical inferiority.[31]

Thus, as the Luftwaffe displayed a discretion in its choice of targets in Britain, a threat of German tactical victory in the air arose; yet the danger of such a German victory rapidly was making this German discretion worthless to the British.

V. August 1940-May 1941: The "Blitz"

On the 24th of August 1940, the Luftwaffe, still concentrating its daytime attack on the installations and supporting industries of the RAF, added a series of night attacks on industrial targets in cities around England.[32] Although London was not programmed as a target, navigation and accuracy inevitably suffered at night, and several planes did drop their bombs unintentionally on London on the 24th (London had, in fact, been accidentally bombed before, as early as the 18th of June).[33] The extension and change in form of the Luftwaffe raids thus once more increased the exposure of the British populace to aerial attack, if

[29] Drew Middleton, *The Sky Suspended* (New York 1960), 35.
[30] Collier, 234.
[31] Middleton, 148; Peter Wykesham, *Fighter Command* (London 1960), 114.
[32] Collier, 203; Richards, 171. [33] Collier, 207.

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only because of the lesser accuracies of night bombing, but as yet no serious raids had occurred on the London area, or on targets not having industrial or military significance.

On the 25th of August, however, 95 aircraft of Bomber Command were dispatched on the first strike against Berlin (of which 81 found the target), a strike executed as usual by night, intended nonetheless to be precision bombing of industrial targets.[34] Berlin was now placed on the regular target list alongside the invasion ports and the Ruhr.[35]

On the 7th of September the Luftwaffe halted most of its attack on the airdromes and began a heavy assault on the city of London, an assault which was to continue for two months, until the middle of November.[36] While the orders to the German crews were to bomb carefully and not indiscriminately, the sheer weight of the night attacks tended to mitigate the effects of such orders.[37] After the 14th of November, attacks were extended again to areas outside of London, targets and aiming points still being chosen for industrial potential, the opening of the new phase being a severe raid on Coventry.[38] Intensive raids alternating between London and the lesser cities of Britain continued through the winter and spring, until the middle of May 1941.

Over the period of the "Blitz," Bomber Command continued to hit an assortment of targets, including the Ruhr, northern Italy, Berlin, invasion shipping, German naval bases, and various special industrial sites around northwestern Germany. On October 30, 1940, it was decided, moreover, to seek targets with a supplementary effect for stray bombs—i.e., targets surrounded by populated areas.[39] On December 12 an attack experimentally designed to inflict maximum destruction on a German town was ordered, the "area bombing" attack being executed on Mannheim on the night of the 16th, with disappointing results.[40]

Early 1941 saw attacks on German U-boat bases, and another area attack on Bremen, followed through the rest of the spring by similar attacks on a series of German North Sea ports. Yet as British bomber forces were drawn away to the Middle East and to anti-submarine patrols at sea, the British failed to match the bombing tonnage of the German assault.[41]

The winter of 1940-1941 thus saw all possible military and industrial targets opened to attack in both Britain and the Axis homelands. No deliberate "terror-maximizing" attacks had as yet been launched against

[34] Arthur Bryant, *The Turn of the Tide* (London 1957), 213; Collier, 234.
[35] Collier, 235. [36] *Ibid.*, 234-61.
[37] Ronald Wheatley, *Operation Sea Lion* (Oxford 1958), 78.
[38] Richards, 211. [39] *Ibid.*, 231. [40] *Ibid.*, 234.
[41] Arthur (Lord) Tedder, *Air Power in War* (London 1947), 106.

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Britain, and only a few with limited resources had as yet been launched against Germany, but the inaccuracies of navigation and bombardment on night flights made the results of "terror" attacks seem not very different from "discriminate" or "precision" attacks.

Winston Churchill in his memoirs cites the bombs dropped on London on August 24 as his moral justification for the Berlin raid of the 25th, and he moreover indicates that he expected a serious German assault on London sooner or later in any event: "The sporadic raiding of London towards the end of August was promptly answered by us in a retaliatory attack on Berlin. . . . He [Hitler] took, of course, full advantage of our reprisal on Berlin, and publicly announced the previously settled German policy of reducing London and other British cities to chaos and ruin."[42]

Yet the accidental nature of the bombings of the 24th was fairly clear, and a serious German attack on London in the absence of provocation could by no means be a certainty for Churchill. There was therefore a reason why Churchill took the step which indeed made an early German assault on London more likely, and it was not simply a moral need to retaliate for the stray bombs that had fallen:

> Far more important to us than the protection of London from terror-bombing was the functioning and articulation of these airfields and the squadrons working from them. In the life-and-death struggle of the two air forces, this was a decisive phase. We never thought of the struggle in terms of the defense of London or any other place, but only who won in the air.[43]

> The War Cabinet were much in the mood to hit back, to raise the stakes, and to defy the enemy. . . .[44]

> It was therefore with a sense of relief that Fighter Command felt the German attack turn on to London on September 7, and concluded that the enemy had changed his plan.[45]

> The night attacks on London for ten days after September 7 struck at the London docks and railway centres, and killed and wounded many civilians, but they were in effect for us a breathing space of which we had the utmost need.[46]

In fact, Churchill's decision to bomb Berlin almost certainly was a conscious effort to bait Hitler into an immediate shifting of the Luftwaffe attack onto London, away from the RAF Fighter Command bases, which were beginning to collapse under the strain. The decision

[42] (Sir) Winston Churchill, *The Second World War*, II (Boston 1949), 342.
[43] *Ibid.*, 330-31. [44] *Ibid.*, 342. [45] *Ibid.*, 331. [46] *Ibid.*, 332.

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was made in the context of the threat of a German invasion, which was indeed expected momentarily.[47] A continuing Luftwaffe assault on the airdromes threatened not only to weaken the bases as flying strips, but also to destroy enough on-base communications and control centers (the "Sector-Stations," which digested radar information and guided the fighter groups in the air) to make southern England untenable for the RAF. A withdrawal of the RAF to the north would have given the Luftwaffe the superiority it needed over the Channel to support an invasion.[48]

Churchill's assessment, therefore, of the value of sparing London from attack may not have declined seriously from May to August, but his estimation of the value of inducing Hitler to bomb London instead of the airdromes had indeed risen. Churchill admits his desire in late August for an immediate shifting of the Luftwaffe offensive from the RAF airstrips to London, and he admits his personal responsibility for the August 25 bombing of Berlin; he could hardly deny an awareness at the time of the likely connection between the two.

The German reaction to the attacks on Berlin was not long in coming. Hitler had desired to deter all air attacks on German cities, and he had by his restraining directives to the Luftwaffe been bargaining since May for an end to the Bomber Command offensive. As the program of conquering Britain got under way, some of these restraints began to be deferred (at least for a time) to the requirements of winning superiority over RAF Fighter Command, and the decision prior to the 24th to open a German night offensive was such a deferment. Yet a great deal of the bargaining restraint was still in effect; Berlin, in particular was of great value to Hitler, for while the minor raids being executed in the Ruhr could be ignored or explained away, a bombing of Berlin would spoil completely the illusion of "perfect safety" for the German people, an illusion for which Hitler still showed himself willing to spare London. While the attack on the German capital was not the only factor in the assault on London, it was therefore the critical factor, and Hitler made his decision on the morning after Berlin was bombed.[49]

Since the real weakness of Fighter Command was not, however, known to the Germans, the decision to bomb London cannot be viewed merely as an instance of the revenge motive (or "punishing of a contract-breaker") irrationally overriding all other practical considerations. The Luftwaffe was not, in fact, aware of the critical state of Fighter

[47] Alexander McKee, *Strike from the Sky* (Boston 1960), 221.
[48] Middleton, 148. [49] Wykesham, 127-28.

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Command's communications, and it had only "accidentally" been destroying the "Sector-Station" communication centers in its general bombardment of RAF airdromes.[50] The invasion of Britain still was pending, still requiring the achievement of air superiority over the coasts, but the Luftwaffe command was far from agreed on tactical policy at this time; some planners had been advocating raids on London as a means of forcing a British commitment of Fighter Command's remaining reserves, while others urged a continued bombing of the airdromes to catch fighters on the ground.[51]

By removing the sparing of Berlin from the German prospects, Churchill tipped the scales in the multi-elemented German calculations and induced a shifting of attack which spared Fighter Command. By exposing London to attack, he led the Germans to see a net advantage where they did not have one, and to miss the real opportunity available to them.

The German motives in continuing the bombing of London, after the "Operation Sea Lion" invasion plan was finally given up on September 17, hinged on the possibility (now, for the first time seriously considered by the Luftwaffe) that air attack alone might induce the British to surrender. Yet this assumption was accepted only with strong reservations, reservations which in fact required that bombing continue to be programmed for industrial targets, regardless of what effects on the national will were expected, reservations which moreover still required the attack to be categorized as a non-terror, non-civilian assault,[52] for fear of British retaliation.

The British reaction, however, to the heavier bombings (especially of London and Coventry) was to interpret them nonetheless as equivalent in effect to all-out terror attacks, which seemed to leave little prospect of gain in any RAF restraints.[53] At about the same time (through reasoning processes which now seem slightly suspect) British target planners began to speculate that German morale might be a key target whose significance had previously been overlooked, and that an area bombing offensive might be more effective than a precise attack, on purely practical considerations. This conclusion, still quite tentative, stemmed partially from the disappointing accuracies shown in missions against precise targets, and also from a flood of advice from sources as remote as President Roosevelt and the propagandist Vansittart, maintaining that German morale would never equal the performance of the British under the Blitz, and that heavy bombing of the German popu-

[50] McKee, 152.
[51] Collier, 233.
[52] *Ibid.*, 233, 261.
[53] Kesselring, 80.

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lace might lead to a breakdown of German civilian life, or even to a revolt.[54]

Yet British capabilities were still so limited as to preclude any really effective "terror raids," and the paradoxical result was that neither side correctly interpreted the other's intentions of attack in 1941, the German "limited" attack being not seen as such in Britain because of its inaccuracy by night, and the British "terror" or "area" attacks being misinterpreted because of their weakness.

The Blitz represented the end of effective bargaining on the question of aerial bombardment, for while certain later German moves might possibly be interpreted as "feelers" aimed at re-establishing limits to the exchange, September 1940 marked the end of British desires for such limits. A bargain, to be consummated, requires that both partners see themselves as better off by it; in September 1940 this had ceased to be the case.

VI. May 1941-February 1942: The Lull

In the middle of May 1941, as new theaters of operations opened in the Balkans and in Eastern Europe, the German assault on Britain quickly tapered off. Over the period of June 1941 to February 1942, the Luftwaffe contented itself with a series of probing attacks and reconnaissance flights, coupled with an occasional retaliation raid for attacks by Bomber Command—a raid on London on the 28th of July, for instance, being explicitly announced as the reprisal for an RAF raid on Berlin.[55]

Bomber Command continued its program of strikes against various targets on the Continent, still changing objectives often, still varying between precise and area targets, and occasionally even attempting daylight attacks. Yet the level and intensity of the assault were slow to rise, and heavy casualties between August and November led to a decision on November 13 to reduce the level of raids until larger forces had been accumulated.[56]

With the RAF raids on Germany thus curtailed by a conservation program, few Luftwaffe sorties were flown against Britain. Bombing activity, which had been light over the period from June to November 1940, thus became very light from November to February, and what had seemed to be an impending exposure of all the civilian population of both sides to severe aerial bombardment failed to materialize.

[54] Webster and Frankland, 169.
[55] Collier, 300.
[56] Webster and Frankland, 186.

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Bomber Command's offensive in the summer and fall of 1941 had been limited in size and scope only by technical capacity; yet the British inability to mount severe raids into Germany in fact led Hitler to see supplementary advantages in the restricted air activity imposed on him by the Russian campaign. It is likely that Hitler saw himself as the beneficiary of voluntary British restraints during the latter portion of 1941, and that he was in fact overestimating the technical ability of the RAF to mount an offensive at this time.[57] Luftwaffe assaults on Britain in late 1941 were limited to reprisal attacks designed to give an impression of precise reciprocity for British raids on Germany, and thereby perhaps to continue a deterrence of such raids.

There is no evidence to indicate that the Luftwaffe lull or the reprisal raids had any actual deterring effect on the British leadership. German radio broadcasts about "reprisal raids" were often interpreted simply as morale boosters for the German people,[58] while the lull in the Luftwaffe attack on Britain was attributed entirely to a German overcommitment to the Russian front. The possibility that the Germans were (or would be) exercising restraints was given little credence, and the failure of the RAF to go over completely to area bombing was due only to a few lingering uncertainties as the form of attack offering the greatest practical results.

VII. February 1942-May 1945: The All-out Finale

On February 14, 1942, orders were issued to Bomber Command to embark on a new offensive, of which the primary target would now be the morale of the German people.[59] "Area" or "morale" bombing had several times been tried by the British before (and often, perhaps unintentionally, accomplished by both sides); it now was to become a general policy, drawing the largest part of Bomber Command's tonnage from 1942 to 1945.[60]

The offensive began with a series of attacks on the Ruhr city of Essen between March 8 and 10, followed on the 28th by a spectacular fire raid of 200 bombers on the old German port of Lübeck. From here the offensive grew almost continuously, with raids occasionally of more than 1,000 aircraft, the growth of the area assault being limited only by technical or meteorological obstacles, by a diversion to French rail-

[57] Collier, 300.

[58] Alexander George, *Propaganda Analysis* (White Plains, N.Y., 1959), 118.

[59] Denis Richards and Hilary St.G. Saunders, *Royal Air Force, 1939-1945*, II (London 1954), 118.

[60] U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, *Description of R.A.F. Bombing* (Washington 1945), A-2.

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ways in 1944 and, to a limited extent, by some renewed efforts at night precision bombing in 1944 and 1945 (based on new night navigation devices).[61] No longer would a city in Germany be spared because of its remoteness from clearly military targets, no longer would specific targets in large cities be aimed at, rather than the city as a whole, and no longer would Bomber Command's offensive be so limited in volume as to make such distinctions imperceptible.

The Luftwaffe was ordered on April 14 to begin a series of reprisal raids calculated to inflict maximum suffering on the British population, aimed at militarily insignificant towns of great historical or cultural value.[62] These "Baedeker raids" continued into the summer of 1942 (with one more October raid, on Canterbury), but the Luftwaffe was unable to match the tonnage of the greatly augmented British effort.

Despite the intensity of the RAF raids on other German cities in 1942, the assault on Berlin was not resumed until January 1943, whereupon the Luftwaffe replied with an attack on London and another series of scattered raids lasting into May. On January 27, 1943, daylight bombers of the United States Army Air Force had made their first attack on Germany; the weight of this American assault, directed usually against precision targets, and only occasionally at area targets, was to be a substantial addition to that of Bomber Command for the rest of the war.

On July 24 began the massive RAF fire raids on Hamburg, which did an unprecedented amount of damage to the town over the next four days.[63] Luftwaffe reprisals were weak during the last half of 1943, but early in 1944 there began a series of relatively effective night assaults on London (the "Baby Blitz"), which continued into May. The first V-1 bombs aimed at London were launched on June 10, 1944, the first V-2's on September 8, both these unguided, random weapons being again openly labeled as reprisal weapons.[64] From February 1942 on, in fact, the German government frequently stated that Luftwaffe attacks on Britain were to be considered as retaliation for the Allied air offensive. Evidence moreover indicates that discreet efforts were made by the German Foreign Ministry to seek some mutual limiting of attack through contacts in neutral countries, with apparently a total lack of success.[65]

[61] U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, *The Effects of Strategic Bombing on the German War Economy* (Washington 1945), 2.
[62] Collier, 305.
[63] Hilary St.G. Saunders, *Royal Air Force, 1939-1945*, III (London 1954), 7.
[64] Collier, 367, 406. [65] Ulrich von Hassel, *Diaries* (Garden City, N.Y., 1947), 351.

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The Anglo-American bomber offensive, while occasionally diverted to V-1 or V-2 launching areas, rolled on uninhibited until April 1945, when the entry of Allied ground forces into Germany began finally to limit the choice of targets.

The period from 1942 to 1945 thus saw an Anglo-American offensive based exclusively on estimates of direct practicality, with no departures therefrom for purposes of bargaining or deterrence. British planners tended to view the Blitz as the worst punishment the Germans could have inflicted, a punishment which was far less severe than had been expected, a punishment which was not likely to be negotiable with Germany, and, at any rate, a punishment which could be absorbed again in the future as the price of great strategic advantages (such as the advantages now definitely seen in an area offensive against Germany).

The form of the Baedeker raids constituted a warning to Britain that the Blitz could have been more painful and could be reproduced in a worse form in the future. The Baedekers had not been convincing, however, for while more sensitive targets were aimed at, smaller tonnages were delivered, and the suffering of Britain's populace was considerably less in such "terror" attacks than it had been in the "discriminate" Blitz.

All the bargaining actions of the rest of the war thus came from the German side. The German broadcasts, dismissed in the West as propaganda; the attempts at negotiation in neutral countries; the failure to bomb London during the Baedekers, until 1943 when Berlin was again bombed; the "Baby Blitz" on London in 1944; and the V-bombs —all these constitute actions appropriate to some form of deterrence, rather than to strictly physical goals. All of these attempts at deterrence were to fail, however, for lack of awesomeness, if for no other reason.

VIII. Conclusions

In the early stages of the Second World War a long series of limits to aerial warfare was proposed on both sides, by word and, often more significantly, by deed. Of these, some were accepted, some were not recognized, and some were rejected. Rated roughly in order of stringency (although not in order of precision or intelligibility), they ran: "no air raids at all," "air raids only on targets away from civilian population," "attacks only on tactical targets," "attacks only on military and industrial targets, by day," the same "by night," and "no raids on national capitals."

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The extent to which the mutual recognition of such limits was due to prior deliberations and declarations is not easy to determine. Various proposals for rules of aerial warfare had been put forward (but never ratified) at the Hague in 1923, and at the Washington Disarmament Conferences, generally making only the distinction, however, between "strictly military" targets and targets close to civilians, which were not, therefore, "strictly military."[66] Hitler himself had in 1935 proposed limits to the areas open to aerial bombing, such as the area of "tactical combat" or, more specifically, the area within the range of both sides' artillery; at other times the Führer alluded to a total abolition of aerial bombing to be agreed to by all sides.[67]

Yet while the "words" of the prewar period may account for the general intelligibility and acceptability of certain distinctions of limitation, others, such as "no capital cities" were simply evolved in practice, being communicated and accepted by "deeds."

It is probably fair to say that Nazi Germany had an interest in limits on aerial warfare for a longer period than did the Allies. For reasons of genuine lack of opportunity, or for failure to see opportunity, the German leadership did not count on winning its war by aerial bombardment, and with its strong aversion to domestic austerity it preferred a limited air war instead. It may be the case that Germany could not have overcome the handicap in aircraft development and production imposed prior to 1935 by the Versailles Treaty, without giving up the heavy bomber; it may also be true that Germany completely missed the significance of the bomber. In any event, Germany desired limits; but, unfortunately for the Germans, their bargaining for such limits was poorly executed in several respects.

German propaganda under Goebbels was not fully harnessed to the task of communicating the nation's intent; Luftwaffe complaints of misinterpretations and distortions of its campaigns were recurrent, and on crucial questions of fine distinction, such as Warsaw and Rotterdam, broadcasts threatening other cities with similar imminent fates served to undermine the general German purpose. The deliberate prewar tendency (in pursuit of lesser objectives) to threaten all-out air attack if German wishes were not granted, similarly made ambiguous the wartime German intention to abstain from such attack except in retaliation.

Beyond the distortions of propaganda, however, the Germans chose rather incautiously at several points to interpret borderline opportunities in their own favor, opportunities which might not appear so "tactical" or "strictly military" to the other side. For a nation as averse

[66] Spaight, *Air Power and War Rights*, 101. [67] *Ibid.*, 102.

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to bombing as Germany, the severity of the final raid on Warsaw and the dive-bomber attack on Rotterdam were precarious moves, as was the decision to add a night offensive against Britain, based, as it was, on a serious overestimate of bombing accuracy.

Thirdly, if the Germans really hoped thus to limit the war, it would seem that a careful measure of the values of the opponent should have been taken before threatening its very existence. While France proved willing to surrender before expanding the air war, Britain preferred, under Churchill, to drop limits when the national existence was threatened, and when a dropping of such limits offered a contribution to survival. By threatening to invade Britain, Germany exposed herself further to air assault.

Finally, to the extent that a German ability to limit the war depended on inflated foreign beliefs in the awesome capabilities of the Luftwaffe, it was unwise to demonstrate how limited these capabilities were. It seems very likely, for instance, that if the British had known what the Blitz would be like, they would not in 1939 have been restrained by fear of a "knockout blow."

The severity of the later Allied air offensive came as a surprise to Hitler, although it was still not a "knockout blow." Perhaps the German aversion to air attack would indeed have been fortified if there had been foreknowledge of its actual severity, and perhaps the bargaining for limits might then have been conducted with more care. As it was, the Germans did seek limits fairly consistently, but also quite ineptly.

In the Allied calculations after 1940 relative to aerial warfare, the fruits of bargaining were regarded as negligible and valueless, when compared with the advantages seen in an "area" or "terror" assault on the German populace. In the event, however, area bombing proved very disappointing, not only in the destruction of industries located in cities, but in the reducing of the German willingness to serve the Nazi regime, and the optimistic calculations of 1941 have been subjected to much criticism since the war.

A strong case has in fact been made that, from practical non-bargaining considerations alone, the area attack by night was a bad investment, and that a precision daylight assault by Bomber Command (even with higher losses) would have contributed more to the final victory.

It might be additionally contended that the reversal of the faith in "area" bombing, combined with a greater awareness of the German willingness to bargain, would have made deliberate Allied restraints after 1942 seem quite appropriate. It might be claimed that the "sense-

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less" destruction of area bombing should have been used only as an unexecuted deterrent, to prevent the relatively weaker, yet deliberately terroristic Baedeker raids and "Baby Blitz," and the indiscriminate V-1 and V-2 attacks.

Yet the exaggerated hopes inherited from Douhet by the British planners outlived the exaggerated fears disproved in the Blitz, and no limitation was probable after 1941. Only German discretion designed to perpetuate the balance of the exaggerations would have made a persistent limited air war likely.

The problem of controlled and limited use of strategic nuclear weapons is a serious one for Western military planners today. The early years of World War II represent an instance of a very similar problem, in which the questions of communication, command and control, escalation, ultimate national values, bluffing and, finally, breakdown all were raised. The relevance of this instance to weapons of considerably greater magnitudes remains to be determined, but at the least this example discourages any overconfidence about our ability to find easy solutions to the problem.

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NKRUMAH'S THEORY OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT

An Analysis of Recurrent Themes*

By KENNETH W. GRUNDY

I. Introduction

IN recent years tremendous concern has been expressed about the problems of what had first been identified as "backward," then euphemistically "underdeveloped" or "undeveloped," and now more positively "developing" or "emerging" areas. A wealth of factual and theoretical studies has been produced, attempting to view the problems of underdevelopment broadly and to construct a conceptual framework by which we might comprehend the apparently complex phenomena occurring in those regions. In spite of this growing scholarly interest, and without attempting to minimize the contribution of those who are laboring in this as yet untapped field, it is this writer's contention that too few studies have been undertaken which examine and analyze the views of those individuals most influential in shaping the future of the emerging states—the national political leaders.

This dearth of systematic analytical writing about the political thought of the leaders of underdeveloped states is particularly acute with respect to Africa.[1] Yet African statesmen and politicians have been quite outspoken regarding the political, social, and economic underdevelopment of their nations. Although this subject is not so omnipresent in their speeches and writings as are questions of nationalism, imperialism, and colonial rule, the problems of underdevelopment command a conspicuous position in their thought and action. As the quest for political independence approaches fulfillment, the problems of na-

* This study was made possible by a research grant from the Department of Political Science of the Pennsylvania State University. The author is also indebted to Vernon V. Aspaturian for his helpful suggestions and criticism. Any error of fact or interpretation is, of course, my own.

[1] Among the few notable exceptions are Henry L. Bretton, "Current Political Thought and Practice in Ghana," *American Political Science Review*, LII (March 1958), 46-63; Georges Fischer, "Quelques aspects de la doctrine politique guinéenne," *Civilisations*, IX, No. 4 (1959), 457-78; Thomas Hodgkin, "A Note on the Language of African Nationalism," in St. Antony's Papers No. 10, *African Affairs: Number One*, ed. by Kenneth Kirkwood (London 1961), 22-40; Walter Z. Laqueur, "Communism and Nationalism in Tropical Africa," *Foreign Affairs*, XXXIX (July 1961), 610-21; and Immanuel Wallerstein, "The Political Ideology of the P.D.G.," *Présence Africaine*, XII (First Quarter 1962), 30-41.

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tional development will assume an even more prominent place in their lives. At this early stage of national existence, African explanations of underdevelopment are inextricably linked with ideas on nationalism, imperialism, and colonialism—indeed, to such an extent that it is not unusual for these four matters to be considered simultaneously. In their approach to underdevelopment African leaders evidence a surprising similarity of views. In spite of the diversity of African political life and historical experience, recurrent themes exist that are shared by most currently influential politicians in sub-Saharan Africa.

The purpose of this essay is to discuss and analyze the views of President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana regarding African underdevelopment in general, and Ghanaian underdevelopment in particular. As President of the first West African state to gain political independence after the Second World War, Nkrumah might well be considered the elder statesman of tropical Africa. His views and the theoretical foundations on which they are based contribute in some degree to the formation of the ideas and actions of both the leaders and the led of the African Continent. We shall consider what Nkrumah understands underdevelopment to be, his explanations of how and why Africa became underdeveloped, and his suggested solutions to the problems arising therefrom. Nkrumah's attitude toward these questions has been gleaned from a welter of primary material—autobiographical accounts, speeches, articles, party pamphlets, policy statements, and reports. After extrapolating what were often isolated statements, it was necessary to reconstruct Nkrumah's arguments in a complete and coherent form, so as to render them susceptible to comprehensive analysis. His words have been quoted extensively in this article, in order to give the reader at least a taste of the vocabulary, tenor, and style in which he communicates his thoughts.

II. Recurrent Themes

PRE-EMINENCE OF POLITICS

Broadly stated, Nkrumah views underdevelopment as a consequence of politics. This was true not only during the period preceding Ghanaian independence, but also since the achievement of that goal. This principle is perhaps best illustrated by the often quoted injunction inscribed on the base of Nkrumah's statue in Accra: "Seek ye first the political kingdom and all things will be added unto it." This maxim is of fundamental importance for at least three reasons. First, his quest for the political kingdom represents not only a normative statement, but also symbolizes his propensity to view empirical reality as a result of po-

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litical struggle. Second, his method of viewing underdevelopment politically conflicts with a popular Western misconception extant among students of underdeveloped areas—that underdevelopment is essentially a matter of economics. Third, it is fundamental in that his approach serves as a springboard to explanations and policy alternatives for Ghanaian and African problems. In Nkrumah's words: "This country must progress politically—indeed political self-determination is the means of further realisation of our social, economic and cultural potentialities. It is political freedom that dictates the pace of economic and social progress."[2] More recently he has written, "And everywhere men and women are beginning to search consciously for political means to solve their problems and advance their hopes."[3]

It is important to grasp fully the significance of this approach, for it is not easy to comprehend when we have been accustomed to viewing underdevelopment substantially as a function of economic factors. Various criteria advanced in the Western world as possible indicators of underdevelopment—per capita income, capital equipment and capital formation, technological skill, efficient exploitation of natural resources, and self-sustaining and diversified economies, to mention a few—are usually considered in their economic context. Where Americans are inclined to say, "They cannot sustain a democratic system of government because their standard of living is too low," the African would declare, "We cannot attain a higher standard of living until we have a democratic system of government." Viewing the matter through this ideological prism, we can see that the articulate African is politically oriented in his thought patterns and consequently in his policy priorities.

IMPERIALISM AS THE CAUSE OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT

From this theoretical underpinning it follows quite naturally that Nkrumah views underdevelopment largely as a product of colonial rule, which is primarily a political phenomenon insofar as the economic and political worlds can be considered separately.[4] His interpretation of how underdevelopment was brought to Africa is most completely stated in *Towards Colonial Freedom* (1947), one of his first political essays as a

[2] *Gold Coast Weekly Review* (July 20, 1955), as quoted in Martin L. Kilson, Jr., "Nationalism and Social Classes in British West Africa," *Journal of Politics*, XX (May 1958), 380.

[3] Kwame Nkrumah, "African Prospect," *Foreign Affairs*, XXXVII (October 1958), 45.

[4] See, for example, his speech on the tenth anniversary of the founding of the CPP, quoted in Kwame Nkrumah, *I Speak of Freedom: A Statement of African Ideology* (New York 1961), 162.

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nationalist organizer.[5] He has summarized the arguments advanced in that pamphlet as follows:

> Existence for the colonial peoples under imperialist rule means their economic and political exploitation. The imperialist powers need the raw materials and cheap native labour of the colonies for their own capitalist industries. Through their system of monopolist control they eliminate native competition, and use the colonies as dumping grounds for their surplus mass-produced goods. In attempting to legitimize their presence they claim to be improving the welfare of the native population. Such claims are merely a camouflage for their real purpose of exploitation to which they are driven by economic necessity. It is from this that the African peoples must constantly strive to free themselves.
>
> The whole policy of the colonizer is to keep the native in his primitive state and make him economically dependent. To ensure increased efficiency in the local handling of the colonies' resources, the colonizer grants loans and invests capital in improving internal communications, social and welfare services, ostensibly to better the native. The big trade combines exert a rigid monopolist control which effectively prevents the native from sharing in the capitalist profits, but without native labour such profits would never be made. The history of the colonies shows throughout that they have been mere pawns in the hands of the imperialist powers, who have vied with each other in their race to acquire untapped resources. This has reduced the native population to economic slavery and degradation from which it must free itself.
>
> Whether the dependent territory is administered as a colony, protectorate, or mandate, it is all part of an imperialist plan to perpetuate its economic exploitation. The colonies gain no advantages whatsoever from being dependent; socially and technologically their progress is hindered; they pay for a nominal protection against aggression by providing troops for the mother country in time of war and their political freedom will never be automatically granted but won by their own endeavors. . . . The African, however, was perfectly capable of governing himself before the advent of the white man and should be allowed to do so again.[6]

According to this view, because the continued presence of the colonial powers spells subjugation and exploitation of the indigenous masses, it is imperative that colonialism and imperialism be abolished and their vestiges eliminated. The preceding quotation, written at a time when Nkrumah considered himself a Marxist, follows a crude Leninist interpretation of political reality. According to Lenin, imperialism arises out of the necessity of capitalist societies to find outlets for investment capital. Thus imperialism and colonialism were the inevita-

[5] Kwame Nkrumah, *Towards Colonial Freedom* (2nd edn., London 1957).

[6] Kwame Nkrumah, *Ghana: The Autobiography of Kwame Nkrumah* (New York 1957), 46-47. The substance of these ideas was reiterated recently in *I Speak of Freedom*, ix.

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ble consequence of the capitalist system. Nkrumah wavered between this position and the view that colonies and imperialism were not necessarily "the highest stage of capitalism," but rather the result of policy choices made by imperialistic governments. Other African statesmen are also divided between these two views. Whereas the leaders of Mali and Guinea subscribe to the Leninist explanation with a few modifications, Nigerian, Ivory Coast, and Senegalese politicians for the most part view imperialism as a policy that could be undertaken by any nation or group of nations—not capitalism in a certain evolutionary stage.[7] While accepting much of Lenin's empirical interpretation, young Nkrumah did not fully adhere to the Bolshevik prognosis of revolution and the eventual construction of a socialist state by violent means. Nkrumah was primarily a nationalist who sought independence, not for the destruction of the international capitalist system and the creation of a world socialist state, but rather for the freedom that political independence affords the African peoples in their quest for a better life.

IMMEDIATE POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE

Since the colonial powers are responsible for the social, economic, cultural, and political backwardness of Africa, Nkrumah argues, the first objective in order to surmount a state of underdevelopment is political independence. This goal, however, is not easily attained. Colonial nations rarely, if ever, relinquish their political control voluntarily. Freedom thus becomes a product of "bitter and vigorous" struggle.[8] In his estimation, ". . . a people's readiness and willingness to assume the responsibilities of self-rule is the single criterion of their preparedness to undertake those responsibilities."[9] At first this pressure for political independence must take the form of " 'positive action'—a combination of non-violent methods with effective and disciplined political action. At this stage open conflict with the existing colonial regime is inevitable and this is a test of strength for the organization. Since it is marked by non-violence and since the forces of might are on the side of colonial power, there is little chance of complete success in this period."[10] "Positive action" entails the adoption of all legitimate and constitutional

[7] For a more detailed examination of the views of the Malian leaders, see Kenneth W. Grundy, "Marxism-Leninism and African Underdevelopment: The Mali Approach," *International Journal*, XVII (Summer 1962), 300-4. For extended discussions of Guinean ideology, see Fischer, "Quelques aspects"; and Wallerstein, "Political Ideology of the P.D.G."

[8] Nkrumah, *Autobiography*, 111.

[9] *Ibid.*, 190-91.

[10] *Ibid.*, xv. See particularly Kwame Nkrumah, *What I Mean by Positive Action*, Ghana Pamphlets No. 1 (Accra 1949).

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means utilizing the weapons of political agitation, newspaper and educational campaigns and, "as a last resort, the constitutional application of strikes, boycotts, and non-cooperation based on the principle of absolute non-violence, as used by Gandhi in India."[11] The second stage in the struggle for independence is called " 'tactical action,' a sort of contest of wits. From now on the movement must make its ideology clear and convincing."[12]

This apparent reliance on non-violent methods of political action does not indicate that Nkrumah was a pacifist by choice. It merely meant that, in accurately assessing the realities of British force in Africa, he became aware that it would be suicide for the independence movement to clash physically with the colonial power. Consequently Nkrumah was compelled to rely on non-violent means, at least until sufficient support could be mobilized to challenge British rule successfully. Had his policy of "positive action" proved a failure, Nkrumah would doubtless have sought other ways to effect his goals. Although he was shrewd enough to realize that in the case of the Gold Coast non-violence was the best means to achieve political independence, it must be remembered that the threat of violence was always present and tended to temper the British response to nationalist demands. The extreme pressure of the cold war that catapulted the underdeveloped areas into the propaganda arena also precipitated the retreat of British colonialism. Clearly, violence might have resulted in the Gold Coast had its necessity been dictated by the failure of the moderate position. Since independence Nkrumah has spoken of a "*phased* transfer of power" with definite fixed dates for early independence.[13] But this gradual prescription applies to the as yet dependent territories, where circumstances such as a large non-indigenous population present the danger of a bloody transition to political independence.

Another determinant of African underdevelopment, largely, but not entirely African in nature, that Nkrumah has attacked is "tribal feudalism." Political independence thus is incomplete without the demise of the "feudal" elements in African society. Concomitant with efforts to expel the colonialist power, Nkrumah initiated a program of "rural reconstruction." He declared in 1955: "It is in the rural areas that the forces of feudalism are entrenched. There can be no social advancement or complete overthrow of imperialism as long as the vestiges of feudalism still remain in this country."[14] The "feudal system" was to be re-

[11] Nkrumah, *Autobiography*, 111-12. [12] *Ibid.*, xv.
[13] Nkrumah, "African Prospect," 47 (his italics).
[14] Nkrumah, *I Speak of Freedom*, 53.

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placed by a network of democratic regional, district, and local councils. However, this substitution can be explained more in terms of Nkrumah's desire to break the resistance of the traditional leaders in the Ashanti region and the Northern Territories. Tribal chiefs were reluctant to relinquish their influence, which had been buttressed by the British policy of "indirect rule." Thus Nkrumah sought not only to solidify his position in the less developed areas of Ghana, but to sever the symbiotic relationship between the traditionalists and the British administration. The wresting of power from the traditional elements in these regions is a most difficult process not fully completed today.

"Africanization" or, more precisely, "Ghanaianization" of the public service has been another facet of the general theme of political independence. It is also related to the African fear of neo-colonialism, which will be discussed subsequently. The desire to supplant the British civil service by Ghanaian nationals is not an irrational one. Ghanaians trained under the colonial regime had been conditioned to dependence on British superior officers. Likewise, the loyalty of the European in Africa was subject to doubt. By removing European officials, it became manifest to Ghanaians that all posts were open to competent Africans. Today, Ghanaianization is practically complete. Fully 97 per cent of the permanent and pensionable posts in the Ghana Civil Service are held by Ghanaians.[15]

ECONOMIC INDEPENDENCE

A fourth theme, representing what might be regarded as a second stage on the road to development, is the struggle for economic independence. Obviously, political independence does not mean that underdevelopment is a thing of the past. In his famous "Motion of Destiny" speech in 1953, in which he called for political emancipation for the Gold Coast, Nkrumah stated: ". . . self-government is not an end in itself. It is a means to an end, to the building of the good life to the benefit of all. . . . The self-government which we demand, therefore, is the means by which we shall create the climate in which our people can develop their attributes and express their potentialities to the full."[16] Self-government is a significant step on the road to development, but a great deal remains to be accomplished before Ghana creates "a welfare state based on African socialist principles." To Nkrumah, as to most

[15] *Ghana Today*, v (June 21, 1961), 3.
[16] Quoted in Nkrumah, *Autobiography*, 200-1.

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African leaders, political independence is meaningless without fulfillment of economic independence. On a number of occasions Nkrumah has written and spoken of this period after independence, when economic freedom looms as the next step toward full development. In his words:

> It has been well pointed out that political independence is but an empty façade if economic freedom is not possible also. I must emphasize again, however, that economic freedom can only be purchased by capital development, it cannot be given from outside.[17]

> Once this [political] freedom is gained, a greater task comes into view. All dependent territories are backward in education, in science, in agriculture, and in industry. The economic independence that should follow and maintain political independence demands every effort from the people, a total mobilization of brain and manpower resources. What other countries have taken three hundred years or more to achieve, a once dependent territory must try to accomplish in a generation if it is to survive. Unless it is, as it were, "jet-propelled," it will lag behind and then risk everything for which it has fought.[18]

> One may sometimes wonder if the Western Powers fully understand the dilemma facing political leaders in the emergent lands. They have gained independence for their peoples. The hazards and excitements of the struggle lie behind. Ahead lies the workaday world in which people must live and eat and hope and prosper. Independence of itself does not change this world. It simply creates the right political atmosphere for a real effort of national regeneration. But it does not supply all the economic and social tools. The leaders are now expected, simply as a result of having acquired independence, to work miracles.[19]

The radicals of Africa—Madeira Keita, Minister of Internal Affairs in Mali, and Guinea's Sékou Touré, for example—tend to stress the continuity of the "revolution." They seek to maintain mass support by repeated admonitions regarding possible foreign economic domination. The less radical—such as Nigeria's Prime Minister, Alhaji Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, and President Félix Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast—are reluctant to keep the nation mobilized for the "struggle" and more anxious to settle into the routine of economic endeavor for national development. Nkrumah, on this matter, leans toward the radical camp. And his efforts to conclude agreements for his Volta River project, among other things, have failed to modify his policy statements.

[17] Kwame Nkrumah, "The Movement for Colonial Freedom," *Phylon*, XVI (Fourth Quarter 1955), 407.
[18] Nkrumah, *Autobiography*, xv-xvi.
[19] Nkrumah, "African Prospect," 51.

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SOCIALISM AND THE PLANNED ECONOMY

Nkrumah's thoughts on the implementation of economic emancipation now come into focus. In a state admittedly backward, and suffering from a scarcity of investment capital, fundamental technological skill and knowledge, and the requisite economic infrastructure, what path can most efficiently secure rapid development? Nkrumah's suggested solutions follow a pattern familiar to most African leaders.

> At the present state of Ghana's economic development the whole community must act in the national interest. In fact most of our major development has had to be carried out by the Government itself. There is no other way out, for our people lack the capital and technical know-how to embark on great industrial undertakings. We cannot agree with those who say that state participation is a denial of democracy. . . . For our own part we are sure that, hand in hand with political and economic democracy, there will be plenty of scope for free enterprise to flourish throughout Ghana. Again and again I have emphasized that we welcome foreign investment and will protect it.[20]

> Capitalism is too complicated a system for a newly independent nation. Hence the need for a socialistic society. But even a system based on social justice and a democratic constitution may need backing up, during the period following independence, by emergency measures of a totalitarian kind. Without discipline true freedom cannot survive.[21]

> We aim at creating in Ghana a socialist society in which each will give according to his ability and receive according to his needs.[22]

But while professing the necessity for the state to assume the leading role in raising investment capital, Nkrumah has not embarked on a comprehensive plan for the nationalization of foreign-owned business firms. Such a course, however, could be consummated should any future government consider nationalization imperative in particular industries. The Ghanaian Constitution guarantees adequate compensation to foreign firms so expropriated.[23] Understandably, a legal instrument is a weak reed on which to base investments in Ghana. But Nkrumah has given assurances that nationalization is not in sight. In fact, when reports were circulated in October 1960 that Ghana planned to nationalize foreign industries, Nkrumah, in a broadcast to the nation, categori-

[20] Nkrumah's "Christmas Eve Broadcast" of 1957, quoted in *African and Colonial World*, VI (February 1958), 4.

[21] Nkrumah, *Autobiography*, xvi.

[22] Nkrumah, *I Speak of Freedom*, 165. See also Nkrumah's *Building a Socialist State: An Address . . . to the C.P.P. Study Group, April 22, 1961* (Accra 1961).

[23] Great Britain, Statutory Instruments (1957, No. 277), *The Ghana (Constitution) Order in Council*, 1957, para. 54.

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cally denied them. He insisted that Ghana needed investments in foreign capital, and that his government was prepared to take measures to ensure their protection. He reaffirmed that the government sought a socialist pattern of society, but stressed that socialism could differ from one country to another. In his judgment, Ghana intended to evolve a society fitted to its peculiar needs.[24]

THE NECESSITY OF FOREIGN ASSISTANCE

Obviously Nkrumah is not so optimistic about self-propelled economic growth as to imagine that advancement can be brought about solely on Ghana's initiative. On the contrary, he quite often has appealed to the wealthier nations to assist the underdeveloped in their efforts. Repeatedly he has declared that his government seeks to attract overseas firms to aid Ghana's industrial expansion by assisting foreign businessmen in exploring the potential resources of the country. As early as 1954 he stated that he realized that it would be years before the Gold Coast would be in a position to develop rapidly on its own, and that it would therefore have to rely in large measure on foreign enterprise.[25] He conceded that it was only to be expected that foreign investors would require assurance about political conditions. Stating that the warmth of the welcome given them depended on the extent to which they would provide training for Africans in better jobs, he concluded that it was his government's wish that those with capital to invest would seek the opportunity in the full confidence that they would be treated as partners in the development of the country's resources.[26]

In December 1961 Nkrumah outlined the ways in which Ghana might finance its industrial development.[27] Bearing in mind that there is no local capitalist class in Ghana, he said that there were three courses open. The first was foreign private investment in Ghanaian industry. However, as he pointed out, this approach is subject to a number of objections. The private investor naturally seeks as large a profit as possible, but the types of industry and commerce yielding high returns on capital are not necessarily the ones that would serve the best interests of Ghana. A developing country requires industries that will increase export trade, diminish the need for imports, and employ as many citizens as possible.

[24] *Africa South of the Sahara*, No. 704 (October 14, 1960), 25-26. More recently he again repudiated rumored intentions of taking over private enterprises. *New York Times*, October 3, 1962.

[25] Nkrumah, *Autobiography*, 154-55.

[26] *Ibid.*

[27] A radio address delivered December 22, 1961, reprinted in *Africa Report*, VII (January 1962), 13-14 and 17.

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Secondly, the foreign investor attempts to export as much of his profit as he can to his home country. Ghana, to the contrary, wants profits reinvested in further industrial expansion. A third objection is that too heavy a reliance upon private foreign capital might render Ghana politically and economically dependent upon expatriate industry. According to Nkrumah, this would merely "reintroduce colonialism in another guise."

The second method by which industrialization might be financed is by foreign loans and credits, an approach popular with the Soviet bloc. But this does not ultimately provide developmental capital; it simply postpones the growth of native industry. The third approach is to rely upon Ghana's own resources in order to build essential industries. The answer, as President Nkrumah sees it, is to employ all three avenues of finance. The Volta River scheme makes use of such a combined approach.

Nkrumah's desire to encourage foreign investment and his statements that the last vestiges of colonialism must be eliminated are not theoretically consistent. Quite obviously foreign businesses in Ghana are remnants of the colonial past. But equally obvious is the fact that foreign aid in some form is essential if Ghanaian economic and political development is to be advanced. This dilemma is a salient one that emerging states must face squarely if development is to continue. Nkrumah has apparently disposed of this problem by dictating the terms on which he will permit foreign enterprise to exist in Ghana, and those terms have been far from easy. They in no way reflect the exploitative experience of the colonial years. If foreign investors seek to alter materially the terms of their presence, they will probably be expropriated, unless of course Nkrumah feels that their placation will encourage a sufficiently increased amount of capital to offset the loss in granting more generous terms to recalcitrant investors.

Presently, the ostensibly uneasy marriage between foreign capitalists and the indigenous government continues. If Nkrumah's policies do not secure a standard of living commensurate with Ghanaian expectations, nationalization looms as a real possibility. In his words: ". . . the leaders of the new Africa have no alternative but to look for outside assistance. The hopes and ambitions of their peoples have been planted and brought to maturity by the impact of Western civilization. The West has set the pattern of our hopes, and by entering Africa in strength it has forced the pattern upon us. Now comes our response. We cannot tell our peoples that material benefits and growth and modern progress are not for them. If we do, they will throw us out and seek other leaders

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who promise more. . . . Therefore we have no choice. Africa has no choice. We have to modernize. Either we shall do so with the interest and support of the West or we shall be compelled to turn elsewhere. This is not a warning or a threat but a straight statement of political reality."[28]

FEAR OF NEO-COLONIALISM

Assistance, although vitally needed, must not be in any form that would tend to compromise Ghanaian sovereignty or substantially limit her policy choices in both foreign and domestic affairs. In this respect President Nkrumah has warned the underdeveloped states to be wary of aid that might lead to a dangerous neo-colonialism. In a 1960 speech he declared: "We should not be so preoccupied with the urgent problems of political independence as to overlook a scarcely less vital sphere —the economic sphere. Yet it is here, more than anywhere else, that we must look for the schemings of a politically frustrated colonialism."[29] And elsewhere he said: ". . . the colonial powers and their imperialist allies are beginning to advance a new, subtle theory—and a disguised one, at that—to safeguard their position in Africa and to beguile and bamboozle the Africans. They are prepared to grant political independence but, at the same time, they are also planning to continue to dominate the African territories in the economic field by establishing control over the economic life of the newly independent African countries. There is no difference between political imperialism and economic imperialism."[30]

At the All-African Peoples' Conference in Accra in December 1958, Nkrumah warned African nationalists to beware of new forms of colonialism and imperialism carried out by non-European powers. "Do not let us also forget that colonialism and imperialism may come to us yet in a different guise, not necessarily from Europe."[31] This warning need not imply that Nkrumah fears Soviet imperialism. In spite of Western efforts to brand the Soviet Union as colonialist and imperialist, few African nationalists consider the USSR a colonial power. Nkrumah was probably referring to Nasser's attempts to assume the leadership of radical Pan-Africanism. It is fairly certain that he was not alluding to the Soviet Union.

Bearing in mind both his caveat on neo-colonialism and his distrust

[28] Nkrumah, "African Prospect," 52-53.
[29] Kwame Nkrumah, "Positive Action in Africa," in James Duffy and Robert A. Manners, eds., *Africa Speaks* (Princeton 1961), 53.
[30] Nkrumah, *I Speak of Freedom*, 200.
[31] *New York Times*, December 9, 1958.

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of non-European powers who might attempt a similar sort of domination, Ghana has willingly accepted non-military aid from both major power blocs. Although an advocate of "positive neutralism," Nkrumah has and freely admits an attachment to the West. Since independence Ghana has been a member of the British Commonwealth, and most of her trade and cultural relations are with the Western democracies.[32] Nkrumah's Western orientation is present in all things save one—his adamant position in the struggle against imperialism. In this respect his stand coincides with that of the Soviet bloc. However, while his anti-colonialism may coincide with present Soviet policy, the motives behind the Soviets' and Nkrumah's positions on the matter are far from compatible.

PAN-AFRICANISM AND THE "AFRICAN PERSONALITY"

While the Soviets are pursuing a world Communist state which is to supersede the Western capitalist system, Nkrumah is seeking a Pan-African state founded on the "African personality." Thus we come to still another approach to full economic independence. "Independence and Unity" are the catchwords of Nkrumah's African policy. A unified Africa can be justified not only in terms of the "African personality" (an amorphous slogan of doubtful historical or political validity) and the "self-evident" community of de-colonized Africans, but also in terms of economic necessity and cohesiveness. Nkrumah has argued forcefully that African industrial and economic advancement is contingent on the destruction of the artificial boundaries created by the colonial powers.[33] Thus more viable economic units must be established. He envisions an All-African common market, a common currency area, and the development of communications and transportation to allow for facile commercial intercourse. In his eyes, a Balkanized Africa is vulnerable to political and economic domination. A united Africa thus becomes a primary policy goal.

The concepts of a unique African experience and "African personality" clash with Marxist-Leninist thought, which conceives of social classes transcending national boundaries. In the Leninist view the

[32] For a more complete discussion of Nkrumah's relations with East and West, see Ernest W. Lefever, "Nehru, Nasser, and Nkrumah on Neutralism," in Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research, *Neutralism* (Washington, D.C., 1961), 100-2; Douglas G. Anglin, "Ghana, the West, and the Soviet Union," *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*, XXIV (May 1958), 152-65; and L. Winston Cone, "Ghana's African and World Relations," *India Quarterly*, XVII (July-September 1961), 258-76.

[33] Nkrumah, *I Speak of Freedom*, 218. See also *Statement by Osagyefo Dr. Kwame Nkrumah . . . on Certain Aspects of African Unity* (Accra 1962).

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African positions on nationalism and Pan-Africanism represent petty-bourgeois deviation. While the Chinese Communists echo the Leninist line, the Russian Communists are willing to coexist with the "national bourgeoisie" temporarily if doing so contributes to the collapse of the West or symptomizes a transitional step toward ultimate Communist affiliation. As long as the "national liberation movements" preach anti-imperialist and anti-feudal doctrine, they receive the Kremlin's approval and cooperation. However, the concept of geographical unity based on common cultural, racial, and historical traits is traditionally more compatible with Western philosophy and practice. In fact, contemporary Pan-Africanism as expressed by Nkrumah traces its ideological roots to the preachments of Marcus Garvey, and the writings of W. E. B. Du Bois and George Padmore.[34] Its foundations are basically Western and, except for several poorly managed Communist attempts to infiltrate established movements or to create "Pan-African" movements of their own, proponents of Pan-African unity have managed to avoid too close an association with Communist forces.

PARTY ORGANIZATION

It has been written that little is known of Nkrumah's political thought.[35] This is no fault of Ghana's President. While flexible and pragmatic, he has been prolific and articulate not only in matters of policy, but also in regard to his ideological disposition. At the time of his return to the Gold Coast in 1947 and his imprisonment after the 1948 flare-ups, he was thought to have Communist leanings.[36] This opinion was not without some basis in fact. His Convention People's Party (CPP), created in 1949, is ruled with an iron hand. Insofar as Nkrumah can be credited with its structural features and tactical decisions, it is not unlike revolutionary Communist parties of Eastern Europe and Russia (except for fundamental normative differences and the fact that it does not owe allegiance to another nation). He has stated several times that the secret of political success is a tightly knit and enthusiastic organization that follows Lenin's ideas of a vanguard party: "In the Convention People's Party no individual is greater than the Party and the principle of democratic centralism, that is, the subordinat-

[34] See George Padmore, *Pan-Africanism or Communism?: The Coming Struggle for Africa* (London 1956); and W. E. B. Du Bois, "Pan-Africanism," *Voice of Africa*, 1 (June 1961), 15-16.

[35] Bretton, "Current Political Thought," 51.

[36] Great Britain, Colonial Office, *Report of the Commission of Enquiry into Disturbances in the Gold Coast, 1948* [Watson Commission], Colonial No. 231 (London 1948), 17-19.

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ing of individual opinion to the decision of the majority, has always been the guiding principle in the formulation of the plans and policies of the Party."[37] In addition to this advocacy of the Leninist principle of democratic centralism, other characteristics of the CPP lead one to suspect that it owes much to the Communist Party pattern of organization. But such practices as candidate memberships, Nkrumah's life chairmanship, and a Party Central Committee closely resembling the Soviet Politburo in operation and structure are circumstantial and inconclusive indications of Communist leanings.[38]

III. Conclusion

It would be folly to suppose that Kwame Nkrumah speaks for all Africans on questions of underdevelopment. Nevertheless, most of the ideas he has expressed on the subject are embraced in varying degrees by his counterparts throughout sub-Saharan Africa. With few exceptions—notably, the conservative views of several of the leaders of the somewhat artificial states of the former French Equatorial and French West Africa—the leaders of most tropical African countries, moderate and radical alike, adhere to the general themes repeated in Nkrumah's speeches and writings.

Much of his political thought stems from the writings of the early leaders of the Communist movement, and he has openly acknowledged his debt to them. Speaking of the political ideas he formed while in the United States, he writes: "I knew that, whatever the programme for the solution of the colonial question might be, success would depend upon the organization adopted. I concentrated on finding a formula by which the whole colonial question and the problem of imperialism could be solved. I read Hegel, Karl Marx, Engels, Lenin and Mazzini. The writings of these men did much to influence me in my revolutionary ideas and activities, and Karl Marx and Lenin particularly impressed me as I felt sure that their philosophy was capable of solving these problems. But I think that of all the literature that I studied, the book that did more than any other to fire my enthusiasm was *The Philosophy and Opinions of Marcus Garvey* published by his wife."[39]

[37] Nkrumah, "Movement for Colonial Freedom," 398. Contrast this position with Sékou Touré's, which contends that, as a mass party, the PDG can have no vanguard or elite. He asserts that no single group or person "can ever be in advance of the point of view of democracy. . . . If a man is in advance of the people, it is for him to place himself at the level of the people or to identify himself with them. It is not for the people to place themselves at the level of one man." Touré, *Expérience Guinéene et Unité Africaine* (Paris 1959), 364.

[38] Bretton, "Current Political Thought," 51.

[39] Nkrumah, *Autobiography*, 45.

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Nkrumah's obligation to Marx, Engels, and Lenin, however, is no stronger than an intellectual bond, and this he has illustrated in the practical management of government. In 1954, for example, the Gold Coast government decided to refuse to employ in certain branches of the public service persons proved to its satisfaction to be active Communists.[40] In addition, Nkrumah has stated that he is not a Communist, and has never been one.[41] Twenty years ago he called himself an "orthodox Marxist."[42] In 1957 he wrote, "Today I am a nondenominational Christian and a Marxist Socialist and I have not found any contradiction between the two."[43]

To label Nkrumah a Communist, or a man possessing strong Communist leanings, as did the Watson Commission, is subject to challenge. If labels are to be applied—and quite often they are more misleading than they are helpful—Nkrumah must be designated a nationalist, a Pan-Africanist, and a socialist. Much of his thought in all three categories he owes to George Padmore, his friend while in London, who for a short period before his death in 1959 was Nkrumah's Minister of African Affairs. But Padmore's influence can be overemphasized as well. Opportunism and expediency cannot be discounted as components of Nkrumah's policies. He is an astute politician of no mean accomplishment. Much of his success can be attributed to an intuitive understanding of popular fears and desires.

Nkrumah's view of underdevelopment most closely parallels Marxist-Leninist theory in branding imperialism as the cause of underdevelopment, in his fear of neo-colonialism, his endorsement of socialism and the planned economy, and in the CPP organization and the single-party system. On the other hand, his attitudes and actions deviate from the Leninist and present-day Communist line most obviously on the issues of foreign assistance as a form of therapy, "positive action," nationalism, non-alignment, Pan-Africanism, and the "African personality."

It seems clear from this examination that in spite of certain major contradictions and exceptions, Kwame Nkrumah has accepted the Leninist explanation of underdevelopment. Although he has in large measure adopted Marxist-Leninist empirical and descriptive theory, the adoption has been primarily eclectic. It must be stressed that Marx and

[40] Gold Coast, *Legislative Assembly, Debates, 1954*, Official Report, Issue No. 1, February 25, 1954, cols. 979-82.
[41] *The Times* (London), February 14, 1951.
[42] Frederick W. Roevekamp, "Harlem Cheers Nkrumah," *Christian Science Monitor*, July 29, 1958.
[43] Nkrumah, *Autobiography*, 13.

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Lenin were not the only theoretical influence on Nkrumah. He is indebted to many thinkers, Western and Eastern alike. The Pan-Africanism of Marcus Garvey, W. E. B. Du Bois, and George Padmore, the passive resistance of Mohandas K. Gandhi, the egalitarianism of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, the "inalienable rights" ideas of John Locke, the non-alignment policies of Thomas Jefferson, the single-party or factionless-nation concepts of James Madison, the vocabulary of Marx, and the empirical categorizations and organizational prototypes of Lenin have all been reflected to one degree or another in the political pronouncements of Kwame Nkrumah. He has skillfully borrowed such aspects of these various ideas as he has found useful in his quest for African advancement.

Nkrumah is not anxious to adhere fully to the Western prescriptions for African development. Ideas like trusteeship, the white man's burden, tutelage or training for self-government, partnership, and moderation and non-violence for their own sake he regards as shams and decoys created to maintain colonial domination. Post-independence programs for financial assistance for the new nations have not been much better received. African leaders are wary of the "generosity" and "altruism" of former colonialists. Policies which in the past ended in domination had been justified by the Europeans as being altruistic and designed to civilize, Christianize, and aid the indigenous masses. In like manner, Kwame Nkrumah and the other African leaders have been dubious of Communist offers. To their satisfaction they have been able to avoid compromising African interests. To Africans, national and continental development based on freedom from foreign domination in any form is the first order of business.

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Research Note

THE UNCERTAINTY OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

By S. I. PLOSS*

"POLITICS cannot tolerate indulgence, it must be logical and consistent." This was a lesson in Soviet foreign policy which N. S. Khrushchev administered in July 1957, or just after the organizational finale to his bitter struggle with V. M. Molotov, whom the victorious leader accused of favoring "the policy of 'tightening all the screws'" in relations with the West.[1] However, in the past two and a half years, erraticism has often marked the Kremlin's foreign political behavior. Does this vacillation originate entirely in "objective" pressures on the party First Secretary and premier, or in his own allegedly impulsive nature, or may it sometimes be due in part to a recurrence of factional clashes in the Soviet hierarchy?

An intelligent guess at the answer to this question is least likely to be arrived at by theorizing about the nature of the Soviet power structure as "revealed" by exegesis of certain murky passages in the CPSU Rules, or projection of either the bizarre history of Stalinism or the interregnum that followed the autocrat's lengthy sway. As Philip E. Mosely shrewdly observed a few months after Stalin's death: "In analyzing the structure of power in an on-going system, it is misleading to rely upon analogies with the past."[2] It might, therefore, be more useful to speculate about political dynamics in the USSR on the basis of a comparative review of the opinion-shaping materials appearing in Soviet media over the course of several months, and particularly during a period when it is reasonable to assume that policy dilemmas confront the Soviet leadership. If the Kremlin denouements of 1955 and 1957 taught anything to outsiders—resource allocation and the jurisdiction of party secretaries vis-à-vis party executive boards, respectively, were then subject to varying interpretations in official literature—it was that dissonance in such materials may reflect not the political ambivalence of the ruling clique as a whole, but conflict within its midst.

* I wish to acknowledge the assistance derived from Dr. G. D. Paige and Dr. J. B. Sorenson of Princeton University; of course, they are in no way responsible for judgments and generalizations.

[1] *Pravda*, July 14, 1957.

[2] *The Kremlin and World Politics: Studies in Soviet Policy and Action* (New York 1960), 380.

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Rarely have Soviet pronouncements on politico-military affairs been as discordant as in the months and, especially, weeks surrounding the Kremlin's risk-fraught decision to emplace intermediate-range ballistic missiles in Cuba. Official Moscow appeared to speak in many tongues on questions like the relative world power of the Communist Bloc, the strategic implication of Russia's "global missile," the desirability of affixing "peaceful coexistence" to the battle ensign of regime agitators, diplomatic priorities, the outlook for *détente* with the United States, and whether to inhibit the disruptive struggle with Peiping over all-important methods by which to expand Communist influence throughout the world. That Khrushchev unilaterally promoted each of the diverse approaches to these issues or may have been indifferent toward any one of them would seem unlikely, if only because he has heavily staked his personal prestige on the achievement of a durable peace-cum-welfare orientation for Soviet policy.

Yet at the 22nd CPSU Congress, in October 1961, disparate estimates of Communist Bloc strength were manifest. Khrushchev strenuously upheld his doctrine of "peaceful coexistence," or the avoidance of perilous East-West military confrontations, with assurances that the Bloc already had obtained military superiority over potential enemies and might thereby deter any armed thrust at its holdings. "The world socialist system," Khrushchev told the opening session of the Congress, "*has become* a reliable shield which covers not only the peoples of countries friendly to us, but all mankind as well, from the military adventures of imperialism" (italics added).[3] In contrast to this self-satisfied appraisal of Bloc might, a notably guarded evaluation was developed by a commission of senior party and military officials who drafted the foremost resolution of the Congress. According to this document, "The world system of socialism *is becoming* an ever-more reliable shield which covers not only the peoples of the socialist countries, but all mankind as well, from the military adventures of imperialism" (italics added).[4]

The varying tenses employed to describe the "shield" would seem to be as politically meaningful as those that more than a half-century ago highlighted the notorious Lenin-Plekhanov controversy over Russian revolutionary tactics. Lenin, it will be recalled, contended that "capitalism already has become dominant" in the country's economic life and so implied the necessity of a socialist monopoly of authority once the awaited revolution erupted and proved successful. Plekhanov,

[3] *Pravda*, October 18, 1961.
[4] *Ibid.*, November 1, 1961.

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on the other hand, maintained that "in Russia capitalism is becoming more and more the dominant means of production," and so appeared to be keeping the door open for future cooperation between socialists and liberals. In the present-day situation, it may be inferred that Khrushchev's allusion to the "shield" denoted personal contentment with the existing military posture of the USSR, while the wording agreed on by the drafting commission of the 22nd Congress marked a concession to bureaucratic elements desirous of a further relentless build-up of the Soviet's military-industrial potential.

After the Congress, propagandists identifiable with Khrushchev's orientation resumed earlier criticism of Molotov, charging that as an opponent of "peaceful coexistence" he had "exaggerated the forces of imperialism and underestimated the power of the socialist camp."[5] This reproach might be assumed to have been directed against figures in the present-day hierarchy, if account is taken of the recorded anomaly in the transactions of the 22nd Congress and the cogent remarks of party Presidium members in the speeches they delivered prior to the March 1962 elections to the USSR Supreme Soviet. An examination of these speeches reveals an optimistic appraisal of Soviet military capability by L. I. Brezhnev, A. N. Kosygin, F. R. Kozlov, A. I. Mikoyan, N. V. Podgorny, D. S. Polyansky, and N. M. Shvernik. Significantly, the individuals of this persuasion whose career backgrounds are most closely linked with Khrushchev's endorsed the premier's well-known advocacy of personal diplomacy (Brezhnev) and negotiations with the United States (Podgorny). Kozlov's remarks are noteworthy, in view of his eminence since the great reorganization of the top leadership in May 1960: "The Soviet Union and the entire powerful camp of socialism *has now become* the leading international force" (italics added).[6]

A challenging assessment of Communist power is to be found in the analogous speech of Presidium member M. A. Suslov, another beneficiary of the May 1960 personnel changes, who in some quarters is regarded as a proponent of moderation in Soviet dealings with the ultramilitant faction of Peiping-Tirana.[7] Suslov conservatively adhered to the dogma of the November 1960 Conference Statement of the 81 Communist parties, averring that "The world socialist system *is turning into* the factor that is determining more and more the course of world

[5] N. M. Druzhinin, ed., *Sovetskaya istoricheskaya nauka ot XX k XXII S'yezdu KPSS: Istoriya SSSR; sbornik statey* [Soviet historical science from the 20th to the 22nd CPSU Congress: USSR history; A collection of articles] (Moscow 1962), 494.

[6] *Pravda*, March 15, 1962.

[7] See Boris Meissner, "Parteiführung und Parteiorganisation," *Osteuropa*, No. 1/2 (1962), 3-24.

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development" (italics added).[8] In contrast to the appreciations of Khrushchev and Kozlov cited above, this seems to have betokened reservations about the quality of Soviet war preparedness—that is, it echoed to a degree Molotov's heresy of having "underestimated the power of the socialist camp." Indeed, the government newspaper *Izvestiya*, whose editor-in-chief is Khrushchev's son-in-law, disapprovingly expunged the remark from its bowdlerized version of Suslov's electoral speech.

In April and May 1962, the question of Soviet military strength continued to be agitated in the Central Committee magazine *Kommunist*. L. N. Tolkunov, a deputy section chief in party headquarters and a prolific writer on Bloc affairs, characterized in the following terms the "global missile" that Khrushchev had earlier extolled as some kind of ultimate weapon: "This missile can strike any point on earth, which, in essence, renders useless the entire system of anti-missile defense built by the United States in the north, and has made that country vulnerable from the south, east, and west."[9] Defense Minister R. Ya. Malinovsky in a follow-up commentary on the "global missile" stated, rather implausibly, that it was highly accurate, but he refused to concede that the DEW Line was now hopelessly outdated.[10] Here one is reminded of the admonition of a Soviet official to the effect that "When this group [of G. M. Malenkov and Molotov] opposed this most urgent and vitally important measure of the party—I have in mind the assimilation of the virgin lands—[Party Presidium member N. A.] Bulganin was silent, that is, acted like a doubledealer."[11]

In sum, it is evident that late in 1961 and early in 1962 a consensus had not been reached on the capability of the Soviet military machine. Some leaders apparently argued that the forces in being, their strike capacity greatly enhanced by perfection of the ICBM, were more than adequate to cope with any contingency that might arise. Soviet missiles could now approach the American continent from directions other than the North Pole, thus rendering ineffective the United States' early warning system. Other leaders and technicians evidently refused to accept this viewpoint. Theirs was a skeptical approach to the "ultimate weapon." Accordingly, they may have pressed for the introduction of an offensive missile system in Cuba, which they were confident would re-

[8] *Pravda*, March 12, 1962.
[9] *Kommunist*, No. 6 (1962), 46.
[10] *Ibid.*, No. 7 (1962), 11ff.
[11] L. R. Korniyets, in *Plenum Tsentral'nogo Komiteta Kommunistischeskoy Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza, 15-19 dekabrya 1958 goda, Stenograficheskiy otchyot* [Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, December 15-19, 1958, Minutes] (Moscow 1958), 518.

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duce drastically the period of US warning from twenty to three minutes. The Soviet Union would then be afforded a clear military advantage. This presumed dispute had strong political overtones, since the transformation of Cuba into a nuclear *place d'armes* would increase the chance of a US-Soviet test of strength and, consequently, vitiate the "coexistence" principle that Khrushchev had lately been defending against Molotov.

Later in 1961, disruptive tensions ran high in numerous Bloc parties. Upper-level realignments or purges, all attended by signs of ideological malaise, were executed in Outer Mongolia (September 10), China (September 27), Hungary (October 12), and Bulgaria (November 4). That the CPSU was not proving itself a unique model of "fraternal solidarity" —a role that is ludicrously assigned to it in the November 1960 Conference Statement—is suggested by a number of concurrent abnormalities in Soviet propaganda. These abnormalities involved primarily the doctrinal watchwords of Khrushchev's foreign policy.

On October 14, apparently after the decision had been reached to establish ballistic missile sites in Cuba, *Pravda* featured the traditional November Revolution "Slogans" without the usual salute to "peaceful coexistence." Also omitted from the biannual scripture for party agitators was the word *Rodina,* or "homeland." This is especially curious inasmuch as Yu. V. Andropov, a senior party functionary, had written in *Pravda* on December 2, 1961: "Molotov composed a 'theory' that in essence deprived proletarian internationalism of one of its most important aspects, viz., socialist patriotism, love for one's homeland. . . . *Proletarian internationalism embodies socialist patriotism, love for one's homeland* . . ." (italics in text). This manipulation of politically charged doctrinal symbols would further tend to indicate that the shipment of IRBM's to Cuba was viewed as inimical to the national interests of the USSR, as defined and championed under "leftist" fire by Khrushchev. The manipulation in effect vindicated the more aggressive and supranational outlook associated with Khrushchev's internal enemies.

On the other hand, the November Revolution "Slogans" no longer called for the "speediest" conclusion of a German peace treaty and did not label the West Germans "revanchists." As recently as September 11, a Soviet government statement on the Cuban situation had raised the question of a German treaty in tones of urgency and denounced "revanchists" in West Berlin. To be sure, Malinovsky in his VE Day article in *Pravda* of June 22, 1962, declared in the classical language of inner-party disputation: "One must be hopelessly blind not to see the threat created by the resurgence of German militarism and revanch-

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ism." Had some variant of the widely anticipated Cuba-Berlin "deal" been struck in Moscow?

Scarcely less "logical and consistent" was the fervent appeal in behalf of "peaceful coexistence" in *Pravda* of October 21—one week after this Khrushchevian maxim had failed to turn up in the November Revolution "Slogans." The introduction to a signed article devoted to the republished minutes of the Seventh Party Congress (March 1918) informed readers that "scanning the pages . . . one thinks of the present day and of the reality which surrounds us." The reality described is that of the acknowledged leader of the party cast into a minority position in the Central Committee and fighting to overturn ascendant "Left-wing Communists" and "Trotskyites" who prefer to engage in armed conflict with "imperialism" rather than compromise their mistaken views on world revolution. The specter of a fatal division in the party's ranks is invoked at no less than three points in this article, which the authors avow to be a perceptive excursion into Bolshevik history.

This *Pravda* article need not be taken to mean that Khrushchev, the oft-heralded "continuator of Lenin's cause," had recently been overwhelmed on a key issue of foreign policy, albeit even that cannot be excluded as a distinct possibility. A safer assumption is that the authors had been commissioned to dramatize in esoteric fashion Khrushchev's differences with domestic as well as foreign Communist bosses who prefer an "armed truce" to any "demoralizing" search for an accommodation with the West. This conjecture rests in part on initial inner-party reactions to the ultimate verdict that Soviet offensive weapons be withdrawn from Cuba. For while there were various obeisances to the wisdom underlying this decision—something in the best tradition of "democratic centralism"—there seemed to be no unanimity on the unresolved question of whether to apply intensive effort toward achieving more far-reaching settlements of Cold War issues.

Consistent with the spirit of Khrushchev's messages to the American President in the latter phases of the Cuban crisis, an *Izvestiya* commentator on November 1, under the rubric "Not Tests of Strength but Negotiations," maintained argumentatively: "No one will come forth and deny that already there have been created favorable conditions not only for mollifying passions in the Caribbean region, but also for a big dialogue concerning the vital problems which excite our planet." The commentator then tangled with "some Western observers" who either rejected the thought of US-Soviet talks on arms control and mutual security arrangements in Europe—the topics raised in Khrushchev's let-

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ter to the American President, dated October 28—or advised "the very greatest skepticism" toward them.

Now, in 1956-1957, while Molotov still sat in the party Presidium, Khrushchev and his cohorts persistently reminded elite audiences of the Old Bolshevik's resistance to their own economic innovations by deploring the "skepticism" expressed about them in the utterances of "bourgeois politicians," "bourgeois journalists," and even "reactionary circles in the United States." That the November 1 attack in *Izvestiya* on "some Western observers" hostile to US-Soviet parleys on major world problems may in reality have been directed at intransigents in the top echelons of the CPSU is possible, in view of the statements of Marshal K. Ye. Voroshilov in *Pravda* of November 3, 1962. Voroshilov, a personal friend of Stalin who had backed Molotov's group in the leadership crisis of June 1957 and whom Khrushchev vindictively hazed at the 22nd Party Congress, unmistakably implied that any search for *détente* with the United States was doomed to failure. In his *Pravda* article, he preached that "the imperialist circles of the USA and their allies in the aggressive blocs do not wish to relax the world situation, continue the arms race and provocations which endanger the peace . . . ; international imperialism, which profits from wars and colonial plunder, does not wish peace, [and] rejects the policy of peaceful coexistence, although it does not spare words for empty declarations about its love of peace." Voroshilov further claimed that the "US imperialists" were preparing a "thermonuclear holocaust" to destroy the Communist Bloc. Instead of welcoming the prospect of bilateral talks on the subjects specified in Khrushchev's letter of October 28 and endorsed warmly in *Izvestiya* of November 1, Voroshilov chose to commend moves toward the "speediest" conclusion of peace treaties with West and East Germany.

Sharply at odds with Voroshilov's diehard contention that the West "rejects the policy of peaceful coexistence" was the temperate appraisal enunciated in the November 6 address of first deputy premier Kosygin. He asserted that "The Leninist policy of peaceful coexistence means that the two antagonistic systems which exist on our planet—the socialist and the capitalist—have recognized that they can live without war, that is, coexist." At the same time, Kosygin inexplicably reverted to the less conceited formulation pertinent to Soviet military power and, notwithstanding the November Revolution "Slogans," dwelt on the need to curb West German "revanchists" with the aid of separate peace treaties.

Kosygin may not, however, have spoken for all the Soviet leaders.

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Addressing the Bulgarian Communist Party's Congress on November 6, Suslov maintained that the "imperialists" both "fear" and "try to demolish" the policy of "peaceful coexistence." Indeed, "as long as imperialism exists there will be preserved the danger of new wars."[12] Of equal interest is Suslov's remark that "The correlation of forces in the world arena in our epoch is such that there has emerged a real opportunity to avoid a new world war." Suslov thereby dissociated himself from the Khrushchev-Mao controversy over local war and disarmament. Khrushchev's aversion to limited war and interest in arms control had been reasserted in the following polemical terms in an editorial article in *Kommunist* for October 22, 1962: "Our party at the 22nd Congress solemnly declared before all mankind that it sees as the main goal of its foreign policy not only (*sic*) to avoid a world war, but also forever to exclude war from the life of society during the very lifetime of the present generation."

Khrushchev evidently did not reverse himself on this in the next two weeks, since his proven mouthpiece Tolkunov reiterated in another party journal, approved for printing on November 2, that the "historic mission" of communism was "forever to exclude the possibility of any (*sic*) war from the life of society."[13] Suslov must also have earned the gratitude of Peiping for his notably discreet treatment of Albania. Whereas at least ten foreign delegations to the Bulgarian Party Congress denounced the Albanian leaders, the head of the Soviet contingent ignored them; Suslov noncommittedly excoriated "right and left opportunism." This brings to mind the justificatory notice in a Soviet party journal published a few months after Khrushchev's denunciation of Enver Hoxha at the 22nd CPSU Congress: "A position of silence would have meant encouragement of the schismatics." Khrushchev had not changed his mind about this, to judge from the shaft against Hoxha in Ye. Yevtushenko's anti-Stalin verse in *Pravda* of October 21, and B. N. Ponomarev's elaborate criticism of the Albanian rulers in the same daily on November 18. Moreover, Khrushchev himself attacked the Albanian ultras in the foreign policy review at the December 1962 USSR Supreme Soviet session.[14] The reticence of Suslov on Albania was, therefore, demonstrative of that "conciliatoriness" which Stalin had shown toward Lenin's inner-party adversaries on the eve of the Bolshevik Revolution and which was acidulously recalled by party propagandists in *Pravda* of November 2 and 6, 1962.

[12] *Pravda*, November 7, 1962.
[13] *Partiynaya Zhizn'*, No. 21 (1962), 29.
[14] *Pravda*, December 13, 1962.

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As is usually the case, any attempt to reconstruct the inner sequence of recent Soviet decisions in foreign policy would be venturesome. The relevant cross-currents in Soviet press materials, discernible even in the same day's issue of *Pravda*, may, however, be deduced to represent clashing world outlooks in Moscow. The contours of these world outlooks evidently were sketched by Khrushchev himself at the 22nd CPSU Congress, when he led what appears to have been an indirect assault on the neo-Stalinism resurgent on all the big fronts of national policy since the leadership overhaul of 1960. The retrograde mentality of "tightening all the screws" had asserted itself on the home front in partial recentralization of industrial management, widespread and centrally approved nationalization of collective farm property, proportionately declining inputs in agriculture, introduction of the death penalty for economic crimes, and the defeat of a strong challenge to the anti-consumer dogma of the preponderant development of heavy industry. Externally, the image of stability and reasonableness that Khrushchev had laboriously sought to create in 1957-1959 was impaired by a suddenly wrecked "summit" meeting, the premier's own clownish deportment at the 15th UN General Assembly session, the form-of-class-war definition of "coexistence" in the November 1960 Statement, and renewed nuclear testing.

Khrushchev's new anti-Stalin campaign apparently was intended to discredit the social psychology of those top leaders in part responsible for this general drift toward reaction. However, later events have tended to indicate the continued vigor of the internal forces that demand implacable struggle with nascent *embourgeoisement* in the USSR and resist efforts to dissipate the siege atmosphere that induces popular cohesion and discipline. In short, the CPSU does not seem to have been spared the agony known to exist in so many other Bloc parties as a result of the Khrushchev-Mao dispute over the true path to the Communist millennium. The vacillating nature of recent Kremlin behavior in world affairs seems to have reflected in part this presumed internal contest over the guidelines of Soviet development. The contest, it should be added, does not appear to have endangered or even involved the organizational status of Khrushchev, but on that plane merely served to suggest the limitation of unilateral authority in Russia's post-Stalin interlude.

In general, the variations in verbal behavior observed above suggest a number of hypotheses for consideration by students of international politics:

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(1) Political systems with a low tolerance for dissent are not free of the foreign policy uncertainties that characterize the political processes of more open societies.

(2) A time-lag rather than purposeful speed may, at least occasionally, characterize decision-making in totalitarian societies.

(3) In the official communications output of such political systems, it is possible to identify symbols, including omissions, that imply differing perceptions of the international environment and varying tactics and strategies for coping with it.

(4) The observed deviations call into question assumptions as to the political and technical feasibility of complete totalitarian control over communications content.

(5) If the observed variations in communications content are to be explained in terms of the tolerance and/or indecisiveness of an all-powerful leader, he can be expected to remain silent or vary his position randomly on a specific issue. That is to say, if the leader is all-powerful and has arrived at a decision, then it is unlikely that any variation will occur; if he has not reached a decision, then he may be expected either (a) to keep silent and permit a policy dialogue among decisive elements or (b) to vary his position on the issue, thus permitting the inference of indecisiveness. In the instance treated above, the evidence shows a variance of views around a rather consistent position of Khrushchev's —which is not in harmony with the hypothesis of an omnipotent Soviet leader.

(6) Over limited periods of time, it is possible to identify in the verbal behavior of individuals in regard to various issues correlations that are logically consistent with an hypothesized tendency for intra-unit coalitions to form at the highest levels of policy-making.

(7) Since crisis conditions are believed to simplify and clarify policy alternatives, it might also be assumed that such conditions tend to expose the wide scope of issues in dispute.

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Review Articles

WAR WITHOUT PAIN, AND OTHER MODELS

By THOMAS C. SCHELLING

Kenneth E. Boulding, *Conflict and Defense: A General Theory*, New York, Harper and Brothers, 1962, 349 pp. $7.00.

I

I DON'T know how many economists, teaching business fluctuations or the corn-hog cycle, have devoted an hour to the household thermostat; I know several. Cybernetics, I am told, drew attention to similarities between vacuum tubes and animal nerve cells, and made predictions about the human nervous system that were verified by surgery. An article on feedback related artillery fire-control and automatic oil-pipeline systems to the ecological complementarity of the lynx and the rabbit. Economists compare the closeness of election campaigns to the market forces that make two brands of cider taste much alike. Analysts of rumor, best sellers, and epidemic diseases have been led independently to the equation for the logistic curve; and the collapse of Batista has been compared to the collapse of a stock market. Individuals with conflicting internal values have been likened to a two-person committee with a complicated voting system; and recently the paradigm of the "prisoners' dilemma" has been used to characterize preemptive attack, cheating on a test ban, and Rousseau's illustration (five men cooperating in a stag hunt when one spies a hare) of the value of enforceable contract.

Everything is unique; and there is no denying that an *adequate* analysis of any phenomenon or decision has to attend to its peculiarities—even if only to verify that they are, for the purpose at hand, of second importance. When Herbert Simon attempted to reduce a large part of George Homans' *The Human Group*[1] to a short set of logical relations among variables (a set of differential equations), he lost a great deal that was in the book. But he also gained something—an accumulated body of mathematical analysis that might not have been recognized as applicable, and a potential for recognizing similarities in any other field of behavior, organic or inorganic, whose mechanism fitted those equa-

[1] New York 1950.

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tions.[2] The human leg is not *just* a pendulum; but for understanding the relative gaits of ants, people, and giraffes (or of H. G. Wells' metallic tripods from Mars) it has to be recognized that the leg *is* a pendulum. Natural scientists no longer wonder at discovering the same logarithmic curve in the spiral of the chambered nautilus, the growth of bacteria (or people) in a culture, and the discount on a long-term railroad bond. Many social scientists still do.

Some undoubtedly think it insulting to man "to reduce him to an equation." Some undoubtedly dislike being informed that their literary masterwork can be distilled to a few propositions in topology or information theory, much as the makers of Old Crow may resent their whisky's being described as a lot of water and drugstore alcohol plus traces of a few complicated molecules that are better understood at MIT than in Kentucky. Some may be concerned lest the impatience of single-minded enthusiasts lead, as with Thalidomide, to premature confidence that the details left out of analysis are of secondary importance. And some, partly because the sorting system in most of our colleges sends those with a taste for hard theory into the hard sciences and the rest of us to the soft, just don't like analysis that distills out of a subject what is distinctive about it.

But some do, and among the most insatiable is Kenneth Boulding. Trained an economist, by persuasion a Quaker, hooked early by cybernetics, information theory, and the mathematical biology of his colleague Anatol Rapoport, concerned about war and the evolution of civilization, Boulding has been trying to put together a new science. Six years ago, in *The Image*, he offered a name—*eiconics*. He found it hard to define the field, but placed its roots in the sociology of knowledge. Some idea of its scope is suggested by the three works he then believed had contributed most toward the new science: Chester Barnard, *The Functions of the Executive*; Norbert Wiener, *Cybernetics*; and Claude Shannon and Warren Weaver, *Mathematical Theory of Communication*.

Since then he has fallen for Lewis F. Richardson's astonishingly original and long-neglected work on arms races,[3] has coupled it with economics and game theory (particularly with the work of Martin Shubik

[2] H. A. Simon, "A Formal Theory of Interaction in Social Groups," *American Sociological Review*, XVII (April 1952), 202-11.

[3] The most pertinent part of Richardson's work can be found in Lewis F. Richardson, *Arms and Insecurity* (Pittsburgh and Chicago, 1960), edited by Nicolas Rashevsky and Ernesto Trucco. See especially Chapters 2-5. For a review, see John C. Harsanyi, "Mathematical Models for the Genesis of War," *World Politics*, XIV (July 1962), 687-99.

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on "games of survival" in economics),[4] and has broadened his new science to include virtually all social interaction processes—from war to courtship, from competitive advertising to the lynx and the rabbit—that lend themselves to a common style of systematic analysis.

This is evidently too much for a single book; and his *Conflict and Defense* should not be taken to epitomize the new science (if there is to be one) nor the new science made to stand or fall with the book. It is a valuable book, but—and this always sounds patronizing, though it is not meant to be—more important for what it attempts than for what it succeeds in doing. The book is uneven in emphasis, but Boulding is trying both to survey a subject and to develop ideas of his own. The methodology reflects economics more than any other discipline, and the main application is to military relations.

The book divides into two parts, hard and soft. Chapters 8 through 11 and 15 contain no quantitative analysis, no diagrams, no "hard theory." They are what economists used to call "institutional"; they are the stuff of Boulding's earlier book and his earlier definition of his new science. They relate more to the roles of organizations than to systems of interaction. Chapters 1 through 7, devoted to nonspecific theory, and 12 and 13 on military relations, are the "hard" theoretical chapters that build cumulatively; among them, Chapters 1 through 4, 6, 12, and 13 are the core.

The two processes that these chapters are concerned with are epitomized by arms races and war. The book deals with them abstractly; price war and spacial competition in economics, political rivalry, intercollegiate football, or the competition of Methodists and Baptists are equally good interpretations of his basic models. But for concreteness of exposition, and because of Boulding's undisguised interest in problems of war and peace, a military interpretation predominates.

Arms races and war are analytically not wholly distinct. Some kinds of territorial jockeying, for example, have the tempo of arms preparation rather than of destructive engagement. Nevertheless, for modern international warfare there is a useful distinction between competitive preparations and destructive engagements. Descriptively, the distinction is usually between the *accumulation* of arms and their *expenditure*; analytically, it may have more to do with expectations and control. War is usually not just "mutual disarmament," though in some long wars of attrition—perhaps the Peloponnesian war—it is not very useful to separate the war itself from the "arms race." (In Mao's concept of civil war, the "arms build-up" is accomplished through war itself.) In some

[4] Martin Shubik, *Strategy and Market Structure* (New York 1959).

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models the difference is between *adaptive* competitive processes and those that, once triggered, run an ineluctable course. The distinction may not prove universally helpful in the abstract; but the particular "basic model" of warfare that Boulding uses is a different species from his arms-race models.

The book invites comparison with Rapoport's.[5] The men are colleagues at Michigan and share a number of enterprises, including the Center for Research in Conflict Resolution. They are both enormously appreciative of Lewis F. Richardson. Rapoport devoted a journal-length essay to Richardson's work, much of which was incorporated in his own book; Boulding proposes the generic name "Richardson processes" for the entire class of interaction phenomena analogous to arms races, and much of his book is devoted to these and related interaction processes. The efforts of Boulding and Rapoport to stake out a new field of inquiry are, though different, nearer to each other than to any other work that I know of. Both men are fascinated by analytical models; both try to transcend any specific application—economics, race, delinquency, war, divorce, arbitration, politics. Both offer a set of concepts, analytical schemes, and terminology with which to build up an organized discipline.

Finally, both have a quality that is likely to confound people who want to organize movements. These are men about the location of whose hearts there can be no question. Both are interested in peace and persuasion, suspicious of military force, sympathetic to disarmament and international institutions, unpersuaded that the Soviet bureaucracy is incorrigibly satanic, willing to explore radical approaches to peace and security, and devoted to peace for reasons that go beyond just the avoidance of war. At the same time, both are intrigued by theoretical ideas—"addicted" is not too strong a term. They have been fascinated by game theory, and not only acknowledge it but build it into their books. Most of those who have recently screamed against "game theory" (outcries really directed at theory, not at game theory) seemed unaware that it could infect the angels too and that some were in fairly high fever. (It is ironic that James R. Newman should have selected some of Richardson's work for his splendid *World of Mathematics*,[6] only to see it inspire the application of game theory and other equally fleshless theories to war and peace.) One can nowhere find as explicit use of game theory or any comparably abstract theory in the published works of

[5] Anatol Rapoport, *Fights, Games, and Debates* (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1960). For a review, see Robert J. Aumann, "The Game of Politics," *World Politics*, XIV (July 1962), 675-86.

[6] James R. Newman, *The World of Mathematics* (New York 1956), II, 1238-53.

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Herman Kahn, Albert Wohlstetter, or even—in his work on military policy—Oskar Morgenstern, as in the books of Boulding and Rapoport.

It is a credit to Boulding, Rapoport, and their colleagues that their *Journal of Conflict Resolution* has not fallen captive to any group, methodological or political. Boulding's book is almost sure to surprise those who know of him, and even some who know him, by the little comfort it will give people who would like him to "prove" the case for some peace movement. His enthusiasm for his theory is understandably great, but his claims for policy are moderate. That, and the fact that his book is hard to read, will keep it from being misused to his embarrassment.

About the durability of his analytical scheme—his concepts, models, and terminology—I am skeptical, just as I was about Rapoport's. A new field may be emerging—I think it is—but we don't know what it is yet. We shall take turns at slicing it up in different ways or marking its boundaries; the eventual definition will reflect the tastes of people attracted to it as much as the nature of the subject. Rapoport's division into "fights, games, and debates" served his purpose, but would not serve Boulding's. Whether Boulding should hold onto his "eiconics," or concentrate on interaction processes, will get a pragmatic answer; and I cannot guess what it will be. The rapid obsolescence of both Boulding's and Rapoport's books would be progress; the contributions of both will be visible in the books that follow—if any do follow, and I hope they will. The subject has a vitality that reflects not just its universality, but its inspiration in peace and war.

II

Few contrasts in the social sciences are more striking than that between the extensive and, on the whole, competent and fruitful models of economic processes, and the almost nonexistent analyses of arms interaction. Boulding points out (p. 25) that the arms race is theoretically similar to the price war; price war, however, has been analyzed professionally and systematically by those who consider economics their business, while the arms race has scarcely been analyzed at all. The reason may be that arms-race theory has not been anybody's business.

There are a few fine exceptions. Lewis F. Richardson's main ideas were substantially published by the outbreak of World War II. The style of his analysis—explicit differential equations denoting the behavior of two or more interacting units—would have been entirely congenial to theoretical economists during the last twenty-five years. Had there been a profession, like economics, ready to gobble up new ideas

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and new techniques of analysis, the theoretical study of international military relationships might have burgeoned. But Richardson himself remarked, just before his death in 1953, that it was difficult to publish serious analytical work on the subject. "There are many anti-war societies, but they are concerned with propaganda, not research. There is a wide public interest in the subject provided it is expressed in bold rhetoric, but not if it is a quantitative scientific study involving statistics and mathematics. There is no appropriate learned society."[7]

Huntington's monograph[8] should have been exceptionally stimulating; it presented enough historical analysis to show the richness of the subject and enough theoretical discussion to set model-builders going (if there were any around). Burns' article[9] is not only good, but nearly unique; it should be just one of many. And we should all by now be in debt to Stefan Valavanis, whose charmingly original examination of personal interaction suggests that his tragic death in 1958 was a great loss not alone to economics. But few of us, I am afraid, have incurred the debt.[10]

The place to have looked for such work was actually not the pages of *World Politics*, but the several journals devoted to operations research. One might have expected that by now it would be standard form, in discussing the implications of a new weapon, of a warning system, of intelligence breakthroughs, or of alternative deployments of weapons, to include some analysis of how the choice or development would affect the parameters of the arms race. That is, one might insert the new development into a two-sided model—an interaction model—to see what the effect on both sides would be if one or both adopted the new development. This is done for the *tactical* implications of a new weapon; countermeasures and counter-countermeasures are examined in detail. But this kind of analysis is typically confined to interactions that have the character of a "zero-sum" game, interactions in which there is little or no bargaining, little or no common interest in damping an expensive or dangerous competition, little or no opportunity for the interplay of threats and challenges.

[7] Quoted in the biographical note to Lewis F. Richardson, *Statistics of Deadly Quarrels* (Pittsburgh 1960), xxvi.

[8] Samuel P. Huntington, "Arms Races: Prerequisites and Results," in Carl J. Friedrich and Seymour E. Harris, eds., *Public Policy* (Cambridge, Mass., 1958), 41-86.

[9] Arthur Lee Burns, "A Graphical Approach to Some Problems of the Arms Race," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, III (December 1959), 326-42. Some interesting unpublished work has been done by Michael D. Intrilligater of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

[10] Stefan Valavanis, "The Resolution of Conflict when Utilities Interact," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, II (June 1958), 156-69.

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A similar situation was reflected in the reaction to Herman Kahn's book. The impact of *On Thermonuclear War*[11] was due not to the particular content of the book, but to the fact that it was the first on that subject in that detail after fifteen years of nuclear weapons. Had there been a dozen books on the subject, diverse in opinion and approach, Kahn's book would have been important but not unique, liked and disliked but not passionately. It would not have been a focus for protest. It would not have led people to fear that, if one accepted the legitimacy of his method, one might be stuck with his conclusions. While Kahn's book is not mainly about the arms race, its reception symptomized the paucity of analytical literature.

Boulding's book takes a few more steps, some quite original, toward the rudimentary theoretical equipment necessary for talking about the arms-interaction process. Rapoport's book already made available a simplified interpretation of Richardson's basic model; his presentation did not, however, go beyond the idea that each side's military preparations might be a function of the other's and that the process might be explosive or damped according to a few parameters of the interaction. Boulding has gone farther and built up the notion of a national "reaction function" on the basis of a set of national objectives and costs. Specifically, he introduces the economist's notion of "indifference curves" or, more generally, a system of national preferences; these preferences relate not only to the nation's own military preparations but to the other nation's as well. This is where he draws on the work of Shubik, whose *Strategy and Market Structure* examined the interaction between firms, a firm's profits being a function of its own behavior and the behavior of its rivals.

This is a major step in the elaboration of a model. Among other things, it makes the difference between a model that admits bargaining and one that does not. It permits the negotiation of mutually preferred positions, and decisions consciously oriented toward the reaction of the other side. Compared with the scope and importance of the subject, Boulding's model is still skimpy; compared with what existed, it is a real step forward.

There is a reason why Richardson did not improvise something like the economist's "preference function" on the basis of which the arms-race phenomenon could be theoretically generated. Richardson viewed an arms build-up mainly as a function of hostility or friendliness—as a popular psychological phenomenon. While he was interested in how some of the parameters of the national reaction might be changed, he

[11] Princeton 1960.

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was dealing with moods rather than budget-making—with something more like autonomous, compulsive, or unconscious behavior than the profit calculus of a firm or the deliberate reaction of a government to a perceived threat.[12]

The matter is not just one of analytical style. It makes a difference whether the arms race is mainly a matter of popular mood (and military preparations just a symptom) or an interaction between central governments that relate budget plans and weapon decisions to a projection of a perceived threat. Surely the correct position is that it depends on which arms race one is talking about—France and Germany in the 1860's, Britain and Germany in the early 1900's, India and Pakistan in the 1950's, or the Soviet Union and the United States since 1949. Once we have made the distinction, though, we have to recognize that any actual arms interaction is a mixture. Governments make the decisions; popular moods can have a lot to do with the decisions the governments find congenial and with the foreign policies that, at one remove, provide the "objective" basis for armaments programs.

If there is any single mistake to be avoided, it is probably focusing on *the* arms race. Not only do arms races differ historically over time and among the different bilateral and multilateral rivalries that exist at a given time; but even between any pair of countries there is no single interaction phenomenon that can be identified with *the* arms race. In the first place, as mentioned, we have to distinguish between popular

[12] The presentation of his model reflects this concept of "mood." Richardson begins, and Rapoport follows him, with a mathematical description of how mood changes as a function of the mood of the adversary—a pair of differential equations. From this can be derived the curve relating one side's eventual mood to the mood of the other side —what Boulding calls a "partial equilibrium curve." To Richardson the instantaneous reaction is the fundamental process; the derived equilibrium curves are an analytical construct. ("The equations are merely a description of what people would do if they did not stop to think."—*Arms and Insecurity*, 12.) In Boulding the method is reversed. Boulding conceives of each nation's having a preferred position on its own arms build-up scale for any given position the other country may be in. From this he can derive the adjustment process (Richardson's differential equations). Analytically, the one can be translated into the other; but the starting point depends on whether the process is regarded as one of conscious goal-seeking or of instantaneous reaction. This difference in conception is reflected in the organization of Rapoport's book; his theoretical arms race is analyzed in Part I, "The Blindness of the Mass," rather than in Part II, "The Logic of Strategy." He puts the arms race in what he calls "social physics," and relates it to psychological epidemics and other phenomena of mass reaction like the lynx-rabbit cycle. Boulding's explicit references to Shubik make clear that Boulding, perhaps because he is an economist where Rapoport is a mathematical biologist, prefers to deal with self-conscious organizations as decision units. He also, as an economist, sees quantitative limits on arms programs; in Richardson's model there is no boundary to the process except war itself.

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moods and government programs.[13] Second, there are at least three different orders of arms race, to be distinguished by their tempo.

One relates to the arms build-up—the dreadnought competition between Germany and Britain before World War I, or the missile build-up of East and West at present. This "race" involves activities measured on a scale of years; lead times in weapons development and procurement guarantee that. Second, there is the phenomenon typified by the "mobilization race" at the outbreak of World War I (and perhaps reflected in some recent crises). The time scale of this interaction is measured in days or weeks; it involves competitive maneuvering for position and readiness, and heightening expectations about war. It, like the slower one, may find a stable equilibrium point at some level of enhanced readiness, or may explode into war. Third, there is the process of interacting *expectations*, which may lead to pre-emptive initiation. This one is probably measured in hours or even minutes; its time scale is that of decision processes and much of the interaction may be conjectural.

In addition, and most nearly analogous to the second one mentioned, is the process nowadays described as "escalation." Limited war itself, if viewed as a heated variant of the cold war, is rather like certain arms-race phenomena. The landing of troops in Lebanon can be viewed both as a step in the "escalation" of a crisis—perhaps even as "escalation" in a war in which no shots were fired—and as a pre-emptive maneuver somewhat like mobilization. (Troop movements in an active Berlin crisis might better reflect the blending of "mobilization" and "escalation.")

Many arms interactions cannot be aptly characterized as a "race." Not all steps that a nation takes to improve its military capability, nor all budgetary outlays, have a purely competitive interpretation. As an extreme illustration, any steps the Soviets can take to minimize the

[13] Drawing a diagram with two axes, one labeled "us" and the other "them," leaving it to the reader to interpret the behavior as tangible or intangible, may be momentarily useful for articulating some concepts of interaction. It is a fault of Boulding's presentation that he switches back and forth between a military-program interpretation and a friendliness-hostility interpretation, as though the two were the same. He also seems to imply—and the need for simplification provides some excuse—that the mood of a nation can be analyzed as though it were the mood of an individual. There is undoubtedly some useful analogy between one nation's "hostility" toward another and one person's "hostility" toward another, and there may even be some structural similarities; but they are not the same phenomenon. Also, from a methodological standpoint, one has to distinguish between quantitative phenomena that show continuity over time—going from less to more by traversing values in between—and those that can jump discontinuously from large to small or from love to hate.

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likelihood that they will inadvertently launch general war (e.g., security precautions on nuclear weapons, or warning systems that are less prone to false alarms) are apt to be in our interest. We may not react to the particular steps they take; but, if we do, it is not to make up some lead we have lost. There are some things, of which a secure capability for authentic communication with an enemy in time of war might be an example, in which the interaction may be one of reciprocation. Again, the hardening or dispersal of a missile force within a fixed budget may represent an "improvement" in a country's strategic posture but may not be deplored by the other side; the second country may actually react, in its own planning, in a direction that is reassuring rather than menacing.

If there is a second mistake, then, to avoid in arms-race analysis, it is assuming that all military preparations can be aggregated into a single index involving just "more" and "less," with "more" being invariably and simultaneously more expensive, more hostile, and more dangerous. A missile-hardening race or a bomber-dispersal race may involve greater outlays on both sides, and what looks like "more" military potency; it is not necessarily destabilizing, and probably not usefully characterized as a "race" at all. The interaction may be intense; but what one wants to look for is whether it is mutually beneficial, mutually self-defeating, or of no mutual consequence.

The matter is important because many proposals for arms control, if not all of them, can be viewed as efforts to shift certain parameters in the "arms race" to make the interaction less mutually self-defeating. It is sometimes said of arms limitations that they would simply cause the arms race to bulge in some other direction. This is a useful observation; but, instead of settling the matter, it just identifies what arms control is about. Does the arms race—or, rather, the complex arms interaction—get diverted into less dangerous, more self-stabilizing, less self-aggravating directions, or does it merely bulge in a direction that is perhaps more expensive but otherwise no different?

A splendid example of this kind of analysis is Colonel Kent's monograph.[14] Kent examines alternative quantitative limitations on long-range missiles and their warheads: a limit on numbers, a limit on aggregate yield of the warheads, and some compromises. He explicitly sets up a model in which both sides in an "arms race" have certain missile-strength goals *relative* to the enemy, and examines the strategic forces

[14] Glenn A. Kent, "On the Interaction of Opposing Forces Under Possible Arms Agreements," Occasional Paper No. 5 (Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1963).

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that both sides are induced to cultivate under the alternative limitations. He examines whether there is a stable equilibrium within the agreed limit, and he compares outcomes under the alternative limits. "Outcomes" reflect the interacting decisions of both participants. He reaches important conclusions. What they are I will not rehearse here; the point is that this kind of analysis, which ought to be common, is rare. Kent's approach should be emulated.

A model of a "missile race" ought to distinguish among several variables: numbers, warhead yields, reliability and accuracy, hardening and dispersal, warning systems, active defenses, target intelligence, capacity for controlled firing, damage assessment, location with respect to civilian targets, procurement and deployment lead time, reliability of enemy intelligence about all of these factors, and reliability of information about the enemy force. The analysis should also distinguish, at another level, between the objective of deterrence and the objective of war initiation or war conduct. One needs a model that can cope not only with the overall size of the force, measured somehow, but with its relevant characteristics. If one examines, with respect to several of these variables, the kind of force that one side would be motivated to deploy as a function of what the other side seems to be deploying, one gets not "the" arms race but a variety of interactions, some benign, some malignant, some neutral. One not only is closer to bridging the gap between theoretical analysis and policy problems, but is on the way to enriching the models themselves.

Take an example. Set up a model in which each side's strategic forces are an explicit function of what the other side is perceived to be acquiring. Insert some plausible quantitative characteristics—vulnerability, accuracy, reliability, target intelligence—and work out the figures for what each wants (and the speed with which it will acquire it), given what it thinks the other has and is currently acquiring. Then add some *uncertainty* about the size of the force on the other side, the lethality of enemy weapons against one's own, or the enemy's lead time in enlarging its force. Explore what this uncertainty does to the forces, or to the build-up trend, on both sides. What kinds of uncertainties are stabilizing, what kinds aggravate problems on both sides? What reactions to uncertainty—e.g., a "conservative" upward bias in estimates—may raise the level of armaments on both sides? What kinds of "multipliers" can one derive, relating the net effect on both sides' programs of some autonomous change in one's program or some systematic error of perception?

The "missile gap" phenomenon of recent years is a reminder that

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what one reacts to is what he perceives or projects into the future, not the true facts. The Soviets possibly are now worse off for having encouraged a Western exaggeration of the speed of the Soviet missile build-up. They have to react to a Western force that is undoubtedly improved qualitatively, and likely enhanced quantitatively, as a result of what may have been a misperception—one that they stimulated or, at least, acquiesced in. The effects of uncertainty are but one class of arms-race phenomena that may be better understood by the use of theoretical models. In particular the role of "inspection"—which is no less important in the absence of arms agreements than with them—can be better understood.

(To avoid contradicting myself, I must point out that perhaps the Soviets are, in the long run, less menaced in consequence of the American response to the once-forecast missile gap. The qualitative changes in U.S. strategic weaponry and its deployment and control may have made the world safer, whether or not the Soviets realize it—and whether or not they want it that way.)

A "primitive" arms race is one in which each side reacts to the other, without realizing its own influence on the other side. A slightly more sophisticated arms race is one in which each side realizes that the other, too, is reacting, and that one's own adjustments to the environment somewhat determine the future state of that environment. In Rapoport's terminology, the arms race at this point ceases to be a "fight" and becomes a "game." That is, a bargaining element is introduced; behavior becomes self-consciously oriented toward the influence one has, not just a reaction to an autonomous environment. In the more sophisticated model, three things can happen. First, one side can moderate its own behavior with a view to where it wants to end up, given the way the other side reacts. This is the case in which one side is (or thinks it is) dominant or sophisticated, the other blind or unsophisticated. (Incidentally, one of the paradoxes that comes out of an analysis of this situation is that it can easily be to one's advantage to be the blind member, not the controlling member, of the pair.)

Second, both sides can acknowledge the nature of the interaction between them and bargain, perhaps attempting to distort each other's perception of their behavior patterns to make each other more concerned about the costs and risks of not coming to terms. Third, without explicit negotiation of understandings, there may be some bargaining behavior of a tacit or informal sort, each conveying to the other something about its own responses, each conveying the state of affairs that it would consider tolerable.

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We have the latter kind of bargaining between East and West at present, though it is far from articulate. Surely the East and West are aware that each side's military posture is substantially a reaction to the other's. Whether the actual military planning process is fully informed by an awareness of the interaction, or is a little more in the nature of "blind" responses to perceived future threats that are considered autonomous, is not an easy question to answer. Governments in the West are not centralized rational decision-making hierarchies; on the other side of the Iron Curtain they probably are not either. But at the level of national policy-making, there is clearly an awareness that what one country does may provoke reactions on the other side. Explicit disarmament negotiations are at least nominally based on this recognition; they cannot yet be said to have affected the process except, for good or ill, to heighten sensitivities to certain aspects of the arms race. But, wholly aside from explicit arms negotiations, there is some evidence that Western governments perceive themselves to be in a continual tacit bargaining process with the Soviets, and evidence that the Soviets see this, too. There were many signs that the Eisenhower administration was inhibited in its defense budgeting not only by the usual fiscal considerations, and not only by a possible worry about an overdeveloped military-industrial complex in this country, but also by a desire not to rock the boat where the arms race was concerned. There was some evidence that the Eisenhower administration declined to get enthusiastic about a large airborne alert force (at a time when the missile gap was causing great concern) partly in order to avoid aggravating the state of relations between us and the Soviets. It is also a fair observation that the reluctance of that administration to engage in any serious civil defense program was at least partly due to a desire not to open up another dimension of the arms race.

When President Kennedy announced increases in the defense budget during the Berlin crisis of 1961, and Khrushchev quickly reciprocated, we were witnessing a process of "communication" as well as one of "preparation." President Kennedy, in effect, was reminding the Soviets that the arms race could be more furious than it was, and would likely become so if the Soviets did not moderate their behavior.

On the whole, this process relates much more to overt political ventures beyond one's borders than to what goes on within borders. In respect of "aggression," we formulate explicit threats and reassurances about what will provoke our military response and what will be safe for the Soviets. We apparently do not articulate "deterrent" threats with respect to the Soviet domestic military build-up. There seems to be

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nothing quite as self-conscious as what went on, say, between the French and the British in the late nineteenth century, as described by Huntington.[15] In that case, he concludes, the British finally succeeded in communicating to the French a British determination and capacity to enforce a particular ratio of strength, and the French finally acquiesced.

Arms interaction takes place not only between enemies but among allies. Boulding's book touches, at least metaphorically, on this possibility. The level of British armament is a function of the American, perhaps vice versa. (The bargaining is actually more articulate than usually takes place between enemies.) There must be interesting cases in which countries are neither clearly allies nor clearly enemies; Indian officials must sometimes have thought of Pakistani armed forces not solely as potential enemies but possibly as potential allies in certain contingencies. During the postwar period, the French, though mainly allies of the Germans, have surely shown signs that some of their military motivation vis-à-vis the Germans is competitive; whether there is any vague thought that Germany might someday again be an enemy, or just an appreciation that political influence in an alliance is partly a function of one's military contribution, is not clear to us and may not be to them.

To sum up, the arms-interaction process is still almost virgin territory. Specifically, there are some good Ph.D. theses to be found here.

III

In the Declaration of St. Petersburg of 1868 it was asserted that "the only legitimate object which states should endeavor to accomplish during war is to weaken the military forces of the enemy." And in a letter to the Assembly of the League of Nations, dated November 23, 1920, the president of the International Committee of the Red Cross wrote: "The Committee considers it very desirable that war should resume its former character, that is to say, that it should be a struggle between armies and not between entire populations. The civilian population must, as far as possible, remain outside the struggle and its consequences. . . ."[16]

Boulding presents a "basic model" of warfare that in some ways corresponds to the "former character" attributed to war by the Red Cross. (It also corresponds somewhat to Clausewitz' model.) It relates most

[15] Huntington, "Arms Races," in Friedrich and Harris, eds., 64.

[16] International Committee of the Red Cross, *Draft Rules for the Limitation of the Dangers Incurred by the Civilian Population in Time of War* (2nd edn., Geneva 1958), 144, 151.

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closely, I think, to continental European warfare between monarchies. Military force is applied against opposing military force; offense is logistically limited; surprise and initiative are consequential only in local engagements; the best defense is what we now call "active defense" (military forces pitted against military forces). The objective is "victory," but the war aims are of no particular concern to the inhabitants, whose principal motive is to save their victuals and their daughters from the troops of either side. And the costs of war are adequately reflected by the drain on a royal treasury.

One can sympathize with the International Committee's nostalgia for the particular "former wars" it had in mind. The ideal would be an affair of honor in which opposing sides could accept any etiquette that might be impartial to the outcome and in which, with respect to the possible spoils of war, both sides wanted to avoid spoiling them by careless destruction. The method of warfare—and Boulding's model is mainly oriented toward the method—was slow and conspicuous travel in a two-dimensional medium, with movement and combat dependent on a secure umbilical cord to one's homeland, and self-sufficient forays limited to the distance a horse could travel carrying his own forage.

Boulding's model is borrowed from the economics of commercial competition. The division of the market between two rival and separated selling establishments reflects their costs of production and transport. The farther from home a firm sells, the higher the transport-cost component in the price the firm must charge. If one firm's costs are so much lower than the other's, even with transport included, that it can undersell the other in its own locale, the second cannot stay in business. In less extreme cases there is a frontier between the firms at which differences in their production costs are compensated by the costs of transport, the frontier being nearer the firm that has the higher production costs. A firm is "unconditionally viable" if it can at least compete near home where its own transport costs are small, against the distant firm whose transport costs are large.

On this analogy, Boulding constructs his "basic model" of international conflict. Each nation has certain resources it can apply to the conduct of war. The potency of these forces diminishes with their distance from home. The farther from home the man, the horse, or the railroad train must go to fight, the more people, horses, trains, forage, and fuel must be consumed in just getting to the front. If one country is so superior in military resources that it can bring superior force to bear even in the other's home base—i.e., after allowance for what is consumed by distance—it can achieve victory. The lesser country is then

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only "conditionally viable"; it can survive only by sufferance. The rate at which resources are consumed by distance Boulding calls the "loss-of-strength gradient"; it is, in his view, critical to international stability.[17] If the loss-of-strength gradient is steep, either nation has difficulty bringing enough force to bear near the other's home base; if the loss-of-strength gradient is slight, moderate superiority in resources makes victory possible. The loss-of-strength gradient thus determines how great a disparity in military resources can exist between two countries without either's being able to conquer, and tempted to conquer, the other.[18]

Boulding pays a little attention to threats in contrast to war itself. His pessimistic conclusion is that "the very problem of the image of the reputation of the threatener, however, points up a weakness of a threat system like diplomacy and leads to the conclusion that diplomacy must almost inevitably end up in war. . . ." And he fears that threats will not be believed unless they are occasionally carried out (p. 255).

He is concerned, in the elaboration of his model, with the speed of modern warfare. The threat of annihilation, he says, has reached a new intensity, altering the nature of the threat of war so completely that the present situation must be regarded as different in kind from that prevailing under earlier forms of weaponry. "The peculiar danger consists not so much in the destructiveness of the modern weapons but in the rapidity of their application and their world-wide range." But the problem of rapidity for him is not one of surprise, pre-emption, false alarm, or miscalculation; it is rather that everyone sits under the sword of Damocles, threats are intolerable, and desperation is induced (pp. 257-58).

He considers the difference between offensive and defensive armaments. "A shield, a city wall, or a bomb shelter are purely defensive

[17] Incidentally, if distance is measured directly in units of transport cost, not in miles, the loss-of-strength gradient is replaced by an equivalent parameter of "distance," and we have essentially the model used by Quincy Wright in Appendix XXIX to his *Study of War* (Chicago 1942), II, 1389-91. In Wright's model a country can be conditionally viable in relation to a single enemy while the latter is deterred by the presence of a third country, in a balance of multinational power. A two-country model can probably not explain how the Americans managed to emerge independent from the Revolutionary War.

[18] Clausewitz emphasized the danger of offensive overextension; an offensive that loses momentum in enemy territory leads not to an equilibrium frontier but to a reversal. (Trench warfare as in World War I was not anticipated.) Boulding might allow for this, but not adequately unless he explicitly includes uncertainty. There is no uncertainty in his model; to include it would change the character of the model, especially in relation to the role of threats. Boulding's model cannot handle the preemptive aspect of the Franco-Prussian War or the German gamble on quick victory against France in 1914.

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armaments; they lessen the capacity of the enemy to harm but can in no way harm him" (pp. 258-59). The interaction between defensive and offensive arms—the immunity to retaliation or counterattack that defensive weapons may provide, and their release of resources (and possibly of motivation) for offensive action—does not fit into his model. (This is somewhat surprising, Boulding being an economist.)

On the whole this analysis is disappointing. The logistically limited land engagement is a significant kind of war, but it is *a* basic model, not *the* basic model. An equally basic model is Malcolm Hoag's, presented in this journal two years ago.[19] It mainly distinguished first-strike and second-strike weapons. It incorporates "pre-emption," "surprise," and "deterrence." Boulding's model cannot—nor can it generate "limited war" or "brinksmanship." Each model is only a piece of the whole system; but if I had to take my choice I'd consider Hoag's pertinent, Boulding's historically interesting. (Hoag's is also historically interesting; the dynamics of preventive or pre-emptive initiation is *not* new, nor is deterrence.)

One can of course interpret Boulding's model in a less geographical sense; obviously, for example, his "distance" needs to be measured in costs, not miles. But he himself considers it of monumental significance that the "range of the projectile" has now virtually eliminated the loss-of-strength gradient; once you can reach half the circumference of the earth, "there are no nooks, corners, or retreats left, and no snugly protected centers of national power.... The result is a sudden and dramatic collapse of unconditional viability" (p. 272). "We may run into the paradox that nations can be destroyed without being conquered" (p. 268).

I wonder, as the Red Cross statement made me wonder, whether the present state of affairs is all that new. We have the collapse—Boulding alleges—of active defense against offensive weapons; and we may have the possibility of destruction without conquest. Boulding concludes that "what we face in the modern world is a fundamental breakdown in the concept of defense as a social system, largely, as I have tried to show, as a result of the constant decline in the loss-of-strength gradient affecting almost all institutions as a result both of physical and social invention" (p. 331).

What I wonder is whether it is historically correct that war has typically taken the form of engagement between opposing military forces, and that primary reliance for security has typically depended on the successful defensive interposition of the main body of one's military

[19] Hoag, "On Stability in Deterrent Races," *World Politics*, XIII (July 1961), 505-27.

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forces before an advancing enemy. Is "deterrence," in contrast to "defense," peculiar to the era of nuclear weapons and global missiles? (Leave aside the technical and economic question of whether Boulding is right that there is no feasible active defense against missiles with nuclear warheads.) Is reliance on the threat of reprisal, or the threat of making victory painful rather than impossible, completely new? Is the possibility of destruction without conquest unprecedented? Has coercion by violence, and the threat of more violence, not been part of war itself? Did war, as the Red Cross suggests, "formerly" involve only combatants, or does the ideal model of the Red Cross relate to a particular segment of history in a particular sector of the world?[20]

Both the motives and the techniques of war are usually mixtures; historically clean cases are hard to find. The Boulding model, emphasizing logistics, may well explain the location of the European perimeter of the Roman empire. It explains less well the mobile forms of warfare, particularly among maritime powers or those that can swoop onto each other's cities on horseback. Wars of reprisal, wars of annihilation, religious wars, colonial wars, wars for the capture of slaves or hostages, wars of harassment, wars aimed at the home front and civilian morale, wars of siege and blockade, guerrilla warfare, wars with subversion and psychological warfare, and mobile wars of attrition do not easily fit the logistically determined Boulding model. Most of them do not fit the Red Cross conception of war as the exclusive business of combatant troops.

In fact, with some exaggeration one might say that the engagement of troops in war is a preliminary stage. The usual object is eventually to coerce people, either whole populations or key officials, by the threat of violence, and to dispose of some by death, imprisonment, or other immobilization. Just as the purpose of besiegers is not to destroy walls but to get inside where they can have their way with somebody, the purpose of the German advance in 1914 was not to destroy French soldiers but to bring bayonets to bear on civilians (or civilian officials) in the city of Paris. This objective is usually most vivid in the wars we choose to call "civil wars," but the difference is mainly in its visibility, not its presence.[21]

[20] Western Europe from the Thirty Years' War to World War I, less the Napoleonic period. See J. F. C. Fuller, *The Conduct of War: 1789-1961* (New Brunswick, N.J., 1961), especially Chapters 1, 2, 5, and 6.

[21] Even for combatant troops there may be a *non sequitur* in the St. Petersburg Declaration. After stating that the only legitimate object in war is "to weaken the military forces of the enemy," it goes on to say that "for this purpose it is sufficient to disable the greatest possible number of men," and that this object would be exceeded by arms that aggravate the sufferings of disabled men or render their death inevitable.

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When an enemy country is effectively controlled by a responsible government, the second stage of war—the *real* stage—may not occur; surrender negotiation may preclude it. Just as an army may quit when the central front is breached and defeat seems inevitable, a government or a population may quit when the army is destroyed. Occupation troops may not need to wage war against the population; defeat of the population may appear so inevitable that the population—once the cover of military force has been torn away—does not fight. (But sometimes it does, or part of it does, especially if the victor uses his bargaining power badly.) Most of the shooting may be over after a decisive military engagement, but that does not mean that the object in war is to shoot soldiers. The shooting may not even occur; Austria lost a war to Germany in 1938 by surrendering before the first shot was fired. (In Boulding's model, since no uncertainty exists, and no costs of war except the "sunk" costs of the preparations, the country that is not "unconditionally viable" should give up rather than fight; Austria did.)

Both the Red Cross model and the Boulding model lack a theory of the role of violence. War involves pain—pain and fear and cost—not just the sunk cost of munitions acquired earlier, but the costs and risks of war itself. Winning a war is not just cashing in on one's superiority; it is a painful, risky, expensive, and ugly process. War is not just acquisition and loss; it is violent, coercive bargaining—bargaining with demonstrations and threats of further pain, privation, destruction, and risk.[22] And it is often inefficient, hotheaded, undisciplined bargaining—in danger of losing contact with policy.

War involves *intentions* as well as *capabilities*. It involves coercion, intimidation, and deterrence. If a model of warfare ignores the pain, the fear, and the cost of war, it cannot encompass the bargaining proc-

Similarly, the IVth Hague Convention (1907) forbids "arms, projectiles, or material calculated to cause unnecessary suffering." (Explosive or poisoned rifle bullets, for example, were outlawed.) I believe it is a fair observation, both from the history of warfare and from the history of tactical doctrine, that one main way to weaken the military force of the enemy—often more important than killing and wounding—has been to make the individual enemy soldier too scared to fight effectively. Ardant du Picq's *Battle Studies*, for example, is mainly preoccupied with how to get soldiers to move forward and use their rifles rather than drop behind the nearest hummock; Frederick the Great, as well as the Romans, recommended sharp steel *behind* the advancing troops to help offset the sharp steel in front of them. Whatever the merits of banning them, the weapons of battlefield horror—fire, war cries, elephants, or bombs with sirens—have usually had that same "legitimate" purpose: "to weaken the military forces of the enemy." Terror is not a weapon to which only civilians are vulnerable.

[22] Fuller quotes from a letter by General Sherman after he took Atlanta: "If the people raise a howl against my barbarity and my cruelty, I will answer that war is war. . . . If they want peace, they and their relatives must stop the war." (*Ibid.*, 108-9.)

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ess. It cannot recognize *deterrence, intimidation, limited war,* or *surrender.* The economics of viability is a benchmark in the analysis of the bargaining, but only a benchmark. Furthermore, without explicit uncertainty it is hard to generate the phenomenon of brinksmanship—of competitive risk-taking, of the game of "chicken." In fact, with neither uncertainty of outcome nor some advantage in preventive or pre-emptive initiation, it may be hard to explain how an international war can start.

Boulding observes that the 12,000-mile missile spells the obsolescence of defense, i.e., of "active defense"—defense that takes the form of defenders fending off attackers. He concludes that national military establishments have become obsolete as national protectors, and that this is new in history. It is a little surprising that an economist accepts the absolute supremacy of ballistic missiles against any kind of defense, but as a practical matter there is something to be said for his assumption. It seems a peculiarly American notion, however, that it is the 12,000-mile missile that denies the safe nook or cranny. It was denied to the American Indian a hundred years ago, to the Poles at least three hundred years ago, and it was almost denied to the British in 1944 with short-range missiles. The Polaris submarine may prove to be as good at denying safe nooks as the world-ranging missile; but then we may as well recognize that the ocean-going vessel—even the Viking ship—had already done much the same thing when rockets were made with saltpeter. The slave trader's rifle must have been as remorseless a pursuer as the ICBM.[23]

But, supposing that active defense is obsolete, are we to conclude the same about national military forces (other than those whose acknowledged purpose is aggression) or do we just conclude that Boulding's model is obsolete? Don't we need a model oriented toward "deterrence" and "intimidation" rather than just toward ground conquest and active

[23] Boulding also avers, in the language of cybernetics, that command and control are necessarily diminished by the modern weapons. "The longer the range of the projectile, the more difficult the receptor-control problem becomes; it becomes more difficult, that is, to know whether the projectile has reached its intended mark and correspondingly more difficult to aim it with a high probability of reaching the mark" (p. 267). Before we become too bemused by sheer mileage, I suggest we ponder some pre-nuclear instances of the fog of war. "During the decisive days of the Marne, the German headquarters at Spa had almost entirely lost touch with their units, could get no word from them, and could send only fragmentary instructions. The order to retreat was given by a Lt. Colonel of the General Staff who had been given full powers by General Headquarters and sent to the front to see what was going on." Guglielmo Ferrero, *Peace and War* (London 1933), 17. The episode is described in some detail in Winston S. Churchill, *The World Crisis, 1911-1918* (abridged and rev. edn., London 1943), 176-81.

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defense? Don't we need models that explicitly examine the motives and decisions to initiate war, to limit or to expand it, and to terminate it, and not just examine the prerequisites for military victory?[24]

It is not necessarily bad news for the peace-loving defensive nation if defensive weapons no longer work. If, for overpowering technological and economic reasons, they no longer work for the defender, they probably no longer work for the conqueror. Defenders have had a pretty hard time of it for several thousand years, particularly those that were not "unconditionally viable" but also those that proved viable only after the tragedy of war. Maybe "deterrence" works better.

Actually, deterrence has always been involved. Japan was surely not unconditionally viable in the early 1940's; but the United States had to be provoked into the war. Italy was not unconditionally viable when it invaded Ethiopia; but intervention was deterred. Vulnerable countries have maintained defensive forces, not in the hope that they can repel an absolutely determined invader, but that they can make conquest unattractive. Forcing the more powerful aggressor to contemplate the sheer cost of winning a bloody and expensive campaign—as, for example, the Swiss have sometimes done—may succeed in deterring where it could not succeed in defending.[25] An era in which the costs of "winning" go up—as measured in civilian pain and damage—even though the technical possibility of victory also increases, could be one in which defensive forces play much the same role as before (perhaps more potently), but in which we are more aware of the deterrent element within that role. There is a difference between *dissuading* and *fending off*, but we tend to exaggerate the historical novelty of dissuasion in the nuclear era.

I see no logical reason to suppose that deterrence is less reliable than

[24] Shubik's firms are interested in profit, not maximization of gross sales or the absorption of rivals for its own sake. If Boulding had made payoffs or indifference curves as explicit in his war model as in his arms-race model, he might have been led to the analysis of deterrence, intimidation, limited war, and surrender. Firms, of course, are not single-minded rational calculators, nor are nations at war; what we get is still only an abstract, incomplete model. But the same is true of Boulding's "active-defense" model.

[25] At the Battle of St. Jacob-en-Birs in 1444 the Swiss, outnumbered fifteen to one, attacked the Dauphin's invading army and piled up twice their number in enemy corpses before being themselves extinguished. The price too high, the Dauphin retired with his troops. "From that day the Confederates were able to reckon their reputation for obstinate and invincible courage as one of the chief causes which gave them political importance. . . . It was no light matter to engage with an enemy who would not retire before any superiority in numbers, who was always ready for the fight, who would neither give nor take quarter." (C. W. C. Oman, *The Art of War in the Middle Ages*, Ithaca, N.Y., 1953, 96.) Five hundred years later the Finns demonstrated that the principle still works.

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active defense. To some it may seem less reliable because more dependent on vagaries of enemy intent, more subtle and psychological; but we are probably most comfortable where we have forgotten defense and rely wholly on deterrence. None of us lives in a secure house.[26]

The same might be true in the disarmed world, organized under a benevolent but ruthless national police force, that some people would prefer to rely on. It is unlikely that a world government, or international military force, would rely on active defenses. Deterrence may not be just cheaper and more reliable; it is probably subtler and more civilized, if only because it depends less on brute force and more on the control and management of conflict. The question can be raised, though, whether "mutual deterrence" is a viable state of affairs, or whether deterrence works solely for the organized monopoly against disorganized smaller units.

It is a good question. Intuition is unlikely to give a reliable answer. The kind of work that Hoag, Kent, and others have done on the incentives to initiate war, and how these relate to the parameters of the arms race, is pertinent. So is work on the limitation and termination of war. Boulding's opinion is that deterrence depends on threats, threats induce desperation, and war is nearly inevitable. Whether deterrent threats lead to desperation, hostility, and panic, or to quiescence, confidence, and security, probably depends on how the threats are arrived at and expressed, what demands accompany them, and the costs and risks of initiating violence or reacting to it.

Psychologists often argue that threats induce resistance, tension, and hostility. I'm sure that threats can be designed to do just that, by making them personalized, arrogant, gratuitous, challenging, and explicit. The threats we most readily live with—and that do not continually affront our manhood, excite our arrogance, heighten suspense, or cast us in uncivilized roles—are those that we take for granted. They tend to be implicit and impersonal, somewhat symmetrical, credible without continual protestations of credibility, and to have a tradition of success. The union that may strike, the wife who may leave her husband, the

[26] A strategic reason why conquerors have often been assimilated by the conquered may be that, to enjoy their conquest, they must cease being unencumbered marauders and settle down in wealth and vulnerability. Viking ships of male warriors could surprise the scattered farmers, commandeer their animals for greater mobility on land, and be gone before a superior force could be concentrated against them. But "the settlement of the invaders in the Danelaw . . . greatly simplified the military problem of the English. An enemy with towns to be burned and fields to be ravaged was much more vulnerable than one whose base of operations was the open sea." (*Ibid.*, 25.) The Vikings were nowhere easy to pacify, but they appear to have become most peaceable where they had immobile possessions, like homes and families.

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executive who may resign, and the nation that may renounce an alliance, all rely on threats. The psychological consequences so often alluded to —consequences that usually, though not always, are to be deprecated— depend on how the threats are structured and expressed, and what they are used for.

If the participants in a threat system lack the kind of "toughness" that immunizes them to irritation, suspense, and the involvement of personal honor, *substantive* threats are probably best kept for last resort —for "constitutional" issues. Not only should they rarely be brandished, but they should not be continually refined and gerrymandered in daily bargaining. They should be deterrent rather than "compellent."[27] They should support some fundamental *status quo,* superimposed on which is a system of etiquette, law, ritual, diplomacy, arbitration, or self-restraint. The threat for regular use, then, is the threat that persistent violation of the rules, or persistent bad faith, will endanger the "civilization" that has been built. It takes more than just willingness on both sides to do this, though. It takes skill, and perhaps some luck; tradition and confidence depend on experience, not just intentions. (And many of us are not yet persuaded that the intentions are even there.)

My point is not that it is little white threats that make the world go round. It is that nations needn't give up just because military brute force may have to be replaced by threats as a means of protection. In fact, the threats that accompanied the "defensive" weapon systems of 1914 had a few irritant qualities themselves. Perhaps as we become less confident of brute force and more attentive to the role of threats, we can be more subtle, more careful, more civilized about them. If there was no "balance of terror" in pre-nuclear 1914, it was partly because people didn't know enough to be terrified.

[27] In a recent paper, Boulding looks at the threat as an abstract human relationship and epitomizes it by the proposition, "You do something nice to me or I will do something nasty to you." (Boulding, "Toward a Pure Theory of Threat Systems," to appear in *Papers and Proceedings, American Economic Review*, 1963.) This, in my scheme, is a "compellent" rather than a "deterrent" threat. It does sound a little antagonistic.

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INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE IDENTITY AND NATION-BUILDING

By RICHARD BUTWELL

Lucian W. Pye, *Politics, Personality, and Nation Building: Burma's Search for Identity*, New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1962, 307 pp. $7.50.

I

PROFESSOR Lucian W. Pye succeeds brilliantly in *Politics, Personality, and Nation Building* in explaining why at least one country, Burma, has encountered some of the difficulties it has in creating an effective, modern state system. Proclaiming at the start of his study the need for a doctrine of democratic development, Pye deals primarily with the related search for individual and collective identity by a people unprepared in many of their sentiments and attitudes for the tasks that now weigh so heavily upon their shoulders. The most revealing section of his book, that dealing with the attitudes of various members of Burma's political elite on such matters as power and action and the nature of Burmese politics, is based mainly on 79 interviews (34 with administrative officials, 27 with politicians, and 18 with "observers and critics of the political scene such as journalists, educators and businessmen"). Disguised sketches of some of the persons interviewed follow Pye's analysis of the views of these Burmese.

The results of Professor Pye's interviews are skillfully interpreted and made more meaningful by his illuminating survey of the main elements of traditional and contemporary Burmese political culture. He correctly emphasizes the effects of various aspects of Burmese political behavior that are rooted in the past upon the contemporary problem of creating a modern state system. Such behavior, Professor Pye states, stems in significant measure from the nature of Burma's response to the diffusion of what he calls the world culture. He is concerned not only with the consequences of this acculturation process for Burma and other newly independent states but also with the disruptive effects it may have on any new pattern of inter-state relations.

According to Pye, the "ultimate test of development is the capacity of a people to establish large, complex, but flexible organizational forms" (p. 51). Thus, development, as he sees it, requires not only acquisition of many necessary skills and the presence of motivations to shape the use of these skills but also a "capacity to relate to others." One of Burma's

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chief problems has been the failure of its politicians and administrators to relate effectively to one another—and to others. Both politician and administrator, in addition, lack the ability to see their acts as part of related patterns of behavior and so are unable to conceptualize in terms of society, polity, economy, and so forth. As a result, they do not attempt the rational formulation of policies and programs designed to achieve specific goals that will in turn make possible the fulfillment of other objectives and thus culminate in the development of their nation in political, economic, and other ways. This failure of Burmese effectively to relate to others is directly connected to their lack of success to date in seeking appropriate political and social identities in the changing world in which they live. The central concern is with the self, particularly the highly personal Buddhist goal of inner fulfillment and the question of status. The character of Burmese associational sentiments and values, Professor Pye states, results from the primary socialization and secondary acculturation processes to which Burmese are exposed.

The findings of Professor Pye's interviews with numerous Burmese represent a substantial contribution to the knowledge of factors influencing the political behavior of the peoples of the countries recently emancipated from Western colonial rule. The conclusions of *Politics, Personality, and Nation Building* about the political consequences of Burma's socialization and recruitment processes are amply substantiated by Pye's evidence and are suggestive of comparable effects of similar processes at work in other formerly colonial countries. The study is an excellent model for searching investigations of other societies and polities, and it is strongly hoped that it will serve as such. Particularly suggestive is Pye's contention that the necessity to deal with power and lead their country has markedly intensified the problems of acculturation for the members of Burma's political elite. Their sense of inadequacy, the resulting fear of failure, and the related lack of meaningful identity—individual and collective alike—provide a psychic explanation of many of the shortcomings of those who have tried to govern independent Burma to date.

In view of the impressive evidence he presents, it is difficult to disagree with Pye that "Fundamentally, the hope for transitional peoples resides in their quests for new collective as well as individual identities" (p. 287). At the same time the reader may be plagued by the feeling that only a particular kind of identity will serve—one, among other considerations, that encourages problem-solving in an approved manner and will be satisfied with the peaceful compromise of differences

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with peoples external to the national unit. Is it not possible that Burma, or any other country, may solve its identity crisis in a manner that is satisfying to itself but not to others? And is it not also possible that, having solved its identity problem, such a country may fail to achieve an effective modern state system for other reasons? Pye certainly does not suggest a negative answer to the latter question, but this reviewer at least would have liked greater attention accorded the interaction of the various forces producing an effective modern nation-state.

Although Professor Pye makes a convincing case for his position that success in the search for individual and collective identity is a major aid in the development process, he is less convincing when he states the reverse proposition. He maintains that when persons involved in political relationships search for their own and their society's identity they are likely to inhibit change. This generalization does not seem entirely applicable to some of the former colonial countries. For example, Malaya—site of an earlier and also outstanding study by Professor Pye—is confronted with a major identity crisis today (with its Chinese and Indian minorities and slight Malay majority); this crisis accounts for the effort to initiate the new state of Malaysia (linking Malaya, Singapore, and the North Borneo territories). Yet Malaya seems more genuinely interested in change than any other Southeast Asian country, except possibly Communist North Vietnam. Indeed, Malaya's search for identity may be more conscious and involve more persons—and be more desperate—than Burma's. This seems to suggest that the search for identity can encourage as well as retard change. Thus the logic that indicates the relationship suggested by *Politics, Personality, and Nation Building: Burma's Search for Identity* needs to be tested in other national settings (as Professor Pye himself would want it tested).

While agreeing with Pye that Burmese politicians and administrators have been overly concerned with status and other aspects of self (and have as a result devoted too little attention to problem-solving), this reviewer cannot help but wonder whether this may not also have been a major source of stability for Burmese politics, in that the failures since independence have thus been prevented from having an even more depressing effect on the country's political leaders. Burma certainly has failed in numerous ways to make a meaningful adjustment to the status of an independent country, but, although Burmese pride has obviously been hurt by this experience, the consequences may have been less painful for men more concerned with personal status than problem solution. What is true of the Burmese is probably also true of other peoples.

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II

The picture of Burmese political behavior projected by Professor Pye in *Politics, Personality, and Nation Building* would seem in most respects to be highly illuminating and not subject to serious dissent. This is certainly so, for example, with respect to his treatment of the attitudes of Burmese politicians and administrators toward power and information. However, there would appear to be reasons for taking issue with some of Professor Pye's points—points that are not lacking in significance. One of these is his assertion that effort in Burmese politics "tends to be concentrated in inverse proportion to the social significance of a problem" (p. 154). He alleges that only limited attention has been accorded by the politicians to the important problem of Burma's rice exports—an allegation that is probably true. But has this limited attention been primarily the result of a tendency on the part of the politicians to avoid reaching decisions in a crucial field? Burma certainly has not backed off from the very important additional problem of rationalizing its relations with neighboring Communist China. Moreover, its neglect of agricultural policy has in part been due to its preoccupation—particularly in the early years of independence—with other considerations, such as industrialization and social welfare.

Pye also states that the Burmese politician's "tendency to look inward to realms of intra-elite relationships" had its origin in the apparent unwillingness of politicians of an earlier day either to become servile to, or to seek to annihilate, the administrative system (pp. 110-11)—an extremely important point, but one that is not really substantiated. The assertion that the Burmese political class is prepared to accept the "tyranny of rigid consensus" but not the "tyranny of the openly dictatorial leader" could mislead some readers. It is open to question whether those who are willing to accept the tyranny of rigid consensus would do so if they were not participants in the process that produced that consensus. Professor Pye also might have given a deeper explanation of the apparent contradiction between the characterization of nationalist movements suggested in an early theoretical chapter and the performance of the long-ruling Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League in governing Burma. According to Pye's general analysis of nationalist movements in transitional societies, the members of such movements are "inclined to feel they have a mission to change all aspects of life within their society" (p. 18). Yet he summarizes the reaction of Burmese politicians to the process of acculturation by stating that they have deep personal feelings of ambivalence that "are touched most harshly

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by an issue relating to modernization and democratization of their country" (p. 265).

These reservations do not affect the conclusion that Professor Pye's presentation of the essences of Burmese political culture and behavior is generally outstanding. This it surely is, providing innumerable new insights into the recesses of how and why Burmese behave as they do politically.

III

The consequences of a continuation of the situation that Pye describes in Burma are frightening. Anxieties stemming from the identity crises he depicts lead to fears concerning personal worth and competence, and these in turn lead to failures—which themselves increase the anxieties and fears and so result in further failures. The possible impact of this process upon the future pattern of inter-state relations is particularly well treated by Professor Pye.

The events of recent months in Burma, moreover, seem only to have increased the dimensions of the general problem. The present soldier-rulers of Burma, who toppled civilian Premier U Nu in a second *coup d'état* in March 1962, seem tragically to possess precisely the fears Pye treats in *Politics, Personality, and Nation Building*—with the same self-defeating consequences. Particularly in regard to Burma's various continuing insurrections, the army leadership seems to have come to the belated conclusion that perhaps its own inadequacies—rather than the failures of the politicians—may underlie the lack of success in fourteen years of fighting against the rebels. Because Burma's top military figures are probably more problem-oriented than the civilians, their depression is in some senses more extreme. The morale of the Burmese leadership may have been lower in the middle six months of 1962 than at any time since independence was gained in 1948. General Ne Win's proclamation in mid-1962 of what he called "the Burmese Way to Socialism" reflected the same search for identity, now almost pathetically pursued, that Professor Pye writes about in his book.

The military, however, even at its best, cannot perform the role played by the popular politician in the modern state system. This Pye notes, although elsewhere in the same study he refers to the potential part armies can play in modernizing transitional societies—presumably with at least some temporary delay in the political democratization of the society. The question is raised, then, as to what can be done to overcome the psychic obstacles to nation-building in Burma and other new lands.

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Two specific suggestions are offered by Professor Pye in a brilliant concluding chapter. The first involves the charismatic leader's sharing with his countrymen the successful results of his own personal search for self-identity and thus serving as "a vehicle for the entire people to find their collective sense of identity" (p. 288). This, however, U Nu certainly tried to do by seeking to transfer to the Burmese masses his own sense of Buddhist identity in its political and social as well as religious aspects, particularly in the years after the mid-1950's. Nu's political demise was not attributable to his failure to create a shared national sense of identity but came about for other reasons (which did interfere with his efforts to establish a national identity). What he apparently tried to do was to serve as a model for resolution of his countrymen's identity crisis while simultaneously serving as a link between the old and new ways in transitional Burma. Many feel, however, that Nu leaned too far in the direction of traditional ways in recent years. This raises the question of how and what, if anything, friendly outsiders can do to help the emergence of a leader who has found his own identity and to assist him in sharing this sense of identity with his countrymen. The problem, as Professor Pye rightly indicates, concerns other countries than those gripped by it in the most immediate sense. The way in which the problem is met, or not met, could have disruptive effects with respect to the new pattern of world order that the United States and other countries are seeking to construct.

Professor Pye's second suggested solution is particularly reflective of his insight into the workings of societies in transition like Burma. He proposes that foreign aid be designed to assist individuals to develop levels of skill that permit them to recognize their personal worth in comparison with individuals in other, more developed, lands. Pye states that while it will be some time before many of the new countries can achieve the level of development of the most modern nations, it need not be such a long time before individuals achieve levels of development comparable to those of their professional counterparts in other lands; indeed, many of them have already done so. However, standards of training and judgment must be strict—lest such persons see their own shortcomings as reflective of national inadequacies (and so fail to terminate the crisis of identity and development with which Pye is justly concerned). Development of pockets of trained persons that would subsequently link with other groups of skilled individuals would both contribute to the emergence of a clearer sense of collective as well as individual identity and also aid the development of the country directly

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and materially. "The more social relations are seen as systematically related," Pye writes, "the more rational choice can become a significant part of human behavior" (p. 293).

This reviewer wishes that Professor Pye had devoted greater and more specific attention in his final chapter to the role of the politician in the transitional society and how aspirants for this role may become more adequately prepared for the part they must play in the development and democratization of their societies. Pye regrets the fact that with independence politicians came upon the scene unprepared for their new responsibilities, and he notes that it is much easier to train the administrator and the soldier, who, among other considerations, are aware that their ways are being changed and presumably want them to be changed. "The logic of competitive politics," Pye states in his concluding chapter, "is possibly the most effective mechanism yet known for forcing people on a community-wide basis to discover their real values and to realize a fundamental coherence between ends and means in their social life" (p. 301). But how is the "logic of competitive politics" inculcated and how is the democratic pursuit of competitive politics to be encouraged?

Politics, Personality, and Nation Building, which raises many extremely important questions and answers most of them, is a highly incisive and superbly executed study. Students of comparative politics, public administration, international relations, and many other fields will profit from reading it, as will those charged with the responsibility for formation and execution of American policy towards the numerous nations possessed of comparable problems of identity, development, and transition throughout the world.

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REVOLUTION AND NATIONALISM

Two Studies on the History of Communism in Eastern Europe

By LEONARD BUSHKOFF

Joseph Rothschild, *The Communist Party of Bulgaria: Origins and Development, 1883-1936*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1959, 354 pp. $7.50.

M. K. Dziewanowski, *The Communist Party of Poland: An Outline of History*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1959, 369 pp. $7.50.

I

ON March 27, 1938, just two days before signing the Munich agreement, by which Czechoslovakia was dismembered, Neville Chamberlain referred to the Czech-German dispute in the Sudetenland as "a quarrel in a far-away country between people of whom we know nothing." The insularity and outright ignorance displayed in this remark, while surprising in a national leader, were not untypical of the views prevailing before World War II among the English-speaking public regarding not only the Sudeten problem, but much else in Eastern Europe. The accounts of journalists, travelers, and writers in search of sensation did little to counteract, and frequently merely reflected, the shallow and often disdainful opinions held by many Westerners regarding the quarrelsome nationalities of Eastern Europe.

Scholarly activity also mirrored the low status accorded the area. In the United States, scholarly knowledge depended largely on a handful of historians, primarily Robert J. Kerner (himself of Czech origin), on a very few political scientists, especially Malbone W. Graham, and on an occasional well-informed journalist, such as Hamilton Fish Armstrong. Britain supported a somewhat larger band of experts, notably Elizabeth Wiskemann, Doreen Warriner, Ian F. D. Morrow, C. A. Macartney, David Mitrany, H. W. V. Temperley, and, above all, R. W. Seton-Watson. Their activity largely focused around either the School of Slavonic Studies at the University of London, or the Royal Institute of International Affairs, which commissioned various works on Eastern Europe that were either overall surveys of contemporary conditions, or intensive studies of specific problems of international concern.[1] While

[1] See, in particular, Ian F. D. Morrow, *The Peace Settlement in the German-Polish*

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providing magnificent compilations of data for the policy-maker, this research generally was not of long-term significance (nor was it so intended).

The situation has improved considerably in the United States since 1945, as the interest kindled by Soviet acquisition of Eastern Europe has been followed up by financial encouragement from the large foundations and also by some scholarly spill-over from the massive research concentrating on the Soviet Union. But the growth of impressive facilities for research and the training of scholars has not, on the whole, been matched, in either bulk or perceptivity, by the scholarship produced. The intense personal involvement of many scholars, and their natural desire to both aid and influence policy-makers and the general public as well, have tacitly encouraged neglect of long-term monographic and interpretive work in favor of immediate responses to immediate events. The Communist seizures of power in 1944-1945, the Czechoslovak coup of 1948, the Yugoslav split with the Cominform, and the risings of 1956 in Poland and Hungary have all stimulated a flurry of books and articles, while numerous collaborative studies and symposia have added some facts and many unexceptional generalizations,[2] but our knowledge of the rich and tumultuous past of Eastern Europe, even of the recent interwar period, is largely based on a few textbooks[3] and a handful of relatively circumscribed monographs on political and diplomatic themes.[4]

Borderlands (London 1936); C. A. Macartney, *Hungary and Her Successors* (London 1937); Elizabeth Wiskemann, *Czechs and Germans* (London 1938).

[2] The usefulness as reference works of the seven-volume collection, *East-Central Europe Under the Communists*, published during 1956-1957 under the auspices of the Free Europe Committee, has been sharply impaired by subsequent developments in the Soviet empire.

[3] L. S. Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453* (New York 1958), is by far the most outstanding, and provides not only a magnificent bibliography, considerable data on socio-economic developments, and valuable insights on the consequences of Westernization for Balkan society, but also a very useful synthesis of the best recent European and American scholarship on the Balkan region. Oscar Halecki, *Borderlands of Western Civilization: A History of East Central Europe* (New York 1952), and the recent English work by C. A. Macartney and A. W. Palmer, *Independent Eastern Europe* (London 1962), reflect the views of a scholarly generation whose interests largely focused on political and diplomatic questions.

[4] C. E. Black, *The Establishment of Constitutional Government in Bulgaria* (Princeton 1943), and Wayne S. Vucinich, *Serbia Between East and West: The Events of 1903-1908* (Stanford, Calif., 1954), are useful monographs. J. B. Hoptner, *Yugoslavia in Crisis, 1934-1941* (New York 1962), goes beyond the customary limits of diplomatic history to present masterfully the dilemma of a small state caught between conflicting power blocs. Two English accounts that combine extraordinarily meticulous research with shrewd insight and an authoritative tone are C. A. Macartney, *October Fifteenth: A History of Modern Hungary, 1929-1945*, 2 vols. (London 1957), and R. F. Leslie, *Polish Politics and the Revolution of November 1830* (London 1956). Leslie apparently is now doing research on the Polish revolution of 1863.

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By contrast, economic, demographic, geographic, sociological, anthropological, and cultural studies of Eastern Europe have been very largely neglected.[5] The peasantry, for instance, have received particularly little attention, although they provided an overwhelming preponderance of the taxes and the military manpower on which the governmental structures of their countries were based. The peasant's experience with laissez-faire capitalism in the nineteenth century, economic depression and state planning in the 1930's,[6] and communism since 1945 may provide valuable lessons for other underdeveloped areas today.

A similar disinterest has hampered study of the many border regions,[7] areas such as Macedonia, Galicia, and Bessarabia, where conflicting national passions have been a constant threat to regional peace since the mid-nineteenth century. While the population transfers of 1939-1947, plus the regional unity imposed by Soviet power, have damped down most of these problems, their long-term significance entitles them to a major place on the scholarly docket, especially since the Macedonian question continues to poison relations between Greece, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia,[8] much as conflicting ambitions in Epirus remain a source of discord between Albania and Greece.[9] Scholarly investigation

[5] Major exceptions are Wilbert E. Moore, *The Economic Demography of Eastern and Southern Europe* (Geneva 1945), Doreen Warriner, *The Economics of Peasant Farming* (London 1939), and two important articles by Traian Stoianovich in the *Journal of Economic History*: "Land Tenure and Related Sectors of the Balkan Economy, 1600-1800," XIII (Fall 1953), 398-411; and "The Conquering Balkan Orthodox Merchant," XX (June 1960), 234-313. Stoianovich is now doing research on the impact of Westernization on Serbian society during 1800-1914. For a sociologist's account of a caste-ridden society, see two articles by John Kosa: "Hungarian Society in the Time of the Regency (1920-1944)," *Journal of Central European Affairs*, XVI (October 1956), 253-65; and "A Century of Hungarian Emigration, 1850-1950," *American Slavic and East European Review*, XVI (December 1957), 501-14. Anthropology has been sparsely represented; see Lawrence Krader, "The Transition from Serf to Peasant in Eastern Europe," *Anthropological Quarterly*, XXXIII (January 1960), 76-90, and two books by Irwin Sanders: *Balkan Village* (Lexington, Ky., 1949) and *Rainbow in the Rock: The People of Rural Greece* (Cambridge, Mass., 1962). Joel M. Halperin, *A Serbian Village* (New York 1958), is disappointing.

[6] Henry Roberts, *Rumania: Political Problems of an Agrarian State* (New Haven 1951), and Jozo Tomasevich, *Peasants, Politics, and Economic Change in Yugoslavia* (Stanford, Calif., 1955), are excellent, as is Jerome Blum, *Noble Landowners and Agriculture in Austria, 1815-1848* (Baltimore 1948). Blum's recent book, *Lord and Peasant in Russia from the Ninth to the Nineteenth Century* (Princeton 1961), provides a useful model for research on the peasant in Eastern Europe.

[7] Exceptions are the excellent Royal Institute of International Affairs studies mentioned above.

[8] Elisabeth Barker, *Macedonia: Its Place in Balkan Power Politics* (London 1950), is the only acceptable account.

[9] Edith Stickney, *Southern Albania or Northern Epirus in European International Affairs, 1912-1923* (Stanford, Calif., 1926), while useful, is outdated.

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is equally overdue for the three nationalities—Germans, Jews,[10] and Greeks—whose domination of urban and commercial life in various segments of Eastern Europe down to the late nineteenth century was a significant factor in the marked hostility existing between the peasant and the townsman.

Finally, the intelligentsia of Eastern Europe have received no systematic study,[11] despite their great importance from the mid-nineteenth century onward, and despite the useful insights provided by the work of Edward Shils on non-Western intellectuals and by the numerous recent studies of their Russian counterparts. The *intelligent* derived predominantly from the lesser gentry and the small native bourgeoisie in Croatia, Hungary, Poland, and Rumania, from the peasantry alone in the Balkans proper, Czechoslovakia, and the Baltic littoral. Higher education often led him to an unfamiliar environment—his capital city, or, for those with family or scholarship aid, Western Europe or Russia. In the process, the *intelligent* frequently absorbed, while significantly modifying, Western ideas of linguistic nationalism, self-government, and progress—ideas repugnant both to his foreign overlord and to the established native political elites, who represented conservatism, particularism, and concern with group, rather than national, interests.

Young leaders arose from the intelligentsia—Masaryk, Beneš, Pilsudski, Radić, Pašić, Stambulov, Venizelos, and, on the flanks of Eastern Europe, Svinhufvud and Kemal Atatürk. They embodied vigor, shrewdness, perceptivity, and the extraordinary patience, ruthlessness, and frequent opportunism of one who combines idealism with the certainty of ultimate triumph.[12] Their charismatic qualities evoked passionate responses from both admirers and enemies. As statesmen, they understood the most valuable of all devices for the leader of a small

[10] The valuable work by Peter Meyer *et al., The Jews in the Soviet Satellites* (Syracuse, N.Y., 1953), deals largely with the postwar years.

[11] Standing virtually alone are Traian Stoianovich, "The Pattern of Serbian Intellectual Evolution, 1830-1880," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, I (March 1959), 242-72; Czeslaw Milosz, *The Captive Mind* (New York 1951); and Alexander Hertz, "The Case of an Eastern European Intelligentsia," *Journal of Central European Affairs*, XI (January 1951), 10-26. Jan Szczepański, "The Polish Intelligentsia: Past and Present," *World Politics*, XIV (April 1962), 406-20, describes the changes since 1945. For the effects of an earlier revolution, see two articles in the *Journal of Central European Affairs*: Peter Sugar, "The Influence of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution in Eighteenth Century Hungary," XVII (January 1958), 331-355; and Paul Bödy, "The Hungarian Jacobin Conspiracy of 1794-95," XXII (April 1962), 3-26. Western influence on the nascent Rumanian intelligentsia is examined in the unpublished Ph.D. dissertation by John C. Campbell, "French Influence and the Rise of Roumanian Nationalism" (Harvard University, 1940).

[12] This characterization is only partially applicable to Beneš and especially to Masaryk, whose political training and behavior reflected Czechoslovakia's status as the most Westernized region of Eastern Europe.

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but ambitious nation: how to profit by the quarrels of the Great Powers. As commanders, they did not hesitate to commit their meager forces to the battlefield with only a passing concern for the welfare of their *intelligent* lieutenants and even less for the peasant masses on whose obedience they relied. As visionaries, they dreamed of glory, national power, progress (in the sense of clean streets and a well turned-out army), and the praise of future generations.[13] In so doing, they accomplished great political feats, while planning others that combined audacity with fantasy.[14] They also infused Eastern European politics with a strain of romantic unreality and an accompanying disinterest in the legislative and conciliatory functions of daily political life. This in turn broadened the long-standing gap between the political strata of society and the rest of the nation.

Despite (or perhaps *because* of) their immense importance, these leaders have received little scholarly attention either in their homelands, where political considerations now more than ever impose a veto, or in the West, where linguistic difficulties and general disinterest have had the same effect.[15] The generation that they had led, having seen its objectives fulfilled in 1918 and recognized by the outside world at Versailles, was concerned only with consolidating and safeguarding the system just created. But the economic backwardness, social frictions, and governmental slovenliness of the new states could not be ignored by the interwar generation, especially that of the 1930's, which found either communism or some local variety of fascism increasingly attractive. The dictatorships of the late 1930's, in attempting to solve these deep-seated problems by repression and an appeal to the traditional virtues, merely aggravated them to the point where the political future of Eastern Europe in 1939 seemed to hold only two possibilities: domestic turmoil and/or involvement in World War II.

Although they have tended to neglect long-term questions in Eastern European studies, American scholars have made rapid progress in the study of many non-Western areas. In this there is a certain irony, for

[13] See especially the attitudes revealed in *Joseph Pilsudski: The Memories of a Polish Revolutionary and Soldier* (London 1931).

[14] Examine Pilsudski's proposals for Polish leadership of an East European federation, Venizelos' attempts to re-establish a Byzantine Empire astride the Aegean, Stambulov's plans in Macedonia, Pašić's Aegean and Albanian objectives, and Radić's program for virtual independence within Yugoslavia. For a comprehensive and perspicacious view, see Walter Kolarz, *Myth and Realities in Eastern Europe* (London 1946).

[15] The biography of Masaryk by Paul Selver, of Beneš by Compton Mackenzie, of Pilsudski by W. F. Reddaway, of Venizelos by Doros Alastos, of Stambulov by A. Hulme Beaman, and of Svinhufvud by Erkki Raikkonen, while the best of a handful, are in no way adequate; the various works in English on Kemal Atatürk are even worse.

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remarkable parallels exist between developments in Eastern Europe since the mid-nineteenth century and those in non-Western areas since 1918; this holds especially true for much of the Balkans and the Middle East, which share a common heritage of four or more centuries of Ottoman rule. The problems of many new states—discontented intellectuals; conflict between the semi-modernized metropolis and the traditionalistic provinces; steeply rising populations and inadequate economic development; extreme sensitivity to world, and particularly Western, opinion; sharp ethnic and functional divisions within the social structure; clashes among the opposing concepts of traditional absolutism, representative government on the Western model, and modernizing, "progressive," oligarchical rule—form an all too prominent part of the recent heritage of Eastern Europe as well.[16] How have the political parties of the area responded to these problems? Our knowledge is necessarily limited by the total absence of studies of these parties in any Western language; the books reviewed below pioneer in this realm as they do in the study of Eastern European communism.[17] In thus breaking fresh ground, they provide bench marks against which further research can be evaluated, while also indicating certain difficulties that such research must meet and overcome.

II

Joseph Rothschild's *The Communist Party of Bulgaria: Origins and Development, 1883-1936*, deserves high praise for the energy, initiative, and courage shown in constructing a pioneer study on the basis of data noted less for clarity than for tendentiousness. But the book also illus-

[16] Recognition of these similarities has not been encouraged by the growing replacement of the appellation "Eastern Europe" by "East Central Europe," which tacitly suggests that the area shares in the material and cultural modernity of Central Europe, and thus constitutes an integral, organic element in the European community. The political conclusions drawn from this thesis have varied according to the international balance of forces: during both World Wars, German publicists often argued that Eastern Europe was a "natural" element in their national firmament, while some ideologues of today bolster their proposals for rollback or liberation with references to the purported unity of both halves of Europe. For an illuminating example of the emotions that the entire question stirred up among inhabitants of the area, see Hamilton Fish Armstrong, *Where the East Begins* (New York 1929). Oscar Halecki, *The Limits and Divisions of European History* (London 1950), offers some interesting views on this issue, as does Henry Roberts, "Eastern Europe and the Historian," *Slavic Review*, XX (October 1961), 509-16.

[17] A history of Czechoslovak communism by H. Gordon Skilling is in preparation. R. V. Burks, *The Dynamics of Communism in Eastern Europe* (Princeton 1961), provides a comparative analysis of the appeals of communism to various social and ethnic groups in Eastern Europe.

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trates the danger of applying a set of theoretical propositions developed within the context of Western Europe to a totally different area.

While complex in its details, the early history of Marxism in Bulgaria closely parallels its growth in other states emergent after 1918 and 1945. Rothschild begins by emphasizing that liberation from the Ottoman Empire in 1878 exposed Bulgaria's backward economy to serious Western competition and the loss of its traditional Ottoman markets. The real impetus for the birth of the Social Democratic Party in 1891 was found, however, in the return of a rapidly developing intelligentsia from the foreign universities in which it had absorbed Marxist ideas (pp. 11-17). Quarrels immediately developed within the Party as the moderates ("Broads") proposed that the Socialists' first aim must be an alliance with other progressive political groups to fight for truly representative democracy, while the radicals ("Narrows") argued instead that isolation was a small price to pay for the preservation of ideological purity. This conflict culminated in a complete divorce in 1903 (pp. 29-34), from which there emerged entirely separate parties and trade union organizations; the vigor with which the two groups attacked each other thereafter was at least one factor in their consistent lack of electoral success.

The picture changed drastically after Bulgaria suffered defeat in the Second Balkan War in 1913 and then in World War I. These disasters (pp. 44-45, 74-77) exploded dreams of national expansion that had grown ever stronger in the forty years since 1878. Nationalism had been the major stock in trade of the traditional (or what Rothschild significantly calls the "bourgeois") parties. Their conflicts had stemmed more from competition for the monarch's favor and disagreement concerning proper tactics in foreign policy than from any doubts concerning basic goals. These parties were now crushed at the polls, albeit temporarily. So were the Broad Socialists, who had also been tarred by the nationalist brush. The recipients of the resulting political windfall were the Peasant Union and its burly leader, Stambulisky, plus the Narrow Socialists, who quickly joined the Comintern, became the Bulgarian Communist Party, and entered the lists as a major political force (pp. 94-100); their bailiwick became the capital and the other cities, while Stambulisky's party held the countryside.

Stambulisky became premier in October 1919. The country had been swept by political violence since the army rebellion at Radomir in September 1918 (pp. 78-82); the turmoil increased in both tempo and intensity during his reign, as Stambulisky sought to destroy what he

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described as the "lice and bugs" of the city (pp. 85-90), while the traditional parties fought initially for survival and then for a return to power. Although he enacted certain reforms of permanent value, and made a praiseworthy attempt to close the gap between government and people, his career aptly illustrates the ease with which militant populism can transform itself into totalitarianism.[18]

Stambulisky's relations with the Communists were highly ambivalent (pp. 101-6, 109-16). After an initial test of strength had clearly proved Stambulisky's superiority, the Communists settled down to ridiculing him as Bulgaria's future Kerensky, despising him as a crude peasant devoid of ideological finesse, and grudgingly respecting him for his ruthless application of power. Stambulisky reciprocated in kind, while hastening to distinguish between Soviet communism, which he admired, and its Bulgarian counterpart, which he loathed both as a competitor and as a bastard child of the urban intelligentsia.

What may be described as Bulgaria's seven-year civil war entered its second stage in June 1923, when Stambulisky was overthrown and assassinated by the traditional parties. The Communist leaders responded with joy (pp. 119-30), ordered their subordinates to observe the strictest neutrality, and predicted that the peasants would express their "disillusionment" with Stambulisky by flocking to communism. This neutralist stand was angrily denounced by the Comintern, which complained that the Bulgarian Communists had violated a tradition both of militant radicalism and of firm friendship with the Russian left, and demanded that a countercoup be organized. The demand was accepted but only after intra-party controversy (pp. 121-30), whose intensity Rothschild underestimates, and the *de facto* installation of Vasil Kolarov and Georgi Dimitrov as the new leaders of Bulgarian communism.

The coup of September 1923 failed abysmally, and both the Communists and the Peasant Union, whose left wing had joined in the rising, suffered badly in the ensuing repression (pp. 133-47). The eighteen months that followed saw a round of intense conspiratorial activity, as the Communists, themselves beset by internal splits and unrealistic orders from the Comintern, took the lead in trying to organize a winning coalition containing as many peasants and Macedonian nationalists as possible. Their attempts failed. The last gasp of Communist militancy was the cathedral bombing in Sofia of April 1925 (pp. 259-64), which

[18] Without minimizing the differences, certain similarities might be noted between the populism of the Bulgarian village—with its egalitarianism, confidence in the general will, fear of metropolitan domination, and hatred of the "overeducated," the wealthy, and the powerful—and the populism of the American Middle West and South.

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simply gave the government another opportunity to exercise its repressive machinery.

The relative political stability that Bulgaria enjoyed during 1926-1929 owed more to exhaustion than to harmony—only the Macedonian nationalists continued their internecine bloodshed. The remnants of Bulgarian communism retreated underground, while seeking to regain their strength through a united front with the Socialist trade unions. When this failed, the Communists organized a front group, the Labor Party, in 1927. Despite the twin problems of vigorous police repression and renewed intra-party purges, the Labor Party quickly picked up strength, and achieved striking successes in the various elections of 1930-1932 (pp. 273-83). This threat of a new round of civil conflict was a major factor behind the military *coup d'état* of May 1934, which effectively ended representative government in Bulgaria. Rothschild concludes on this note, adding only a brief passage that raises more questions than it answers.

This short outline cannot hope to indicate the richness of the material that Rothschild presents, not only on Bulgarian communism, but on the Macedonian nationalists, the Peasant Union, the Socialists, the Balkan Socialist Federation and its Communist successor, and the Comintern as well. However, this desire to achieve encyclopedic inclusiveness is self-defeating, as the reader finds himself overwhelmed by a welter of names (frequently accompanied by long biographical footnotes), dates, and events. The wide-ranging analysis that alone could place these facts in their historical context is largely replaced by pronouncements on Communist duplicity and dogmatism (see pp. 81-83, 115, 136-37, 282-83).

In plunging into what is virtually a history of Bulgarian domestic politics during the critical years 1918-1925 (pp. 74-204, 220-64), Rothschild has followed a peculiar scheme of organization that singles out certain political groups (the Communists, the Peasant Unionists, and the various irredentist organizations—the Macedonians in particular) and describes them consecutively, under topical headings, rather than in the closely woven chronology that alone could indicate their place in the pattern of events. His framework tacitly plays down the state of reciprocal parasitism in which Bulgarian political parties existed during this violent era. With a virtual equilibrium in the balance of forces (as measured more in fighting, than in voting, strength), survival, let alone power, depended far less on long-term ideological considerations than on incessant maneuver, the negotiation of alliances, the

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Leadership in Communist China

By John Wilson Lewis, Cornell University

BASING his study on the written evidence of Chinese Communist policy statements and practices, plus interviews with Chinese refugees in Hong Kong in 1959-1961, Lewis gives the first major analysis of the Chinese Communist political system. Although he provides a comprehensive analysis of leadership doctrines and techniques devised and employed in the party's rise to power before 1949, he emphasizes the period of the rise and fall of "great leap" optimism, 1958-1962. Among the topics are an assessment of the lessons of leadership in the rural commune experiment of 1958-1962 and discussion of the Chinese problem of transmitting the revolutionary system to the next generation of the elite.

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recruitment of new forces, and the tactical feint that masked a general advance. To compartmentalize what was truly a relationship of challenge and response seriously lessens the book's value as, among other things, a description of political power tactics in one of the Balkan states.

For it is self-evident that Bulgaria is part of a distinct geographical and cultural entity, the Balkan peninsula, and that an inquiry that does not take into consideration the trends and events of the region as a whole must be somewhat unbalanced. While it has been natural for Eastern European scholars of the older generation, who have experienced nationalism in its heyday, to consider their national histories as *sui generis*, the advantages of perspective, dispassionateness, and familiarity with interdisciplinary regional studies make the American scholar uniquely suited to appraise and generalize concerning the area as a whole. Few scholars have done so;[19] Rothschild is no exception. Yet only through comparison with the other Balkan and East European states does it become clear that Bulgaria was unique in at least one respect: despite a social structure far more egalitarian than that of, say, Hungary, Rumania, or even Greece, despite a virtual absence of disaffected national minorities, despite a defeat in 1918 no more disillusioning or degrading than that suffered by Greece in 1922, Bulgarian communism was a political force of the first magnitude, based on grass-roots organizations, attracting mass support, and seriously menacing the existing order. To account for all this by referring to the Bulgarian's "traditional attachment . . . to Russia" (p. 300), and thus, presumably, to Russia's new doctrine, is unconvincing; most Bulgarians had found little difficulty in combining admiration for Tsarist Russia's power with opposition to its political tenets and objectives, especially when, as in the 1880's, these had encroached on Bulgarian independence. A full understanding of the appeals of communism in Bulgaria requires a more sensitive analysis of the Bulgarian scene than Rothschild's assumptions permit him to give.

For he fails to note that the cut-and-thrust of Bulgarian domestic politics was strongly influenced by the international tensions convulsing the Balkans and the Near East in the early 1920's. While heightening the already bitter rivalry between Great Britain and Soviet Russia in the area, the threatened expansion of the Greco-Turkish War into the Balkans proper during 1922-1923 also heartened the many parties, factions, and ethnic groups that had refused to accept the peace settlement of 1919 and that now scented an opportunity to overthrow it. Bulgaria lay in the eye of this storm, watched closely by her hostile neighbors

[19] L. S. Stavrianos is perhaps the most notable.

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and their patrons among the Great Powers, encouraged by Italy to turn against Yugoslavia, by Russia to support Turkey, and by Britain to remain calm and neutral. It follows that the ebb and flow of the Bulgarian Communist Party's support for Stambulisky was strongly influenced by Soviet evaluations of the international scene, and that the independence displayed by the local Communists in standing neutral in June 1923 was denounced by the Comintern, which viewed a peasant government in Bulgaria as both a barrier to British influence on the Black Sea and a potential tool, so it was hoped, in revolutionizing the Balkan peasantry. It also follows that the need felt by the Macedonian nationalists (IMRO) for subsidies and diplomatic backing, their despair when Italy withdrew her aid in January 1924, their anger at increasing signs of a Yugoslav-Bulgarian rapprochement at their expense, all led IMRO into a *mariage de convenance* with communism. Rothschild, however, gives short shrift to these underlying, motivating factors, passing over them with a few scattered remarks (pp. 119, 123, 150, 182-83, 228, 246) that merely whet the appetite for something more substantial.

Moreover, by stressing the deceitfulness, but not the programmatic content, of the various public statements (pp. 123, 178, 181, 189, 232, 235-37, 243-44, 251) with which the Comintern and the Balkan Communist Federation both appealed to and welcomed the Macedonian nationalists, he tends to overlook a far-reaching shift in Comintern policy during 1924-1925, away from the scenes of its past defeats in Germany and Central Europe, and toward Eastern Europe, where national rivalries and hatreds appeared to be as dynamic as in the years before 1914. The Comintern therefore was not fussy about the composition of the coalition it was striving to form, and it did not hesitate to praise and fawn upon individuals and groups whose nationalism and traditionalism were anathema to the convinced Marxist; this alliance with nationalism set the stage for similar action in China after the policy had failed in Eastern Europe. By accepting Communist statements at face value, by failing to distinguish between the esoteric and exoteric modes of communication, which, as Gabriel Almond has shown, are an integral part of the operational style of communism, Rothschild has also failed to point up the cool-headed calculations underlying much of the Comintern's bombast.

Much as Rothschild has de-emphasized the effect on the Bulgarian Communist Party of both the national and the international political environment in which it operated, so he has both viewed and judged Bulgarian communism on the basis of assumptions developed in a

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

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locale quite foreign to Eastern Europe in general and to Bulgaria in particular. This locale was Western Europe; these assumptions are clearly Marxist.

The hallmarks are easily visible. A description of the Bulgarian economic depression of the 1880's is couched in terms tacitly relating this development to the subsequent birth of Bulgarian socialism—i.e., "the ruined artisans joined the ruined peasants to form the labor reserve" (p. 8). In actuality, utopian socialist and radical ideas had been propagated by the *intelligent* revolutionaries Botev and Karavelov (whom Rothschild mentions only in passing) as early as the late 1860's and early 1870's, had quickly gained adherents among a portion of the intelligentsia, and finally had erupted with the formation of a socialist party in 1891, as the younger *intelligents* realized that independence was no panacea for Bulgaria's basic difficulties.[20] The dissatisfied and alienated *intelligent* thereby became, and remained, the mainstay of Bulgarian radicalism (pp. 3, 14, 21), whose influence mirrored the *intelligent's* dominant place in the social structure. This partially explains the vigor and ruthlessness with which Stambulov and Stambulisky, the two strong men of Bulgarian politics, tried to bring the intelligentsia to heel. For, as men just beginning to assimilate the cultural and political traditions of Western Europe, most Bulgarian *intelligents* continued to regard politics, not as the business of the Bulgarian nation as a whole, but very much as their own exclusive preserve. Stambulisky's challenge to this assumption was the basic cause of his own downfall.

Rothschild regards these social and political facts not only as reprehensible, but as distorted and contradictory, part of "the elaborate and top-heavy political superstructure of Bulgaria," a superstructure "largely artificial and in no way [corresponding] to social development or class differentiation" (p. 9). Seeing in Western Europe the measure of all things, he finds much lacking in Bulgaria's evolution: "In consequence, however, of many pressures, . . . Bulgaria did not follow the path of Western capitalist development very far" (p. 8). A socialist party could itself only be a contradiction under such circumstances: ". . . that an avowedly proletarian party should have been formed before an agrarian one [indicates] the over-intellectualization and sociological artificiality of Bulgarian party politics" (p. 24n). The vehemence with which Rothschild condemns the Marxists thus spills over onto the entire Bulgarian political system. Its activity, he implies, largely revolved about a businesslike competition within the intelligentsia for govern-

[20] A similar post-liberation disillusionment among a segment of the intelligentsia in the new states of Africa and Asia has been emphasized by Edward Shils.

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ment posts and perquisites (pp. 8-9, 35, 302); this interpretation hardly explains the compelling attraction that communism and militant nationalism had for conflicting elements of the intelligentsia, for both doctrines involved their devotees in constant risk, turmoil, and sacrifice.

While Rothschild invokes Marxist doctrine to suggest tacitly that the presence of a Communist party in a peasant country such as Bulgaria was a grotesque anomaly, he simultaneously condemns the Communists for having betrayed revolutionary strictures (the unfavorable comparison on p. 82 to Lenin's activism is significant) through the "passivity" (p. 81), "opaque dogmatism" (p. 82), "sheer resentment and political myopia" (p. 115), "pseudo-Marxist casuistry" (p. 125), etc., etc., with which they met, or did not meet, the revolutionary situations of October 1918 and June 1923. The older Bulgarian Communist leaders, however, had long been troubled, as their power-oriented successors were not, by the obvious discrepancy between the revolutionary imperative and the abysmal weakness of the Bulgarian working class; they therefore concluded that any militant action not linked with a revolution in the industrialized countries of Europe would be sheer adventurism. With the exception of a rather grudging reference (p. 82) to the likelihood of Allied intervention in October 1918, Rothschild ignores this doctrine. He also ignores the fairly substantial body of theory by which the older generation of Bulgarian Communists attempted to adjust Marxist injunctions to the conditions of an agrarian society; can a party that developed "not in the ranks of a vigorous working class, but in the revolutionary circles of the Russian universities" (p. 11), have anything worth contributing either to Marxist theory or to political practice? The resounding "no" with which Rothschild responds to this question, the moral fervor with which he views his dramatis personae, the interpretations that he imposes on events and developments, all suggest that an excess of zeal can be as dangerous for the historian as Talleyrand suggested it was for the diplomat.

II

In *The Communist Party of Poland: An Outline of History*, M. K. Dziewanowski has performed a scholarly task of high importance and value. Having tapped the substantial printed sources available in Western libraries, as well as the valuable knowledge acquired by various Poles through arduous experience, he has produced an exceptionally clear, objective, careful, and broad-based account of both the pre-history and the recent past of Polish communism.

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While his emphasis falls heavily, perhaps excessively so, on the 1939-1958 era, his account really opens during the aftermath of the abortive revolt of 1863, as a combination of favorable economic conditions, severe Russian repression, and psychological disillusionment all led to "organic work"—i.e., intensive economic development—rather than revolutionary agitation, becoming ascendant throughout Russian Poland (p. 7). The subsequent industrial growth reached major proportions during the 1870's and 1880's (pp. 9-11), but so did friction between the growing working class and their entrepreneurial masters, many of whom were Jews, Germans, or Russians; this added a xenophobic note to the conflict. Social discontent was intensified by the impoverishment of the lesser gentry arising from their losses in 1863 and the abolition of serfdom in 1864. In flocking to the cities to join the intelligentsia (p. 7), the gentry brought as their principal political baggage an intense Russophobia and a correspondingly intense desire to see Poland reborn, united, expansive, and powerful.

Circumstances thus provided fair weather for the rebirth of revolutionary activity in Russian Poland during the late 1870's. By contrast, those Poles within the Hapsburg Empire concentrated on securing the maximum advantage from their semi-autonomous position, while their compatriots in Prussian Poland were fully occupied in defending their national individuality against systematic pressure for their assimilation (p. 6). Russian Poland thus took, and retained, the political lead, although its relative social and cultural backwardness vis-à-vis the more Westernized portions of Poland, plus the psychological tensions accruing from decades of Russian rule, all induced a political style that owed more to the conspiratorial and revolutionary tradition of Russian radicalism than to Western concepts of civility and constitutionalism.

The question of relations with Russia, however, constituted the watershed that divided the socialists of Russian Poland. Contact between the Warsaw workers and student socialist discussion groups first began in 1876, under the inspired leadership of Ludwik Waryński, who went on to organize the first socialist party, Proletariat, in 1882 (pp. 12-13). Waryński argued that nationalism and Polish independence were mistaken sentiments, and that all Polish radicals should instead join closely with their Russian counterparts in achieving the higher ideal of a revolution throughout the Tsarist empire; the terrorist exploits of the Narodniks encouraged him to feel that this upheaval was imminent.

There was, however, another side to Polish socialism. A group of intellectuals and students had bucked the tide of internationalism by organizing the Polish People group in Geneva during 1881, with a pro-

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gram that mixed nationalism with socialism by asserting that only through independence could Poland achieve an unhampered economic development; it followed that Polish revolutionaries should maintain a separate organization and require reciprocity for any support extended to their Russian associates (pp. 14-15). While weak at first, the Polish People gained in influence as the revolution in Russia on which Proletariat had banked appeared less and less likely. Polish revolutionaries therefore began to seek a formula through which the Polish masses could be mobilized in the struggle against Tsarist rule. Nationalism clearly provided the answer, and the minor parties that coalesced in 1892 to form the Polish Socialist Party (PPS) adopted a program combining a moderate, gradualist approach to social problems with an ardent call for Polish unification and independence (pp. 19-21). The conscious attempt by the PPS to attract all but the most conservative elements of the Polish nation hardly strengthened party solidarity, especially during periods of stress, while the socialist component of its program tended to evolve into a somewhat mechanistic set of precepts that served primarily to reinforce the romantic contempt long felt by the Polish gentry intelligentsia for capitalism and the bourgeoisie.

The PPS challenge brought a quick reply from the internationalist (or what Dziewanowski describes, somewhat tartly, as the "cosmopolitan") elements of Polish radicalism, which formed a new party, the Social Democracy of the Kingdom of Poland (SDKP), early in 1893. As the lineal descendant of Proletariat, the SDKP never ceased denouncing Polish nationalism as ineffective, utopian, a betrayal of the world proletariat, and as economically retrogressive, since it threatened to divorce Polish industry from the growing market of Asiatic Russia (pp. 10, 24). The SDKP instead urged all Poles to work for a revolution across the Russian empire through the closest association, including actual merger, with Russian socialism. The numerous intellectuals supporting the SDKP provided it with an impressive group of leaders—Julian Marchlewski, Felix Dzierżyński, Leon Jogiches, Karl Radek, and, above all, Rosa Luxemburg—many of whom later played significant roles in both the German and Russian Communist parties.

The reverberations of this conflict between Russophobe nationalists and Russophile internationalists have never completely ceased. The most recent echo occurred in 1956, when Gomulka and his followers overcame the Russophile Natolin group and emulated the PPS by preparing to use force, if necessary, to achieve a modicum of freedom for Poland, albeit within the Russian empire. Russian Poland had also witnessed a near-revolution in 1904-1905, when the PPS, having de-

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veloped its strength in all of Poland since 1892, having staved off both the SDKPiL[21] and the newly formed Jewish socialist party, the Bund, used both terrorism and mass action to exploit Russia's military defeat in the hope of gaining independence (pp. 36-46). But the Russian forces stood firm, while the initial strength of the revolution in Russia proper appeared to support the arguments of the SDKPiL. The short-lived triumph of the Tsarist government, however, seriously weakened the SDKPiL as well as the PPS, and the ensuing dissension, splits, and purges virtually eliminated both parties as major political contenders until the downfall of the three occupying powers in 1917-1918 revived Polish independence and Polish socialism as well.

Events had provided an overwhelming vindication for the policy of a majority of the PPS. By contrast, the SDKPiL transformed itself into the Communist Party of Poland in December 1918, continued to denounce the independence movement, and organized workers' councils in the cities to gain the power needed for a socialist state within a revolutionized Russia (pp. 70-79). Economic confusion, inflation, unemployment, food shortages, internal disorder, skirmishing on the frontiers, plus the undoubted attraction that Communist social and economic doctrine held for many Polish workers (p. 73), all aided the Communists during early 1919. But the situation soon began to stabilize, the government quashed the councils, and the Communists proved incapable of either halting or seriously limiting Polish efforts in the war with Russia of 1920-1921.

Recent historiography in the United States has, on the whole, treated Poland's interwar record with considerable indulgence.[22] A corollary of such treatment has been the assumption that the intense patriotism and Catholicism of the Polish nation posed insurmountable obstacles to the spread of communism. There were, however, various minorities —Ukrainians, Byelorussians, Germans, and Jews—whom no one, themselves included, really considered a part of the Polish *nation*. The social, educational, and bureaucratic disabilities which they bore increased their receptivity (excepting the Germans, who looked to Berlin) to Communist promises (pp. 98, 105, 111-12, 127-30). Moreover, Poland was afflicted with serious overpopulation, a sluggish agrarian reform program, low standards of living and industrial growth, and deep-

[21] The merger of the SDKP with a Lithuanian socialist group in 1899 involved a change in name; hence SDKPiL.

[22] Bernadotte Schmitt, ed., *Poland* (Berkeley, Calif., 1945), and Jack Taylor, *The Economic Development of Poland, 1919-1950* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1952), are good examples. Samuel Sharp, *Poland: White Eagle on a Red Field* (Cambridge, Mass., 1953), despite its occasional tendentiousness, provides a stimulating corrective.

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seated divisions that made political violence a constant threat. The Pilsudski regime (1926-1935) imposed a spurious unity by fiat and the invocation of past glories, but the ensuing military dictatorship (1936-1939), lacking the Marshal's prestige and bedeviled by international problems, resorted increasingly to adventuristic policies abroad, complemented by demagoguery and anti-Semitism at home. Elements from the minorities, the younger intellectuals, and the workers found in communism expression for their dissatisfaction, especially during the late 1930's, when Comintern advocacy of a popular front against fascism attracted many Poles who saw in Russia an ally, both powerful and close at hand, against German aggression (pp. 140-46).

The Polish party, however, constantly disrupted by the reverberations of dissension within the Kremlin and by Comintern directives that further underscored the Party's subservience to Poland's traditional enemy, was unable to evolve from an influential but nevertheless peripheral group into a major political force. Having supported Pilsudski during his coup in 1926, the Polish party thereafter suffered Comintern recriminations (pp. 118-26) when he went on to become, not a second Kerensky, opening the gates to a second October, but a new threat on Russia's western frontier. Further difficulties arose through Trotskyite sympathies inherited from the SDKPiL by many Communists (especially Jews and intellectuals) and stamped out, at the Comintern's behest, only in 1935.[23] The worst disaster occurred, however, during the Soviet purges of 1937-1938, when most of the Polish Communists within Soviet Russia were either exterminated or imprisoned, while their parent party was quietly dissolved owing to Comintern charges of Trotskyism and mass subversion by Polish intelligence agents (pp. 149-54). Although Dziewanowski fully demonstrates the inaccuracy of these accusations, his view (p. 154) that dissolution was primarily aimed at removing a potential opponent of a future Nazi-Soviet partition of Poland assumes an extraordinary degree of omniscience and foresight on Stalin's part. An alternative explanation might lie in Stalin's Great Russian nationalism and an accompanying Polonophobia, aggravated by the paranoid atmosphere of the purge era, which aroused suspicions that a Polish-German alliance against Soviet Russia might attract even Polish Communists.

In any case, Moscow now settled accounts with an annoyingly independent underling, and by late 1939 the Polish Communist Party had virtually ceased to exist.

So had the Polish state. While the Nazi-Soviet pact and the ensuing

[23] Isaac Deutscher and certain of his followers left the Communist Party at this time.

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annexation and Sovietization of eastern Poland drove hatred of the Soviets to new heights, their military successes during 1943-1945 clearly signified that the future of Eastern Europe lay in Soviet hands. Those Poles who believed that national survival required a *rapprochement* with their future masters turned toward communism, as did others from sheer opportunism, while still others were impressed by the Polish Communists' wartime record and their promise of extensive social reforms after the armistice (pp. 187-89). The adherence of such diverse elements brought to the middle and lower echelons of the Polish Communist Party a spirit, however attenuated and circumscribed, of nationalism and an attendant distaste for Soviet dictates. Gomulka and his associates, as veterans of the resistance movement, were well-qualified to represent this spirit, and Dziewanowski recounts at length (pp. 190-92, 208-14) the stages of their rivalry with the "Muscovites"—Bierut, Berman, Minc, Rokossovsky, *et al.*—whose willing acquiescence to Soviet demands threatened to provoke major disorders. Intra-party dissension remained beneath the surface until the Communist grip was consolidated, but the Titoist heresy triggered major attacks on Gomulka for advocating a "Polish way to socialism." Although the purges continued into 1949, executions were relatively few, and Poland therefore retained an alternate set of able and relatively popular leaders who could later be pressed into service. The Muscovite victory was gradually eroded, however, during the ferment following the death of Stalin, and Dziewanowski suggests that the return of Gomulka during the bloodless revolution of October 1956 signified a relative triumph for Polish nationalism. These events are treated with a degree of detail (pp. 236-40, 252-87) that disrupts an otherwise well-balanced account, and is, moreover, unnecessary in light of the many competent studies of the October upheaval. Unfortunately, Dziewanowski shares the preoccupation with the contemporaneous that constitutes the original sin of much scholarship on Eastern Europe; thus, his history of Polish communism ultimately evolves into a full-blooded study, paralleling other studies, of Polish politics during 1945-1957 (pp. 184-289). This shift in emphasis does not, however, lessen his sympathetic regard for nationalism as the principal force behind the rebirth of Poland in 1918 and her revival in 1956.

While this view provides a sound basis for analysis of the years after 1945, it leads Dziewanowski seriously astray when dealing with the SDKPiL (1893-1918) and the interwar period (1919-1939). Dziewanowski views the SDKPiL with a jaundiced eye, labeling its program as "cosmopolitan" (pp. 22, 26, 39), "extremist" (pp. 22, 23), and "doctrinaire"

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(p. 25), and certain of its leaders as "Russianized" (p. 29), "domineering" (p. 30), and afflicted, in one case, with "the thin bloodless lips of a terrorist fanatic" (p. 32) and, in another, with "a kind of inverted socialist snobbishness" (p. 31); the heaviest fire (pp. 25, 26, 28) falls on Rosa Luxemburg,[24] whose writings embodied the resistance of the SDKPiL to nationalism. This resistance stemmed, however, not from cosmopolitanism or even the "theoretical speculations" (p. 39) of intellectuals, but from a firm understanding of the ultimate consequences of Polish nationalism.

For neither in the Napoleonic Wars, nor in the revolts of 1830 and 1863, nor in the invasion of the Ukraine in 1920 by Pilsudski (a former leader of the PPS), nor in the proposals of certain Polish politicians in the late 1930's, had the nationalists hidden their desire to restore the frontiers of 1772, when Polish banners stood far to the east, on the Dnieper and the western Dvina, while Polish lords dominated millions of Jews, Ukrainians, Byelorussians, and Lithuanians. The SDKPiL drew its strength from these very groups, whom, it argued, might be disposed to emulate the decision of the Croats, Slovaks, and Rumanians to support the Hapsburgs against Magyar nationalism in 1848-1849, and side with St. Petersburg should Polish independence and expansion appear likely.[25]

Divisiveness could be avoided, Rosa Luxemburg insisted, only by de-emphasizing national rivalries through a common, united front against Tsarism. This in turn would reinforce Polish Marxism with the superior power of the revolutionary movement in Russia proper, and, furthermore, would conform to Marxist views regarding the inherent superiority of large economic units by preserving the Russian empire as a huge market, thus speeding the growth of Polish industry and the Polish proletariat as well.[26] Both parties to the dispute invoked Marxist scripture in self-vindication, the PPS by pointing to Marx's consistent support for Polish independence, the SDKPiL by arguing, with considerable justification, that Marx had simply hoped to use the dynamic power of Polish nationalism to drive Russia, the champion of reaction, beyond the Vistula, thereby furthering the revolutionary cause throughout Europe. The situation had changed drastically since

[24] Paul Frölich, *Rosa Luxemburg* (London 1940), the only biography in English, is both strongly Marxist and completely uncritical.

[25] This prophecy was partially fulfilled in 1920-1921, when many Byelorussians and Ukrainians supported the Soviets against Pilsudski.

[26] A Polish economist known to the author was labeled unpatriotic by his colleagues for suggesting, in the 1930's, that independence had created difficulties for Polish industry by disrupting its Eastern orientation and forcing it to compete for foreign markets against the superior products of Western industry.

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his death, the argument continued: Russia was now alive with revolutionary ferment, and therefore should be brought into close proximity with similar tendencies in Europe. Dziewanowski, however, gives short shrift to these basic elements in the SDKPiL creed.

In the final analysis, much of the Jewish, Lithuanian, Byelorussian, and Ukrainian support for the SDKPiL stemmed from nothing less than fear of Polish nationalism. These peoples existed on the cultural and, except for the Jews of central Poland, the geographical fringes of Polish society; their feelings of marginality were intensified by the increasing friction between the nationalities of the Polish-Russian borderlands prior to 1914. Under these circumstances, Dziewanowski's portentous references (pp. 28, 30-31, 39) to the shifts in "allegiance" to German or Russian Marxism by numerous SDKPiL leaders are woefully misguided. To expect a sense of Polish patriotism from those whose acceptance by Polish society was highly conditional is to expect the illogical as well as the impossible. Nationalism in Eastern Europe, though passionately felt, is often loosely defined, and the sense of marginality that impelled Pilsudski, himself of Lithuanian lineage but of Polish upbringing, to take the helm of Polish nationalism, infused Rosa Luxemburg and her associates with a hatred for nationalism and a burning desire to see it submerged by a great revolutionary upheaval; their gravitation to Russia (especially after 1918) and Germany simply reflected the great significance of these countries for the cause in which they believed. The relative disinterest that Dziewanowski continues to show in the smaller nationalities seriously mars an otherwise excellent account of the interwar period. The paucity of available materials on the Communist subparties of Western Byelorussia and the Western Ukraine partially explains the deficiency (p. viii), but it is nevertheless regrettable that interest should be so tightly focused on Communist policy and internal disputes as virtually to exclude more than casual treatment of the only regions in Poland where communism gained substantial popular support.

It is perhaps equally regrettable that Dziewanowski does not raise the great, urgent, and poignant question with which any study of Polish politics must conclude: what should be the nature of Poland's international policy? The governments of the interwar period unhesitatingly asserted that Poland's substantial population and purported military spirit assured her of a rank just below that of a Great Power,[27] and

[27] See the extraordinary articles by Kazimierz Smogorzewski, a semi-official publicist: "Poland's Foreign Relations," *Slavonic and East European Review*, XVI (April 1938), 558-71, and XVII (July 1938), 105-20.

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frequently acted as if the alliance with France on which Poland's survival depended was more of a burden than a benefit. Groups in the center and the moderate left in turn advocated the fullest cooperation with France and also with Poland's smaller neighbors. The Communists argued that Poland was not a vital interest for the Western democracies, and that Russia alone could and would protect her against Germany, but only if a friendly—i.e., Communist—government existed in Warsaw. To Polish ears, the question is no less pertinent today than it was in 1925 or 1939. The answer given by Gomulka suggests that, with Poland now free from its traditional social inequalities and from racial and religious minorities as well, and with industrialization proceeding apace, the only *positive* role remaining for the Polish Communist Party is the protection, so far as circumstances permit, of Polish national interests against her two great neighbors.

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